People v. Fonda

• Decision Date: 15 July 1886
• Citation: 62 Mich. 401,29 N.W. 26
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. FONDA.

29 N.W. 26

62 Mich. 401

PEOPLE v. FONDA.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 15, 1886

Error to St. Joseph.

The Attorney General, for the People.

Edwin F. Conely, Orris P. Coffinberry, and Chamberlain & Guise, for defendant and appellant.

SHERWOOD J.

The complaint against the respondent in this case is criminal and was made by Charles W. Cond, president of the Farmers' National Bank of Constantine, in behalf of the bank, for the larceny and embezzlement of its funds, while the respondent was engaged in its employment as clerk or servant. The Farmers' National Bank of Constantine, at the time the alleged crime was committed, was "an incorporated banking institution, organized and existing under the laws of the United States providing for the creation of national banking associations."

The information against respondent contains nine counts, upon two of which (the third and fourth,) he was tried and convicted of the offense stated therein, in the St. Joseph circuit, at the last October term, and was, upon such conviction sentenced to imprisonment at Jackson for the period of three years and six months. The case is now before us for review on error. The counts upon which the conviction was had will be found in the margin. ^[1]

The statute under which the conviction was had at the circuit reads as follows: "If any officer, agent, clerk, or servant of any incorporated company, or of any city township, incorporated town or village, school-district, or other public or municipal corporation; or if any clerk, agent, or servant of any private persons, or of a copartnership, except apprentices, and other persons under the age of sixteen years,--shall embezzle, or fraudulently dispose of, or convert to his own use, or shall take or secrete, with intent to embezzle, and to convert to his own use, without the consent of his employer or master, any money or other property of another, which shall have come to his possession, or shall be under his charge, by virtue of such office or employment, he shall be deemed by so doing to have committed the crime of larceny." How.St. � 9151.

This statute was passed by the legislature prior to the national banking system, and could not, therefore, have special reference to the national legislation creating that system, however clearly the crime of the respondent may be described in the statute. Rev.St.1838, p. 630, � 27; Rev.St.1846, p. 666, � 29. At the time the alleged act of embezzlement was committed the respondent was in the bank, and in its service, as clerk.

The question raised in this case is: The federal government having declared the act charged against this respondent a criminal offense, and provided for the apprehension, trial, and conviction of the offender under its laws, had the state court any jurisdiction, concurrent or otherwise, to deal with the respondent under the state statute making the same act criminal, and providing for its punishment? The learned counsel for the respondent claim that the jurisdiction of the federal court in the case is complete and exclusive; that the offense charged in the information is for the violation of a federal law; and that the punishment therefor has become fixed and established, and the whole subject has been covered by the legislation of congress.

The constitution of the United States provides as follows: "This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Const.U.S. art. 6.

The statute passed by congress punishing the offense charged in the information is as follows: "Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of any association, who embezzles, abstracts, or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds, or credits of the association; or who, without authority from the directors, issues or puts in circulation any of the notes of the association, or who, without such authority, issues or puts forth any certificate of deposit, draws any order or bill of exchange, makes any acceptance, signs any note, bond, draft, bill of exchange, mortgage, judgment, or decree; or who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the association, with intent, in either case, to injure or defraud the association, or any other company, body politic or corporate, or any individual person, or to deceive any officer of the association, or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association; and every person who, with like intent, aids or abets any officer, clerk, or agent in any violation of this section,--shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not less than five years, nor more than ten."

An examination of this statute, I think, must convince any one that the offense described in this information is clearly defined therein, and falls within the scope of the act, and within the jurisdiction of the federal court, and, if that jurisdiction is exclusive in the case, but little remains to be said,--if it is, the conviction cannot be maintained.

Is the jurisdiction concurrent with that of the state? is the only remaining question. Section 711 of chapter 12 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that "the jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States in the cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states. First, of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States." The other clauses of the section need not be given, as none of them relate to criminal jurisdiction. Congress, by law, created the national banking system, and provided for their internal workings, and prescribed a punishment for the offenses charged against the respondent. Rev.St.U.S. tit. 62.

It seems to me, clearly, the case is one falling within the paragraph of section 711 above quoted, and that by the federal law itself the jurisdiction of the state is expressly excluded. Chancellor KENT, in his Commentaries, in concluding his discussion of the matter, says: "In judicial matters the concurrent jurisdiction of the state tribunals depends altogether upon the pleasure of congress, and may be...