People v. Francis
| Decision Date | 08 June 1936 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE v. JOEL FRANCIS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Prosecution for murder in the second degree. Defendant moved that he be discharged on ground that provisions of Code on which prosecution was based had been illegally enacted, in that Colonial Council, which had enacted the provisions, was partly composed of members appointed by the Governor of the Virgin Islands, such appointments being in excess of his authority. The District Court, Levitt, J., held that, while the appointments were illegal, all thirteen duly qualified and duly elected members had voted in favor of the ordinance, which was more than a majority of the legal membership, and accordingly the provisions had been lawfully enacted.
Motion denied.
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Joel Francis was charged with murder in the second degree. After the trial jury had been empanelled, counsel for the defense moved that the defendant be discharged on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case because the ordinance on which the prosecution was based was invalid. The invalidity of the ordinance was predicated upon the fact that the ordinance was passed by an illegally constituted Colonial Council. The Colonial Council was illegal because its members included persons appointed by the Governor who had no authority to appoint members of the Colonial Council. Thereupon the Judge of the District Court withdrew a juror, dismissed the jury, postponed the trial, and reserved judgment on the motion.
The section of the Code which the accused is charged with having violated is section 2 of chapter V [5], of Title 4 [IV] of the Code of Laws for the Municipality of St. Croix. This ordinance is part of the ordinance which enacted Titles 2, 3, 4 and 5 (II, III, IV and V) of the Code of Laws for St. Croix on May 17, 1920 (published 1921). The motion, therefore, challenges the actual legal existence of Titles 2, 3, 4 and 5 (II, III, IV and V) of the Code of Laws of the Municipality of St. Croix. The issue is squarely raised. We shall decide it.
Two questions are before us:
1. Did the Governor of the Virgin Islands have the legal authority to appoint members to the Colonial Council of St. Croix which enacted Titles 2, 3, 4 and 5 (II, III, IV and V) of the Code of Laws of St. Croix on May 17, 1920?; and,
2. If the Governor did not have such power, were Titles 2, 3, 4 and 5 (II, III, IV and V) of the Code of Laws for the Municipality of St. Croix validly enacted ?
At the outset it is to be accepted that this is an American Territory. This is an American Possession. It is not a Danish Possession. Not Danish but American principles of law are to be followed. However much it may have been the intention of Congress to continue the system which was in force at the time when the Territory was taken over, it still remains true that an American system of administration and American system of laws was actually brought here to the Virgin Islands when the Act of March 3, 1917 , was enacted.
It must not be forgotten that the principles of government of the United States are different from those which obtain in Denmark. The latter are monarchal; the former are democratic. The latter provide for a Chief Executive who is supreme over the Legislature and the Judiciary. The former is a government of divided powers. The Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary are coordinate and equal in regards to each other. One may not encroach on the functions of the others. All three are subject to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of government which that Constitution contains.
[1,2] Congress intended (by Act Mar. 3, 1917, § 2, supra; 48 U.S.C. § 1392) to continue so much of the former Danish laws as was compatible with the changed sovereignty. That means the continuance of such laws as were compatible with the ideals and ideas of American government. Ithas always been the American principle to keep the three great departments of government separate and apart (Dillon, Municipal Corporations, sec. 95, 5th ed.). In the federal government the President does not appoint members of Congress. In no State does the Governor appoint members of that State Legislature. In no other territory or possession of the United States does the Governor appoint the local legislative assembly. The entire history of our country shows that the intention of our people has always been to keep the legislative branch of the government as far as possible from executive control. There is no reason to believe that Congress did not intend to place the principle of the separation of powers into the legal system enacted for the Virgin Islands. Only an express and unmistakable statement of Congress that our historic tradition should be departed from can lead us to believe that the American doctrine of the separation of the powers of government is not in force and effect in the Virgin Islands.
Counsel for the government has pressed upon the court the fact that there were in other territories than the Virgin Islands provisions which permitted the President to appoint members of the local legislature. The court acknowledges and accepts the argument established by the material which the government counsel presents, but it is to be noted that all of the material presented does in no way establish the principle that the governor of any territory has ever had the authority to place his appointees in the local legislature. The President, and his power, are not before us at this time.
[3, 4] We are keenly conscious of the delicacy of our task. Courts will not lightly assume to deal with powers that are claimed and exercised by the Chief Executives. Indeed, there is a presumption, which we adopt, that whatever the Chief Executive does is legally done. That presumption,however, is not conclusive. It may be rebutted. Evidence against it must be considered. But the evidence against it must relate only to the existence of the power which is exercised. The need for its exercise, the wisdom of its operation, the motives which lie behind its use, are entirely outside the sphere of judicial functioning. If, however, it is clear that the power to do or to forbear, which the Chief Executive claims and exercises, does not legally reside in him, the courts cannot hesitate. They must declare the law as they find it. They must protect the rights of those who are immune from the consequences of a power which is illegally asserted and used.
[5, 6] The foregoing principles are also germane to the discussion of the relation between the judicial and the legislative branches of the government. The courts have but one function to carry out, so far as legislative is concerned. The courts interpret, construe and apply the laws. The wisdom, the necessity, the expediency of a statute is not for the judgment of the courts. They can but ask: Did the legislature have the power to pass the statute? Was the statute enacted according to law? If the power existed, if it was properly exercised, the courts cannot set the statute aside. It would be the height of judicial arrogance to do so. Hence the presumption exists, which we accept, that the legislature has acted within its powers. That presumption, however, is also rebuttable. It can be overcome. If it is clear that the statute is invalid the courts must make a declaration to the effect.
[7] In the instant case we are dealing with a criminal ordinance. Here, too, we have presumption to guide us. A person who is accused of the commission of a crime is presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty. As has often been said, it is better that many guilty persons should go free than that a single innocent man shouldbe punished unlawfully. This presumption of innocence has weight equal to, if, indeed, not greater than, the weight possessed by the presumptions that the Chief Executive and the Legislature have acted validly within their powers.
[8, 9] Furthermore, there is a basic maxim of the common law — nulla crimen sine lege — there can be no crime without a law. No act is criminal unless made so by a valid law. No one can be guilty of a criminal offense unless he has acted so as to violate a valid law. An invalid law is legally nonexistent. It cannot be broken. It cannot be the basis for a criminal prosecution. To try a person for the violation of an invalid statute would be a denial of a basic principle of American law. Such a trial is forbidden by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (prec. 1 V.I.C.). That amendment is in force and effect in the Virgin Islands. Thus the accused, in the instant case, is well within his constitutional rights when he insists that the validity of the statute under which he is to be prosecuted be first passed upon by this court.
[10] His attack upon the statute is not collateral. It is direct (Dillon, sec. 650). It is proper. That the statute has remained upon the books for fifteen years unchallenged is immaterial. The passing of time does not make an invalid statute valid. That the questions at issue have not come before us before is also beside the point. The questions are before us now. That is enough. The duty is upon us to decide them. We turn to those questions.
The first question is:
Did the Governor of the Virgin Islands have the power to appoint members of the Colonial Council for the Municipality of St. Croix in 1919-1920?
If that power existed it must be found in the laws of the United States which were in force and effect in the VirginIslands in 1920, because only the laws of the United States can operate within territory which belongs to the United States.
[11] The supreme law of the United States is the Constitution of the United...
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