People v. Flores

• Decision Date: 12 August 2019
• Docket Number: G055861
• Citation: People v. Flores, 38 Cal.App.5th 617, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 236 (Cal. App. 2019)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Antonino FLORES, Defendant and Appellant.

38 Cal.App.5th 617

251 Cal.Rptr.3d 236

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Antonino FLORES, Defendant and Appellant.

G055861

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

Filed August 12, 2019

Patrick Dudley, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Yvette M. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

THOMPSON, J.

Following the partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, defendant Antonino Flores pleaded guilty to one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11378 ). The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted defendant probation under various terms and conditions.

Defendant's sole contention on appeal is the court erred by not granting his motion to suppress in its entirety. We agree and reverse the judgment and remand with directions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Evidence Presented

One October day, a seven-member team of Huntington Beach police officers went to an alleyway in a residential area claimed by the "Looney Tunes Crew," also known as the "LTK" street gang. LTK "usually me[t]" and "congregate[d]" in this alley. Police went there as part of a "continuing ... investigation" into LTK, to "identify[ ] and contact[ ]" individuals regarding recent criminal activity, and to ascertain possible gang membership or association of those in the area. There had been multiple complaints regarding gang activity in the area, including "several shootings ... over the past several months," and "drug sales ... in the alley."¹ There were no reports of a specific crime or of gang activity this day and time.

Officers drove to the area in unmarked cars, although they wore clearly marked police raid vests or jackets. They "came up with a plan to approach [the members of LTK] on both sides because we knew as soon as they see police cars they run." The team approached on foot from opposite ends with a goal to "hopefully detain them before they run."

Stationed adjacent to one end of the alley, Sergeant Oscar Garcia saw "people ... running from the alley" toward him and Detective Daniel Quidort. Among them, Garcia recognized defendant from "prior contacts dealing with the LTK gang," and suspected he "might be involved in criminal activity, past, present, or taking place at that time." Such activity could be "[e]ither gang activity or drug sales because of the complaints we had received" "within days, weeks, months."

On cross-examination, Garcia explained defendant was singled out because "we focused on [him] as he was coming towards us and we were already detaining him." He was also "the closest one we could get." Garcia's suspicion defendant was involved in their current investigation was also based on "[t]he fact that he ran from an area where we know there's criminal activity taking place." There was no evidence of criminal activity then taking place.

Quidort testified he saw defendant "making his way rather quickly" through a residential walkway between the alley and where he and Garcia were located. Quidort made eye contact, and defendant slowed to a "brisk walk," and then to a "quick pace." When defendant was about five to ten feet from the officers, Quidort made contact. Quidort told defendant to sit down on a step next to the sidewalk, and he immediately complied without incident.² At this point, Quidort did not know who defendant was or anything about him, including any LTK connection. Only after defendant was seated did Garcia tell Quidort who defendant was and that he believed defendant was a member of LTK.

Garcia acknowledged that when Quidort seated defendant on the step, he was not "a suspect in a particular crime," and was not "in the process of committing some crime." Similarly, Garcia had no information defendant had committed a crime "in the recent past [Garcia] wanted to investigate him for," or "about a crime [Garcia] believed he was about to commit."

There is no evidence defendant was patted down for weapons. He was not handcuffed or placed under arrest, and neither Garcia nor Quidort had his weapon drawn.

Garcia left the scene to check on officers who were detaining other individuals nearby, momentarily leaving defendant with Quidort. While engaging in "some small talk" with defendant, Quidort noticed a bulge in defendant's sock. Quidort radioed Garcia and asked him to come back. When Garcia returned, Quidort asked defendant what he had in his sock. Defendant said it was "meth." Quidort asked defendant to remove it from his sock, and he complied, handing the package over to Quidort. Quidort recognized the package, which contained four bindles of approximately equal weight, as methamphetamine packaged for sale.

Garcia knew defendant shared an apartment with a brother, an LTK member who was on probation for narcotics sales and subject to warrantless searches and seizures. Garcia asked defendant if he had anything illegal at home. Defendant did not answer, but he agreed to go back to the apartment. He did not consent to have it searched. Defendant said he did not want anyone else to get into trouble and did not want his parents to find out about the drugs he had given to Quidort. Defendant, Garcia, and Quidort then walked to defendant's nearby apartment. Again, defendant was not handcuffed and was not under formal arrest during this short walk.

Garcia knocked on the door, and once he confirmed the probationer brother was at home, the officers entered. Defendant did not give consent either to the entry or to any subsequent search inside.

Detective John Topartzer soon joined the group at the apartment and, at Garcia's request, defendant directed the officers to his bedroom, which he shared with a different, nonprobationer, brother. Garcia asked defendant if he had anything illegal in his room, and defendant responded by again saying that he did not want to get anyone in trouble. Defendant then walked over to a dresser drawer and pulled out a shirt containing four small baggies of suspected methamphetamine.

Topartzer arrested defendant for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. He was transported to jail, where Topartzer informed him of his Miranda³ rights. Defendant admitted to Topartzer that he was selling methamphetamine in order to make money, and stated the methamphetamine "he had on him" was for sale.

The Trial Court's Ruling

The court found the initial contact between defendant, Garcia, and Quidort was a detention, but was supported by reasonable suspicion. Recognizing that flight alone cannot support a lawful detention, the court found additional supporting facts were present, including the previous citizen complaints regarding crime in the alley—specifically drug sales, assaults, and "gang-related activity." The court also found defendant had engaged in "headlong flight" from the group of people congregating in the alley as soon as police arrived. "[W]hen you put all of that together there was articulable suspicion to detain [defendant] and to see if he either had drugs on him or some kind of a weapon that can be used in an assault." "[T]his ... is different than a situation where this person is alone. He's with that group that they expect to find in that alley. That's the gang hangout. That's where they've gotten the complaints, and then he bolts. I think when you put all of that together it ... does constitute articulable suspicion to stop him." Relying on Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 ( Wardlow ), the court found defendant's unprovoked headlong flight from a high crime area upon seeing police provided legal cause for an investigatory detention. Based on this finding, the court concluded the drugs in defendant's sock and any curbside statements should not be suppressed.

The court granted the suppression motion with respect to the evidence seized at defendant's apartment, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove express or implied consent to either enter defendant's room or to search it. It concluded the search could not be justified as a probation search because defendant did not share his room with his probationer brother. The People do not contest this ruling on appeal.

Subsequently, the court received additional briefing and testimony regarding the admissibility of defendant's jailhouse statements to Topartzer. The court considered whether the statements had been obtained by an exploitation of the illegality of the residential search or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of that search. The court determined "[t]he same questions would have been asked if [defendant] had simply been arrested after the drugs were found in his sock." It also noted detectives did not confront defendant with the illegally seized evidence, opining "this might be different if at the interview room ... all eight baggies were lined up and then [defendant] was asked the same question. Here there's a break .... He is present to see that the other baggies are found, and then he's taken to the police station and Mirandized and makes his statement." The court declined to suppress the jailhouse statements, ruling that the illegal search of the residence did not induce defendant's later admissions at the jail.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

Defendant, as the moving party, had the initial burden of proving a warrantless search or seizure occurred. ( People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127-128, 136, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52.) There was no warrant in this case, so the burden shifted to the prosecution to show any warrantless searches or seizures were justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Id. at pp. 130, 136-137, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52.) "[T]he controlling...