People v. Fowler

• Decision Date: 20 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34800,34800
• Citation: People v. Fowler, 151 N.E.2d 324, 14 Ill.2d 252 (Ill. 1958)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Jimmie Ray FOWLER, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 324

151 N.E.2d 324

14 Ill.2d 252

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Jimmie Ray FOWLER, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 34800.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1958.

Angelo N. Gaziano and Anthony R. Fabiano, Rockford, for plaintiffs in error.

John B. Anderson, State's Atty., Rockford, for defendant in error.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

On pleas of guilty in the circuit court of Winnebago County, Jimmie Ray Fowler, 15 years of age, and William V. Powell, 16 years old, were convicted of armed robbery. After a hearing at which proof of their ages was made, their petitions for release on probation were denied, and on January 23, 1958, each was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than two nor more than seven years. On February 4, each defendant filed a motion to vacate the sentence. A hearing thereon was had February 6, and an order was entered denying the motion. They were thereafter granted leave to file an original petition for mandamus in this court, seeking to expunge the order sentencing them to the penitentiary. Pursuant to oral stipulation the cause has been taken as on writ of error, and no question remains as to the propriety of the remedy of mandamus.

Defendants insist that under the provisions of section 3 of the Sentence and Parole Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 38, par. 803), the trial judge had a mandatory duty to commit them to the Illinois Youth Commission, and that the sentence to the penitentiary was contrary to law and void. Section 1 enumerates the crimes of misprision of treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape and kidnapping, and provides that where a person is found guilty of any such crime the jury shall fix the punishment, or if the trial is by the court without a jury the court shall fix a definite term of imprisonment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 38, par 801.) The first sentence of section 3 reads as follows: 'Except for the crimes enumerated in Section 1 of this Act, every person, male or female, over ten years of age, who shall be adjudged guilty of felony, or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or by imprisonment either in the penitentiary or jail, and as to whom the court shall not have assessed the jail sentence, shall in all cases, except as herein otherwise provided in clauses one and two, be sentenced to the penitentiary, and the court imposing sentence shall fix the minimum and maximum limits or duration of imprisonment.' (Emphasis supplied.) By clause 1 of said section it is required, in so far as is relevant here, that 'Every male person under the age of 17 years adjudged guilty after December 31, 1953, of any offense enumerated in this Section shall be committed to the Youth Commission instead of the penitentary.' Section 3 provides further that: 'Every commitment to the Youth Commission pursuant to Clause 1 or Clause 2 of this Section shall be a general commitment to the Youth Commission, subject to placement, transfer, parole, and discharge by the Youth Commission in accordance with the Youth Commission Act, enacted by the Sixty-eighth General Assembly, and subject to transfer at the age of 21 as provided in Section 3a of this Act, and the court making the commitment shall not fix or limit the duration thereof, but the duration of such commitment shall not exceed the maximum term provided by law for the offense for which the person was convicted. It shall be deemed and taken as a part of every such commitment that the provisions of the Youth Commission Act relating to the powers of such Commission with respect to persons committed to it and the provisions of Section 3a of this Act relating to transfer of such persons at the age of 21 shall be a part of such commitment as fully as though written in the order of commitment.' Under the provisions of section 3a (par. 803.1), when the person becomes 21 years old without having been discharged, and the maximum term provided by law for the offense has not yet expired, he or she must '1. Be transferred to the Illinois State penitentiary in the case of a male placed in an institution or facility under the control of the Youth Commission; 2. Be transferred to the State reformatory for women, in the case of a female placed in an institution or facility under the control of the Youth Commission; 3. Become subject to the supervision of the Parole and Pardon Board, in the case of a person placed on parole by the Youth Commission.'

It is not disputed that each of the defendants was under 17 years of age at the time of conviction, which occurred in January, 1958, and that the crime of which they were adjudged guilty was one as to which section 3 is applicable. It is argued, however, that the crime was one of violence; that probation was properly denied; and that the court had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter. It is then asserted that there was a duty upon the court, as evidenced by section 2, to impose a minimum and maximum sentence. We find no basis whatever for the position. Section 2, which directs the courts to fix the minimum and maximum limits or duration of imprisonment in imposing sentence for a crime within the present class, expressly states that 'The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to persons committed to the Youth Commission pursuant to clause 1 or clause 2 of Section 3.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 38, par. 802.) The language of the statute in clear and unambiguous terms requires commitment to the Youth Commission where the defendant is less than 17 years of age. Where the intention of the legislature is so plainly expressed there is no room left for construction.

The principal contention in support of the sentence is apparently that the provisions requiring commitment to the Youth Commission are unconstitutional. The argument advanced in support of it consists in the statement that 'a sentence to the Youth Commission created by the Youth Commission Act of 1953 is an improper and an unconstitutional sentence in as much as that is an unlawful delegation of judicial power to an administrative agency.' The Youth Commission Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 23, par. 2501 et seq.) was passed to provide methods of training and treatment for youthful offenders which are directed to their correction and rehabilitation. Upon receiving a person committed to it, the commission is required to examine him and investigate the pertinent circumstances of his life, including the causes of the behavior for which he was committed. The commission must then order such placement and treatment as it determines to be most conducive to his rehabilitation and the protection of society. Section 11 of the act authorizes the commission to '1. place him in an appropriate institution or facility under such conditions as it deems best designed for the training and rehabilitation of the person and the protection of the public; 2. order his release on parole under such supervision and conditions as it believes conducive to law-abiding conduct; 3. order replacement or renewed parole as often as conditions indicate it to be desirable; 4. revoke or modify any order of the Commission except an order of discharge as often as conditions indicate it to be desirable; 5. discharge the person from its custody and control when it is satisfied that such discharge is consistent with the welfare of the individual and the protection of the public.' Other provisions empower the commission to require his participation in vocational, physical, educational and corrective training activities; and direct that periodic re-examinations be made of all persons under control of the commission. By section 15 it is provided that unless the person has already been discharged, 'The control by the Commission of a person committed in a criminal proceeding shall cease at the expiration of the maximum term provided by law for the offense for which he was committed and he shall thereupon be discharged, but if such maximum term does not expire until after his twenty-first birthday the control and custody of the Commission over such person shall cease on his twenty-first birthday and he shall immediately become subject to the control and custody of the Department of Public Safety or if on parole of the Parole and Pardon Board, * * *.'

An examination of section 3 of the Sentence and Parole Act and the provisions of the Youth...