People v. Fratus

Decision Date25 November 1974
Docket NumberNo. 25907,25907
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edmund A. FRATUS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Gregory L. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Lee Belstock, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.

ERICKSON, Justice.

The defendant Fratus was charged and convicted of possession of more than one-half ounce of a narcotic drug, to-wit: marijuana. C.R.S. 1963, 48--5--2. The defendant asserts, as his primary ground for reversal, that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. He alleges that probable cause did not exist for his arrest or to search his automobile, and that the police were required to obtain an arrest warrant and a search warrant. We affirm.

On July 10, 1972, Deputy Sheriff Claussen was provided with information by a confidential, reliable informant. The informant told the deputy that he had purchased marijuana from Fratus in front of the premises at 1021 Main Street, Grand Junction, Colorado. The informant also provided a description of the car used by Fratus, identified the car by license number, and said that the car contained the marijuana which Fratus was selling. He additionally described Fratus and told the deputy that Fratus would be leaving Colorado to go to Arizona that night. The deputy, based on the facts provided by the informant, placed the premises at 1021 Main Street under surveillance. In the course of three-and-a-half hours of surveillance, the deputy saw several people come to the house and then leave and saw Fratus make two or three trips to the car parked in front of the house which the informant had described. On each occasion, Fratus went to the car, opened the trunk, removed a small paper bag, returned to the house, and immediately thereafter the people would leave.

At approximately 10:30 p.m., Fratus left the house and began driving east in his car. The deputy notified other police units and effected an arrest of Fratus before he left Grand Junction. A search was made of the trunk and the interior of the automobile, and eleven pounds of marijuana were found.

The posture of the case before us is that the defendant's Fourth Amendment claims have been reviewed at a preliminary hearing and prior to trial. Central to the suppression issue is the question of probable cause to arrest and to effect a search without a warrant under the circumstances of this case. Again, we must measure probable cause which is based upon information provided by a confidential informant by the two-prong test articulated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). See Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741 (1974).

In the instant case, the two-prong test was met by setting forth the underlying circumstances which established that the informant had a basis in fact for stating that narcotics were at a particular place and also provided facts which supported the reliability of the informant. People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971). Of particular significance is the fact that the informant purchased marijuana from the defendant which was taken from the trunk of the defendant's car. The deputy reenforced the information which he obtained from the informant with his surveillance. The deputy's observation verified each statement which the informant made. The failure of the deputy to obtain a warrant is justified under the facts of this case. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948). See LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the 'Quagmire,' 8 Crim.L.Bull. 9 (1972).

Probable cause is the touchstone for measuring the right to arrest without a warrant. The circumstances in each case must be considered to determine the reasonableness of police action and the existence of probable cause. Moreover, the scope of the search which was conducted as incident to the arrest, and the right to search the automobile which Fratus was driving, must be examined in the light of the factual information which was in the hands of the police. The facts of this case provide the officers with probable cause to make the arrest and to search the automobile...

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12 cases
  • People v. Smith, 80SA86
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Colorado
    • November 10, 1980
    ...to establish probable cause to arrest. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52, 528 P.2d 392 (1974); section 16-3-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8).7 From our reading of the record, the issue of standing was never specif......
  • People v. Villiard, 83SA97
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Colorado
    • March 26, 1984
    ...III. A warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause. E.g., People v. Schreyer, 640 P.2d 1147 (Colo.1982); People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52, 528 P.2d 392 (1974). An officer has probable cause when the facts and circumstances within his knowledge--or upon which he has reasonably trust......
  • People v. Henry, 27837
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Colorado
    • May 1, 1978
    ...555 P.2d 974 (1976); People v. Hernandez, Colo., 554 P.2d 291 (1976); People v. Hoinville, Colo., 553 P.2d 777 (1976); People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52, 528 P.2d 392 (1974); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971). In People v. Hoinville, supra, we examined our statutory requirem......
  • People v. Glasener, 27124
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Colorado
    • June 7, 1976
    ...his interests. Finally, many of the precise details of his tip were corroborated by the police officer. Compare People v. Fratus, 187 Colo. 52, 528 P.2d 392 (1974), and People v. Trontell, The totality of all these factors warrant, as a matter of law, a conclusion that the informant was rel......
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