People v. Ford

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SIMONS; KAYE
• Citation: 86 N.Y.2d 397,633 N.Y.S.2d 270,657 N.E.2d 265
• Parties: , 657 N.E.2d 265 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rudolph FORD, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 24 October 1995

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633 N.Y.S.2d 270 86 N.Y.2d 397, 657 N.E.2d 265 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Rudolph FORD, Appellant. Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 24, 1995.

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[86 N.Y.2d 399] [657 N.E.2d 266] Beldock Levine & Hoffman, New York City (Melvin L. Wulf, Peter A. Perlman and Karen Dippold, of counsel), David Scheinfeld, Noah Simeon Scheinfeld and Robert Cini, for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Seth M. Lieberman, Roseann B. MacKechnie and Richard T. Faughnan, of counsel), for respondent.

[86 N.Y.2d 400] Jonathan E. Gradess and Stacy Wolf, Albany, for New York State Defenders Association, amicus curiae.

[86 N.Y.2d 401] Lucas Guttentag, Judy Rabinovitz and Arthur Eisenberg, New York City, for American Civil Liberties Union and others, amici curiae.

Stern & Elkind, Denver (Kenneth H. Stern of the Colorado Bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), Claudia Slovinsky, New York City, and Lory Rosenberg, Washington DC, of the District of Columbia Bar, admitted pro hac vice, for American Immigration Lawyers Association and others, amici curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

This appeal raises the question whether Trial Judges or defense counsel are under a

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[657 N.E.2d 267] duty to warn defendants of the possible deportation consequences before entering a guilty plea. We conclude that there is no such duty, and we therefore affirm.

[86 N.Y.2d 402] I

On September 28, 1990, 19-year-old defendant Rudolph Ford was showing a gun to his girlfriend, Alicia Byron. Believing he had removed the bullets, defendant put the gun to her head and pulled the trigger. The gun discharged, and Byron was killed instantly. Defendant was indicted for manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15[1], criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03), and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law § 265.02[4]. With the advice of counsel, defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the second degree in full satisfaction of the indictment and was sentenced to two to six years in prison. After serving the minimum sentence, he was paroled.

Defendant is a documented legal alien from Jamaica and, following his release, the Immigration and Nationalization Service instituted proceedings for his deportation based upon his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (see, 8 U.S.C. § 1251[a][2][A][i] ).

Consequently, defendant moved in the Supreme Court for an order changing the manslaughter judgment to a judgment convicting him of criminally negligent homicide. The court granted the motion to the extent of vacating his plea and directing a new trial. It held that "where the facts surrounding the episode to which defendant pleads would not suggest to a reasonable person that the plea involves an admission of grossly immoral activity then, in those rare cases, the defendant should be told that even though what he describes to the court does not involve moral turpitude, he may nevertheless be deported, if he pleads guilty." (157 Misc.2d 668, 671, 597 N.Y.S.2d 882.) The Appellate Division, construing defendant's motion as one to vacate the plea pursuant to CPL 440.10, reversed Supreme Court's order and reinstated the judgment of conviction. It held that under the doctrine of collateral consequences the court was not obligated to warn defendant of possible deportation before accepting his plea and that the failure of counsel to advise his client of that possibility before permitting him to plead did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (see, People v. Ford, 205 A.D.2d 798, 613 N.Y.S.2d 688).

II

A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of [86 N.Y.2d 403] what the plea connotes and its consequences (People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 19, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274). The court is not required to engage in any particular litany when allocuting the defendant, but due process requires that the record must be clear that "the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant" (North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, supra; see also, People v. Moissett, 76 N.Y.2d 909, 910-911, 563...