People v. Flynn
| Decision Date | 22 March 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 33620,33620 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Homer D. FLYNN et al., Plaintiffs in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Paul W. Schnake, Aurora, for plaintiffs in error.
Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and John C. Friedland, State's Atty., Elgin (Fred G. Leach, Decatur, Edwin A. Strugala, Chicago, and John S. Petersen, Aurora, of counsel), for the People.
Plaintiffs in error, Homer D. Flynn and James Yoakum, hereinafter referred to as defendants, were indicted in the circuit court of Kane County for the crime of armed robbery. After trial by jury, verdicts were returned finding them guilty as charged, and judgment was entered sentencing Flynn to the penitentiary for a term not less than two nor more than five years, and Yoakum for a term not less than eight nor more than twenty years. Defendants prosecute this writ of error to review the proceedings.
No question is presented concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, and it need not be related here. It is contended, first, that the court erred in admitting incompetent and prejudicial evidence; and second, that defendant Yoakum was denied due process of law by reason of being held in jail for eighteen days before being formally charged with a crime, during ten days of which he was not permitted to see either his family or his counsel.
We must consider, at the outset, the State's contention that since defendants' motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were orally presented, and nothing appears of record to show the grounds urged in support thereof, the objections cannot be considered on review. It is not disputed that defendants failed to file written motions for new trial or in arrest of judgment, and the record does not disclose any specific grounds presented to the trial court in support of their oral motions. Neither does the record show, however, any request by the prosecutor that defendants specify their grounds in writing. In People v. Jankowski, 391 Ill. 298, 63 N.E.2d 362, relied upon by the State, it was held that since 1933 the requirement that motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment be in writing is a mandatory one in criminal cases; that the legislature, by the 1933 amendment to section 17 of division XIII of the Criminal Code, intended to require defendants in criminal cases to apprise the trial court in writing of all grounds for a new trial or for arrest of judgment, and that failure to do so precludes assigning as error any point not so specified. We deem it appropriate here to re-examine the basis for this holding, and to inquire whether it represents a reasonable and just construction of the statute.
The amendment in question provides merely that 'all motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment shall be made in writing.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 38, par. 747.) There is nothing in the bare language of this amendment from which we can reasonably infer a legislative intent to change or alter the rule existing at the time of its passage, or to prescribe the consequences of a failure to comply. Prior to 1933 the rule, in both civil and criminal cases, required the moving party to file his points in writing, particularly specifying the grounds of his motion. However, if a verbal motion was made without objection, the party could avail himself of any cause for a new trial which might appear in the record. If the party filed a written motion specifying the grounds, then he would, of course, be confined on review to the reasons specified in the trial court, and would be held to have waived all causes for a new trial not set forth in writing. People v. Cohen, 352 Ill. 380, 185 N.E. 608, 88 A.L.R. 481; Anderson v. Karstens, 297 Ill. 76, 130 N.E. 338; Bromley v. People, 150 Ill. 297, 37 N.E. 209; Ottawa, Oswego & Fox River Valley Railroad Co. v. McMath, 91 Ill. 104.
The 1933 amendment substantially restated the requirement of writing which had theretofore appeared in section 77 of the Practice Act of 1907, governing procedure in both criminal and civil cases. Nothing in its language purports to change the character or incidents of the requirement, and the holding in the Jankowski case to the contrary is not supported by sound reasons. If the legislature desired to change the established consequences of a failure to comply, and intended that an oral motion without objection should constitute a waiver, on review, of all grounds for a new trial, it would have said so by specific provision. It would not have left such a change to be inferred from a mere absence of provisions to the contrary. We think the decision on this point, made in the Jankowski case, was wrong; and that case, in so far as such holding is concerned, is hereby overruled.
We think the better rule to be that applied in Ottawa, Oswego & Fox River Valley Railroad Co. v. McMath, 91 Ill. 104, wherein a question of legislative intent similar to that...
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People v. Enoch, 59390
...... Page 1131 . [119 Ill.Dec. 272] requirement that the motion for a new trial be in writing and specify the grounds is based on the concept of waiver. Since the State failed to object to the oral motion, it has waived the requirements of the statute. (People v. Flynn (1956), 8 Ill.2d 116, 118-20, 133 N.E.2d 257.) However, when no motion for a new trial is made, the first opportunity that the State has to object to the defendant's failure to comply with the statute is when the defendant raises issues on appeal. . In People v. Irwin (1965), 32 ......
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