People v. Frame

• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Citation: 165 Ill.App.3d 585,519 N.E.2d 482
• Docket Number: No. 5-85-0700,5-85-0700
• Parties: , 116 Ill.Dec. 590 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas B. FRAME, Defendant-Appellee.
• Decision Date: 05 February 1988

Page 482

519 N.E.2d 482 165 Ill.App.3d 585, 116 Ill.Dec. 590 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Thomas B. FRAME, Defendant-Appellee. No. 5-85-0700. Appellate Court of Illinois,
Fifth District. Feb. 5, 1988.

Page 484

[116 Ill.Dec. 592] [165 Ill.App.3d 586] David W. Hauptmann, State's Atty., Harrisburg, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Vito A. Mastrangelo, Staff Atty., State's Attys., Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, for plaintiff-appellant.

Louis P. Johnson, Metropolis, for defendant-appellee.

[165 Ill.App.3d 587] Justice LEWIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Thomas Frame, was charged in the circuit court of Saline County with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), illegal transportation of alcoholic liquor (illegal transportation), and possession of less than 2.5 grams of cannabis. On the date set for trial, defendant filed a petition for discharge, claiming his speedy trial rights had been violated. The circuit court granted the petition and dismissed all three charges. The State appeals.

The record reveals that on November 24, 1984, Trooper C.R. Fulkerson charged defendant with DUI, illegal transportation, and possession of cannabis. Each offense was charged on a separate Illinois Citation and Complaint form which bore the word "complaint" in bold red letters. The tickets, or complaints, designated December 17, 1984, as the date upon which defendant was to appear in court if he intended to plead guilty to the charges. The complaints indicate that defendant was unable to post bond and was transported to the Saline County jail for confinement.

The complaints were filed with the Saline County Circuit Clerk on November 26, 1984. They were placed in small, manila jackets such as are commonly used for traffic citations. Each jacket indicates that defendant entered a plea of not guilty on November 26, 1984. Bond was set at $1,500 for the DUI, $500 for illegal transportation, and $1,000 for possession of cannabis. Each case was assigned a docket number indicating that it was a traffic offense.

On November 27, 1984, Louis Johnson entered his appearance on behalf of defendant by filing an "Appearance and Demand" pertaining to the three charges at issue here (Circuit Court Nos. 84-TR-3179, 3180, 3181) and an apparently unrelated felony charge (84-CF-46). The document purported to initiate "a continuing demand for a speedy trial * * * to continue should the accused * * * become, 'on bail'." In addition, the "Appearance and Demand" requested an order or ruling on defendant's "Motion for Discovery and Procedure" (apparently defendant's demand to produce) in the event the State failed to answer within a reasonable time. It also requested an evidentiary hearing for "bail relief."

Simultaneously defendant filed a motion to suppress arrest, a motion to suppress confession, a motion to suppress evidence, and a "demand to produce." The three motions to suppress bore docket number 84-TR-3179 (DUI). The demand to produce bore the docket numbers of all three cases.

The demand to produce sought the following from the prosecution: (1) a copy of any written statement, admission or confession the [165 Ill.App.3d 588] defendant may have made, together with a list of all witnesses thereto; (2) a written description of the substance of any material oral statements, admissions or confessions made by the defendant, together with an exact list of witnesses identifying persons present when the statement was made and a "particularization" of the time and place of the statement; (3) a list, and an offer for inspection, of all physical evidence in the State's possession and control; and, (4) a list of occurrence or material witnesses known to the State.

The next entry in the record is a notation that defendant posted $300 cash bail on

Page 485

[116 Ill.Dec. 593] March 21, 1985, the 118th day of his incarceration.

The record is again silent until July 31, 1985, when the State filed an answer to defendant's "motion for discovery" (defendant's demand to produce). The State listed two witnesses, attached a four-page police report, and noted that physical evidence would be available for inspection at the State's Attorney's office. Also on July 31, defendant filed a petition for discharge, claiming that his speedy trial rights had been violated. Defendant argued that he had not been brought to trial within 160 days of his speedy trial demand as required by section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 103-5(b)).

On August 14, 1985, defendant submitted a memorandum of law in support of his position. In particular, defendant contended that the motions to suppress which he had filed in the DUI case did not in fact delay the trial and did not, therefore, interrupt the running of the speedy trial term. Relying in part on the rationale of People v. Perkins (1980), 90 Ill.App.3d 975, 46 Ill.Dec. 388, 414 N.E.2d 110, defendant argued that the State's failure to provide discovery precluded him from pursuing his motions.

The State filed a response to defendant's petition for discharge. The State asked the circuit court to take judicial notice of a felony case pending against the defendant, claiming that delay attributable to defendant in that case caused delay in the cases now before us on appeal. The State appended to its response numerous cases relating to speedy trial issues; however, it did not discuss those cases in the body of its response. The State argued that dismissal of the charges was not the proper remedy for violation of defendant's speedy trial rights. The State contended the only remedy mandated by statute was release from custody, or in the case of a person not in custody, release from the obligations of bail or recognizance.

The circuit court, on August 21, 1985, dismissed the three charges against defendant. The court noted that defendant's motions had been filed three days after his arrest, that the State had not responded to [165 Ill.App.3d 589] defendant's motion to produce until the date set for trial, and that 246 days had passed between the demand for speedy trial and the trial setting. The court stated that it could not "find delay in fact occasioned by the defendant, certainly not 86 days."

On appeal, the State contends that the circuit court abused its discretion when it dismissed the charges against the defendant. Specifically, the State argues that (1) defendant's written demand for speedy trial contained a defective proof of service and was therefore insufficient to trigger the running of the speedy trial term; (2) defendant's demand for speedy trial was made while he was still in custody and was therefore inoperative unless renewed after his release on bail; (3) defendant's failure to call his motions for hearing and disposition caused delay attributable to him and he was therefore not entitled to discharge. We address these arguments in the order of their presentation.

The State initially contends that the speedy trial demand filed by defendant was insufficient to trigger the running of the speedy trial term because it contained a defective proof of service and was, therefore, inadequate for purposes of demonstrating notice to the State. The proof of service stated that a copy of the demand was mailed to the "attorneys of record * * * at their business address as disclosed by the pleadings of record * * *." The State argues that the pleadings at that time contained no business addresses; therefore, defendant failed to show that the State was notified of his demand.

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