People v. Forester

• Decision Date: 10 May 2022
• Docket Number: D078912
• Citation: 78 Cal.App.5th 447,293 Cal.Rptr.3d 728
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mark FORESTER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

78 Cal.App.5th 447

293 Cal.Rptr.3d 728

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Mark FORESTER, Defendant and Appellant.

D078912

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed May 10, 2022

Jeffrey S. Kross, Oakland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Junichi P. Semitsu, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

McCONNELL, P. J.

IINTRODUCTION

Defendant Mark Forester pleaded guilty to one count of felony stalking and was found guilty of five counts of disobeying a domestic violence restraining order. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Forester on felony probation for a period of three years.¹

Forester appeals the judgment and contends Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a) precluded the court from imposing a probation term in excess of two years.² Section 1203.1, subdivision (a) places a two-year limitation on probation terms for most felony offenses.

The People argue an exception to the two-year felony probation limitation applies because Forester was convicted of "an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions." ( § 1203.1, subd. (l )(1).) They assert Forester was convicted of an offense with a specific probation length because he stalked a victim of domestic violence within the meaning of section 1203.097. Section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(1) mandates "[a] minimum period of probation of 36 months" when a person is placed on probation for perpetrating a crime against a victim of domestic violence.

We agree with the People. Because Forester was found guilty of stalking a victim of domestic violence, the two-year felony probation limitation in section 1203.1, subdivision (a) does not apply.

The judgment is affirmed.

IIBACKGROUND

H.F. is Forester's ex-wife and the mother of his child. In January 2020, H.F. obtained a domestic violence restraining order against Forester after he exhibited bouts of anger and threatened physical violence against her. Thereafter, Forester sent dozens of disturbing and threatening communications to H.F. and her friend.

Forester was charged by information with one count of stalking with a court order in effect ( § 646.9, subd. (b) ; count 1) and five misdemeanor counts of disobeying a court order ( § 273.6, subd. (a) ; counts 2–6). A jury found Forester guilty of the charges of disobeying a court order. However, it was unable to reach a verdict on the stalking charge and a mistrial was declared as to that charge.

After trial, Forester pleaded guilty to felony stalking in violation of section 646.9, subdivision (a), a lesser included offense of stalking with a court order in effect, and the court dismissed the greater offense charged in the information. As part of the plea agreement, Forester admitted he "willfully [and] malicously [sic] harassed [H.F.] [and] made a credible threat to her with the intent to place her in reasonable fear for her safety."

The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Forester on probation for three years. When selecting three years as the probation term, the court opined the two-year felony probation limitation in section 1203.1, subdivision (a) was inapplicable because it "does not apply to domestic violence related charges." Forester was released from custody for time served.

Forester appeals the judgment and challenges his three-year probation term.

IIIDISCUSSION

AAssembly Bill No. 1950

Effective January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1203.1 to limit the maximum probation term that may be imposed for most felony offenses. Prior to the effective date of the legislation, a court could impose felony probation for a period "not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence," except "where the maximum possible term of the sentence [was] five years or less," in which case probation could "continue for not over five years."

(Former § 1203.1, subd. (a).) As amended, section 1203.1 now states that felony probation "may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years."³ ( § 1203.1, subd. (a).)

There are exceptions to this general rule. The exception of relevance to this appeal provides that the two-year felony probation limitation set forth in section 1203.1, subdivision (a) "shall not apply to: [¶] ... an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions." ( § 1203.1, subd. (l )(1) ; see also ibid. [the felony probation limitation does not apply to violent felonies listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c) ]; id. , subd. (l )(2) [the felony probation limitation does not apply to certain crimes involving grand theft, embezzlement, or making false financial statements].)

BThe Parties' Arguments

Forester was convicted of felony stalking. He claims the general two-year felony probation limitation applies, and the above-referenced exception is inapposite, because the felony stalking statute ( § 646.9, subd. (a) ) does not include a specific probation length within its provisions.⁴

The People respond that Forester was not merely convicted of felony stalking. Rather, he was convicted of stalking a victim of domestic violence within the meaning of section 1203.097. The People assert the above-referenced exception to the two-year felony probation limitation applies because section 1203.097 (titled "Terms of probation for crimes of domestic violence") requires a specific minimum term of probation for any probationer who committed a crime against a victim of domestic violence.

Section 1203.097 provides in relevant part as follows: "If a person is granted probation for a crime in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the terms of probation shall include all of the following: [¶] (1) A minimum period of probation of 36 months, which may include a period of summary probation as appropriate." ( § 1203.097, subd. (a)(1).)⁵ Section 1203.097 does not only apply when a probationer commits the substantive offense of domestic violence. Instead, it "applies to any person placed on probation for a crime if the underlying facts of the case involve domestic violence, even if the statute defining the crime does not specifically refer to domestic violence." ( People v. Cates (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 545, 548, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 919 ; see People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 119, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 [stalking victim "qualified for protection under section 1203.097, as both a former girlfriend of defendant's and the mother of his child"].)

CThe Two-Year Felony Probation Limitation Does Not Apply When a Defendant Is Convicted of Stalking a Domestic Violence Victim

To determine whether the two-year felony probation limitation applies to a defendant like Forester, who has been convicted of stalking a victim of domestic violence, we must employ the principles of statutory interpretation.

" ‘ " ‘ "When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task ... is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ " ’ " ’ " ( Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 662, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 742, 502 P.3d 389.) " ‘In the end, we " ‘must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ " ’ " ( In re M.B. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1477, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 359.)

Consistent with these principles of statutory interpretation, we begin our analysis with the relevant statutory language— section 1203.1, subdivisions (a) and (l )(1). These provisions state that felony probation "may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years," ( § 1203.1, subd. (a) )–unless the defendant is convicted of "an offense that includes specific probation lengths within its provisions" ( § 1203.1, subd. (l )(1) ).

The defendant suggests the word "offense," as used in section 1203.1, subdivision (l )(1), refers strictly to the statute or statutes defining the substantive elements of a crime. By contrast, the People urge us to interpret "offense" more expansively. They argue "offense" encompasses not only the statute or statutes defining the elements of a crime, but also other statutes—such as penalty provisions—that apply in a given case. We conclude the People's interpretation of section 1203.1, subdivision (l )(1) is the more reasonable interpretation of the statutory language at issue and, more importantly, the one our Legislature intended.

The elements of a crime and the penalties attendant to the commission of a crime are, of course, distinct concepts from one another. But both are necessary components of an offense. Section 15 makes this clear, as it defines a "public offense" as "an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon conviction, ... punishment [ ]...." (Italics added.) Our case law reinforces the longstanding notion that it is the combination of a prohibited act and a punishment, in tandem, that compose an offense. ( People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, 281, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 239 ["for a crime to exist, there must...