People v. Flaherty

• Decision Date: 20 April 1900
• Citation: People v. Flaherty, 162 N.Y. 532, 57 N.E. 73 (N.Y. 1900)
• Parties: PEOPLE v. FLAHERTY.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

162 N.Y. 532

57 N.E. 73

PEOPLE

v.FLAHERTY.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 20, 1900.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Fourth department.

Charles Flaherty was convicted of having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 16 years, not his wife. From a judgment of the appellate division (50 N. Y. Supp. 574), affirming the judgment of conviction, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Charles Flaherty, in pro. per.

William Carter, for the People.

PARKER, C. J.

By the judgment under review, Charles Flaherty was convicted of the crime of an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife while under the age of 16 years. His contention in this court is that errors, greatly prejudicial to him, were committed in the progress of the trial, and the result of our investigation of the record has induced the conclusion that his contention is well founded. Some of the errors we shall now point out.

In the first place, the safeguards that the statute provides for the purpose of assuring a defendant in a criminal trial a fair and impartial jury were not fully observed. While the law is not so unreasonable as to require the exclusion from the jury box of all persons who have formed an opinion touching the guilt or innocence of the defendant on trial, it nevertheless treats the existence of such an opinion as establishing prima facie that the juror is disqualified, and the statute (Code Cr. Proc. § 376) then steps in and provides a method by which this prima facie disqualification may be overborne, i. e. the juror must ‘declare on oath that he believes that such opinion or impression will not influence his verdict, and that he can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence, and the court is satisfied that he does not entertain such a present opinion or impression as would influence his verdict.’ But, as we have recently held in People v. Wilmarth, 156 N. Y. 566, 51 N. E. 277, if the juror, who is prima facie disqualified by his opinion, fails to make such a declaration as the statute provides, his acceptance as a juror by the trial court constitutes error of law, which may be reviewed in this court, where it appears that the defendant has been prejudiced thereby.

George H. Snyder, a man of considerable intelligence, was examined as to his qualifications for a juror after the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges, and, in answer to inquiries put to him, said, among other things: ‘I formed my opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Father Flaherty from the fact that he was removed from his church by the bishop. He was guilty perhaps, or else would not have done what they did do. That is one reason. There might be various things that I formed my opinion on. That was the most important. * * * This opinion I formed I have been satisfied was right from the time I formed it. It is formed largely upon the action of the bishop, as I understand that. I don't know whether the action of the bishop could be investigated on this trial or not. * * * The action of the bishop proved or disproved, I would naturally be influenced by that action. * * * Possibly it may be he would not only have to prove he was not guilty, but prove in some way facts aside from that with regard to the bishop thinking that he was guilty.’ His examination covers several pages of the record, but that which we have quoted is sufficient to establish, to say the least, that the juror had such an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant as constituted prima facie a disqualification; and it became necessary, therefore, to call for the ‘belief’ of the juror upon the two subjects referred to in the part of the section of the Code that we have quoted, namely, whether the influence or impression which the juror had would influence his verdict, and whether he could render an impartial verdict according to the evidence. But, after all this lengthy examination of the juror had ended, no such question was put to him by the prosecuting attorney. Instead, the court at once decided that the juror was qualified, and, from what the court said in announcing its decision of the matter, it would appear that the court was under the impression that some time during the examination an attempt had been made to bring the juror within the provisions of the statute. Perhaps, indeed, that may have been what the district attorney had in mind when on the direct examination of the juror this answer from him was obtained: ‘Notwithstanding that opinion, I could render a fair and impartial verdict upon the evidence as it shall be offered in this case.’ It will be observed that this answer is not at all in compliance with the statute. By it the juror did not declare on oath that he believed that such opinion or impression would not influence his verdict; hence the statute was not satisfied, either as to form or substance. In overruling the challenge, therefore, the court erred to the prejudice of the defendant, who, having exhausted his peremptory challenges, was compelled to allow Snyder to sit as a juror, although, in addition to his admitted opinion, his relations were so friendly with one Maurice Noonan, with whom the prosecutrix lived, and who personally took so great an interest, and so far exerted himself in the prosecution of the defendant, as to render it especially desirable to the defendant that he should not sit.

The juror Henry Ford was excluded from the jury box by the exercise of the last of defendant's peremptory challenges. Had the defendant not been compelled to use it in excluding Ford, it would have been available to him to keep Snyder out of the jury box; but he was compelled to use it because the court refused to sustain his challenge to Ford on the ground of actual bias. Ford said, in answer to defendant's counsel: ‘I have a pretty strong opinion now, and it would take sufficient evidence, of course, to change my mind. I am perfectly satisfied with my present opinion as correct. In hearing all the evidence introduced in this case, I would have in my mind my present opinion and information, and compare them, I suppose, as they came along, with what I understood about the matter. * * * I have a definite, settled, and satisfactory opinion whether this girl is telling the truth or not. I hold the same opinion yet. I have not had anything to change it since.’ What has already been quoted sufficiently establishes that the juror had an opinion touching the guilt or innocence of the defendant. I pass over the succeeding pages of his examination, to the end of it, where may be found the one question during his examination which was apparently intended to meet the requirements of the Code. That question was put by the court, and was as follows: ‘Q. Could you, in this case, devest yourself of any opinion you entertain, and render a fair and impartial verdict upon the evidence brought out on the trial here? A. I think I could. Q. Could you do it? A. Yes, sir. The Court: The juror is qualified.’ So the court doubtless thought; but he was not legally qualified, because the question put to him did not comply with the terms of the statute. The court did not ask the juror whether he believed that the opinion or impression that he had would not influence his verdict.Such an inquiry the statute requires in terms, and for the reasons given in People v. Wilmarth, supra, which we do not deem it necessary to again present, it constitutes a most important feature of the statute's provisions, and its omission leaves the prima facie disqualification incident to an existing opinion in full effect. It was error, therefore, for the court to overrule the defendant's challenge, and the result was that he was obliged to use his last peremptory challenge in order to exclude Ford from the jury box.

As these errors call for a reversal of the judgment, we might not consider the case further, were it not that the trial was conducted in distinct violation of the rights of the defendant in most important respects, and, as the same course was pursued on the former trial to a certain extent, it seems to be our duty to guard against the repetition on the next trial of some errors most damaging in effect, which the defendant has had to meet on the previous trials. The indictment charges the defendant with the crime of an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, under the age of 16 years, and alleges, in due form, that the act constituting the crime was committed on the 1st day of July, 1892. The complainant says that the defendant had sexual intercourse with her on seven different occasions prior to her becoming of the age of 16 years. Notwithstanding the fact that, if all of said acts were committed, they constituted seven distinct crimes, for only one of which defendant was or could have been charged in this indictment, the people were permitted on the former trial to prove all of these acts, and the jury authorized to find the defendant guilty, provided they found he had committed any one of them. On the trial which is the subject of this review the court refused to follow the precedent thus set for it in one respect only,-it did hold finally that the defendant could be convicted for only one offense; but that decision did not go far enough, as we shall see, nor was it made at the time that it should have been. The defendant was represented by skilled counsel, who, although having but a very short time for the preparation of the case, fully appreciated the difficulties that had unjustly been placed upon the defendant on the former trial to defend against seven distinct crimes where but one was or could have been charged, and so, at the very opening of the trial, by request to the court, and also to the district attorney in...