People v. Fisher
| Decision Date | 09 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 98903,No. 15,15 |
| Citation | 449 Mich. 441,537 N.W.2d 577 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Ray FISHER, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Defendant Charles Ray Fisher was twice convicted by a jury of first-degree murder of his wife. M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. Both convictions were set aside, the first by the trial judge for alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The second conviction came before this Court following a decision by the Court of Appeals that none of the eleven issues raised by defendant required reversal. This Court decided defendant had been denied a fair trial because of the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the victim-wife's state of mind, peremptorily reversed his conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court for a third trial. 1
Before a third trial, the prosecutor moved for permission to introduce certain oral and written statements of the victim-wife that were relevant to the issue of motive and premeditation. The trial judge granted the motion. 2 The Court of Appeals denied defendant's application for leave to appeal, and denied rehearing. This Court granted leave to appeal solely on the issue whether the trial court erred in granting the people's motion to admit the decedent-wife's oral and written statements with conditions. We affirm the trial court's ruling and hold that the trial court did not err, and that the admission of evidence in accordance with the trial court's ruling was proper.
Defendant argues that this Court rejected in toto the victim-wife's oral and written statements in its earlier ruling. 3 Defendant suggests that in our previous peremptory reversal we intended to close the door to any evidence of the decedent-wife's state of mind. Such an argument misconstrues our order. We stated "defendant-appellant was denied a fair trial by the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the victim's state of mind," and despite limiting instructions the prejudice of the evidence outweighed its probative value. 4
In order to reach the issue whether the trial court erred in granting the people's motion to admit the decedent-wife's oral and written statements with conditions, we must first determine whether or not the "law of the case" doctrine applies. The doctrine as generally stated provides: 5
[I]f an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.
Defendant maintains that our earlier peremptory reversal left no opening for the admission of any evidence, and thus is the law of the case. 6
In the peremptory reversal order we stated:
[W]e have concluded that the defendant-appellant was denied a fair trial by the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the victim's state of mind.... While limiting instructions were given in this case, we believe that under the circumstances there was such a great likelihood of prejudice that the evidence should have been excluded because the relevance of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudice. MRE 403. [Emphasis added. 7
In light of the order and in preparation for the third trial of defendant, the people moved to admit only "relevant, nonhearsay or hearsay excepted evidence that was not substantially more prejudicial than probative, with the further understanding that the trial court give the jury a strongly worded cautionary instruction during preliminary instructions, during trial, and during the court's final charge to the jury...."
This evidence was broken down into nine categories.
1. Statements by decedent-wife regarding her feelings for the defendant.
2. Statements by decedent-wife regarding her feelings about the state of her marriage to the defendant.
3. Statements by decedent-wife about or relationships with men other than the defendant.
4. Statements by decedent-wife about her desire to pursue an education and career in transcultural nursing.
5. Statements about decedent-wife's intent to enter Wayne State University's program in transcultural nursing.
6. Statements about decedent-wife's desire for independence from the defendant.
7. Statements about decedent-wife's insistence on visiting her cousin/lover in Germany.
8. Statements about decedent-wife's intentions to divorce or separate from the defendant during the marriage.
9. Statements made by decedent-wife that directly contradict statements made by the defendant about her to others.
The trial judge ruled that statements, both oral and written, that were shown to be relevant to the issue of motive and the elements of premeditation and deliberation would be admitted with limiting instructions. In granting the motion, the trial judge adopted the people's recommendations, and further ruled that a list of nonhearsay evidence would be prepared by the parties, that objections to entry of the evidence could be made in front of the jury, but that the evidence would be admitted.
Though defendant argues to the contrary, the trial court was acting within its power in so ruling. As we stated in Sokel v. Nickoli, 356 Mich. 460, 464, 97 N.W.2d 1 (1959), "The power of the lower court on remand is to take such action as law and justice may require so long as it is not inconsistent with the judgment of the appellate court." 8 Likewise, the doctrine of the law of the case has no application where a case is remanded without directions to the lower court; in such a case the lower court would enjoy the same power as if it made the ruling itself. Lyon v. Ingham County Circuit Judge, 37 Mich. 377 (1877); Garwood v. Burton, 274 Mich. 219, 222, 264 N.W. 349 (1936).
Though clearly this Court felt some evidence of the victim's state of mind was inadmissible hearsay, more prejudicial than probative, and not cured by limiting instructions, defendant's position that all of the proffered evidence in categories 1 to 9 was meant to be excluded is not justified. To sanction such a result would not further the causes of justice. As stated in Taines v. Munson, 42 Mich.App. 256, 259-260, 201 N.W.2d 685 (1972):
To straightjacket proceedings subsequent to a decision on a case by an appellate court by making assumptions regarding the disposition of arguments which the appellate court did not see fit to consider is not, in our opinion, the wisest of policies.
Leave to appeal was granted in this case to resolve the apparent ambiguity surrounding this Court's previous order.
In granting leave, we likewise asked the parties to "be as specific as possible in identifying and discussing the testimony and documents they contend should be admitted into or excluded from evidence, as the case may be." 445 Mich. 945, 521 N.W.2d 611 (1994). This the parties did not do. 9
Within the nine discrete categories of evidence sought to be admitted are literally hundreds of proposed exhibits, many of which were admitted during the second trial of sixteen days' duration. The trial judge stated that the parties should develop a list of oral or written statements made by the victim that were known to the defendant. The court ruled that these statements were not hearsay and that it would admit those statements that are especially relevant to the issues of motive and the elements of premeditation and deliberation. The trial court also ruled that it would also admit certain statements made by the victim that were not known to the defendant:
The people's intent to present certain other material not known to the Defendant but which can be properly considered to be admissible as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence as to the existence and extent of marital discord which is admissible as proof of a motive for Defendant to kill his wife will also be permitted at the trial. That material described on page 29 Sec. II and thereafter will be allowed it being the impression of the court that they are not violative of the Supreme Court's ruling. 2
We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court. It is well accepted that evidence that demonstrates an individual's state of mind will not be precluded by the hearsay rule. 10 Several legal scholars have commented on the nonhearsay use of such evidence:
Wherever an utterance is offered [into] evidence [for] the state of mind which ensued in another person in consequence of the utterance, it is obvious that no assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of it, and the utterance is therefore admissible, so far as the hearsay rule is concerned. [6 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev.), § 1789, p. 314 (emphasis added).]
Likewise, in 4 Weinstein, Evidence, p 801(c), pp. 801-94 to 801-96:
An utterance or a writing may be admitted to show the effect on the hearer or reader when this effect is relevant. The policies underlying the hearsay rule do not apply because the utterance is not being offered to prove the truth or falsity of the matter asserted.
Specifically, statements by murder victims regarding their plans and feelings, have been admitted as hearsay exceptions in a number of jurisdictions. In United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 737-739 (CA 3, 1989), cert. den. 494 U.S. 1058, 110 S.Ct. 1528, 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990), a statement by the victim's wife that she intended to move out of the apartment and separate from the defendant-husband was found admissible to show marital discord and motive. Likewise, in Whitmire v. State, 789 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.App.1990),...
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...intent or plan to meet with defendant on the night of her murder falls within the plain meaning of the rule. In People v. Fisher, 449 Mich. 441, 450, 537 N.W.2d 577 (1995), our Supreme Court admitted evidence of several statements made by a murder victim. Although the victim's state of mind......
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