People v. Franklin
| Decision Date | 22 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 75570,75570 |
| Parties | , 212 Ill.Dec. 153 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. William FRANKLIN, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Kim Robert Fawcett, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, and Larry Carlson and Marshall J. Hartman, all of Chicago, for appellant.
Roland W. Burris and James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Arleen C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, William D. Carroll and Sally L. Dilgart, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
The defendant, William Franklin, was convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County for the murder of Elgin Evans, Jr. The same jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty on the basis of having previously been convicted of a murder in addition to the murder of Evans. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 9--1(b)(3).) After hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the jury determined that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty.
Defendant's conviction and death sentence were affirmed by this court on direct appeal in People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743. The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. (Franklin v. Illinois (1990), 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 228, 112 L.Ed.2d 182.) On February 28, 1991, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The defendant then filed an amended petition and a supplemental petition to the amended petition.
[212 Ill.Dec. 156] The State filed motions to dismiss all of the defendant's petitions. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's claim that prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor entered the jury room, the circuit court of Cook County found that a prosecutor did not enter the jury room and the court subsequently denied all of defendant's post-conviction claims for relief. This court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(a). 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a).
The facts of this case are adequately set forth in the opinion on the defendant's direct appeal (People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743) and will be repeated here only as necessary. The body of Elgin Evans, Jr., was found on February 6, 1980. He had been shot once in the right side of his head and once in the left side of his chest. At trial Ulric "Buddy" Williams testified that he was at the home of Marion Holmes when defendant drove up. Defendant told Williams that Evans was in the car, and then defendant went inside to speak with Holmes. After coming back outside, defendant and Holmes told Williams that they were going to take a ride in the car and that Williams was to drive. Holmes told Williams where to drive. When they reached the desired location, Holmes, Evans and defendant got out of the car and went to the trunk supposedly to dispose of stolen auto parts. Williams was told to stay in the car. Williams stated that in the rearview mirror, he saw defendant pull a gun from his jacket pocket and shoot Evans in the head. He then saw defendant bend over Evans and he heard another gun shot. In exchange for his truthful testimony in the instant case and in the trial of Marion Holmes, Williams stated, he agreed to plead guilty to a separate armed robbery charge, to receive a sentence of six years for this armed robbery, and to be relocated with his family after his release from prison.
A proceeding brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act () is not a direct appeal, but a collateral attack on a judgment of conviction. The proceeding is limited to constitutional issues which have not been, and could not have been, presented on direct review. (People v. Winsett (1992), 153 Ill.2d 335, 346, 180 Ill.Dec. 109, 606 N.E.2d 1186.) A defendant bears the burden of establishing a substantial denial of his rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution. (People v. Odle (1992), 151 Ill.2d 168, 172, 176 Ill.Dec. 34, 601 N.E.2d 732.) A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition unless the allegations in the petition are supported by the trial record and by accompanying affidavits and show a substantial violation of constitutional rights. Determinations made by a reviewing court on the prior direct appeal are res judicata as to issues actually decided; issues that could have been presented on direct review, but which were not, are deemed waived for purposes of post-conviction review. On review, the trial court's determinations will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous. People v. Silagy (1987), 116 Ill.2d 357, 365, 107 Ill.Dec. 677, 507 N.E.2d 830.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his post-conviction petition without granting a full evidentiary hearing or relief. Specifically, defendant contends that (1) he was denied a fair trial, as the prosecution misled the jury by failing to disclose that Buddy Williams testified against him with an expectation of leniency and that Williams was an accomplice to the murder; (2) defense counsel was ineffective as he was under criminal investigation at the time of trial; (3) his Federal due process rights were violated and defense counsel was ineffective since defense counsel failed to request an instruction that the alternative sentence to death was natural life in prison without parole; (4) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, prepare and present mitigation evidence at sentencing; (5) the post-conviction court erred in finding his past Federal prison records irrelevant to the post-conviction proceedings; (6) counsel was ineffective for failing to make a plea for mercy at sentencing; (7) the jury instructions used at sentencing were unconstitutional; and (8) a prosecutor improperly entered the jury room during deliberations,
[212 Ill.Dec. 157] causing him substantial prejudice. We find that the trial court's denial of the defendant's post-conviction petition, after conducting an evidentiary hearing on only the claim that the prosecutor entered the jury room, is amply supported by the record and by Illinois law. Accordingly, we affirm.
Defendant claims that he was denied a fair trial, because the State misled the jury about Buddy Williams' true involvement in the crime by stating that Williams was an innocent bystander rather than an accomplice and because the State failed to tell the jury that Williams was testifying under a hope of leniency in not being prosecuted for the murder. Defendant contends that the post-conviction circuit court was governed by the case of People v. Holmes (1992), 238 Ill.App.3d 480, 179 Ill.Dec. 607, 606 N.E.2d 439. Holmes, a codefendant in the instant case, was found guilty of Evans' murder by a jury on a theory of accountability and sentenced to 40 years in prison. On appeal, the appellate court reversed Holmes' conviction. The appellate court found that Williams was an accomplice to the murder. Since the State knew that Williams was not an innocent bystander to the murder, the court ruled that the State misled the jury by not informing the jury of Williams' true involvement. Thus, Holmes was entitled to a new trial. The appellate court also found that Williams was operating under an expectation of leniency of not being charged with Evans' murder at the time of Holmes' trial. Thus, the State was required to disclose to the jury that Williams had hopes and expectations of leniency in not being charged with the murder. Holmes, 238 Ill.App.3d at 489-91, 179 Ill.Dec. 607, 606 N.E.2d 439.
Defendant also supports his claim with the statement which Williams gave to Will County authorities. Defendant contends that the statement provided the State with knowledge of Williams' true involvement in the crime. In the statement, Williams discusses how he, Holmes, and Franklin had looked for Evans several days before the murder because Evans had supposedly robbed a lounge owned by an associate of Holmes. The man who owned the lounge paid to have Evans killed and Holmes had killed other people for this man. Williams stated that he knew Holmes was "supposed to whoop his [Evans'] ass or break his nose or something." Defendant contends that since the State knew from this statement that Williams was not an innocent bystander, the State had a duty to tell the jury that Williams was an accomplice.
Although not phrasing his argument in the exact terms, defendant attempts to apply the Holmes decision to his post-conviction proceedings through the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies " 'when a party or someone in privity with a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.' " (Emphasis in original.) (People v. Moore (1990), 138 Ill.2d 162, 166, 149 Ill.Dec. 278, 561 N.E.2d 648, quoting Housing Authority v. Young Men's Christian Association (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246, 252, 78 Ill.Dec. 125, 461 N.E.2d 959.) The threshold requirements for collateral estoppel are that (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in question; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the adjudication. (In re Owens (1988), 125 Ill.2d 390, 399-400, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248.)...
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