People v. Frazier

• Decision Date: 15 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1–14–0911.,1–14–0911.
• Citation: 407 Ill.Dec. 159,62 N.E.3d 1081
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Terrell FRAZIER, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

62 N.E.3d 1081

407 Ill.Dec. 159

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Terrell FRAZIER, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–14–0911.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Aug. 15, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Christopher L. Gehrke, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Miles J. Keleher, and Michael J. Czopkiewicz, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Presiding Justice CUNNINGHAM

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant Terrell Frazier was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and sentenced, as a Class X offender, to 6 ½ years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, arguing that the evidence failed to show that the motor scooter he possessed qualified as a motor vehicle, that it was stolen, and that he knew it was stolen. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 2 At trial, Conrad Hard testified that he owned a 2011 Lingyu 13L150 motor scooter, which was started with a key. He bought the motor scooter from the “Tool Store” in Forestview and registered it with the State of Illinois. The registration form for the scooter, which was entered into evidence, indicated the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the scooter.

¶ 3 On July 22, 2013, Hard parked his motor scooter across the street from his apartment at the corner of North Kedzie Avenue and West Warren Boulevard in Chicago. The following day, he observed that the motor scooter was not where he parked it and the lock to the motor scooter and its cover were inside his apartment building at the front door. Hard called the police and reported that his motor scooter had been stolen. Hard went to the police station on July 25 and was directed to the motor scooter. The motor scooter appeared different as it was broken and items were missing, including the ignition. He specifically stated that the space where the ignition was supposed to be was “just busted straight down the middle with a big hole where I used to put the key for the ignition.” Hard had the key from the stolen motor scooter with him at the police station and used it to open the storage compartment under the seat. Hard did not know defendant, and did not give him, or anyone else, permission to take the motor scooter between the last time he saw it on July 22 and when he saw it again at the police station on July 25. Hard stated that police returned the motor scooter to him, and he was able to drive it home by connecting the wires in such a way that he only needed to press the start button. At the time of trial, Hard still owned and drove the motor scooter.

¶ 4 Officer Sean Flynn testified that he saw defendant talking to another person while sitting on a motorized scooter that had its engine running and was parked on the sidewalk at approximately 1002 North Hamlin Avenue in Chicago on July 25, 2013. Flynn and his partner exited their squad car, noticed that the motorized scooter did not contain a license plate, and asked defendant for his driver's license. Defendant did not have a license, and Flynn detained him. Flynn discovered that defendant's license had been suspended, and, when he ran the VIN on the motorized scooter, it came back as stolen. He subsequently learned that the motorized scooter was registered to Conrad Hard. Upon defendant's detention, Flynn noticed that the cylinder for the ignition had been removed and no key was inside as there was no ignition to put it into. Flynn stated that he had seen hundreds of motorized scooters similar to the subject motor scooter and that scooters in good condition are operated with a key. He denied ever seeing a scooter that could be operated by a “push start.” No pictures were taken of the damaged scooter.

¶ 5 After the State rested, defendant made a motion for directed finding, arguing that the State failed to prove that he knew the motor scooter was stolen. In denying the motion, the trial court found that the type of damage the motor scooter sustained showed that defendant knew it was stolen.

¶ 6 Defendant, who was on probation for possession of a controlled substance and had previous felony convictions, testified that he was having a conversation with his friend, Raymond Thompson, about Thompson's motor scooter on July 25, 2013. Thompson started the motor scooter by holding the brake and pushing a button. Defendant got on top of the motor scooter and asked Thompson if he could take it on a test drive because he was considering buying it from him. Defendant believed that his driver's license was valid and indicated that he knew he needed a driver's license to operate the motor scooter. The police arrested defendant before he had the chance to drive the motor scooter. Thompson did not tell defendant that the motor scooter was stolen, nor did he see any evidence that it was stolen, particularly where he believed the scooter was a “push start” that did not require a key.

¶ 7 During cross-examination, defendant indicated that the motor scooter could be driven on the street and could reach approximately 40 miles per hour. He did not see the empty space in the motor scooter where a key would have gone and stated that he previously owned a “push start” motor scooter. Defendant denied ever going to school to become a mechanic and never told the police that he went to mechanic school or that he thought the motor scooter was a “push start” based on his auto mechanic training.

¶ 8 Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. In doing so, the court found that defendant's testimony lacked credibility where he did not inform the police that Thompson owned the motor scooter, and there was no real distinction between this case, where there was a hole where the ignition should have been, and a case where an individual is caught riding in a motor vehicle with a peeled steering column. The court noted that such a condition is a strong indicator that the vehicle was stolen, particularly considering defendant was experienced with motor scooters.

¶ 9 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the State never proved that he had any knowledge that the motor scooter was stolen. The trial court denied the motion, again finding that it was obvious to defendant that the motor scooter he was on was stolen where the entire ignition portion of the vehicle had been ripped apart. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the motor scooter belonged to Thompson as defendant never informed the arresting officers of that alleged fact when it would have been appropriate to do so and could have avoided defendant's subsequent charge.

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove him guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle. Specifically, defendant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to prove the three elements of the offense: the motor scooter qualified as a “motor vehicle,” the motor scooter defendant possessed was stolen, and defendant had knowledge that it was stolen.

¶ 11 In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Davison, 233 Ill.2d 30, 43, 329 Ill.Dec. 347, 906 N.E.2d 545 (2009)

. A reviewing court will not retry the defendant. People v. Cox, 195 Ill.2d 378, 387, 254 Ill.Dec. 720, 748 N.E.2d 166 (2001). Instead, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to assess witness credibility, weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom, and resolve any conflicts in the testimony. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 242, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006). A defendant's criminal conviction will not be reversed on appeal unless the reviewing court finds that the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Evans, 209 Ill.2d 194, 209, 283 Ill.Dec. 651, 808 N.E.2d 939 (2004).

¶ 12 To sustain a conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant was in possession of a motor vehicle, (2) the vehicle was stolen, and (3) the defendant knew it was stolen. 625 ILCS 5/4–103(a)(1)

(West 2012); Cox, 195 Ill.2d at 391, 254 Ill.Dec. 720, 748 N.E.2d 166.

¶ 13 Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove that the motor scooter was a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/1–100 et seq.

(West 2012)). In particular, defendant asserts that the State failed to show that the motor scooter did not qualify as a low-speed electric or gas bicycle.

¶ 14 Illinois law defines, in relevant part, a motor vehicle as “[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overheard trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except for vehicles moved solely by human power, motorized wheelchairs, low-speed electric bicycles, and low-speed gas bicycles.” 625 ILCS 5/1–146 (West 2012)

. Low-speed electric and gas bicycles are defined as two- or three-wheeled vehicles with fully operable pedals and electric or gas motors of less than one horsepower, whose maximum speed on a paved level surface, when powered solely by such motors while ridden by an operator who weighs 170 pounds, is less than 20 miles per hour. 625 ILCS 5/1–140.10, 1–140.15 (West 2012); People v. Grandadam, 2015 IL App (3d) 150111, ¶ 15, 398 Ill.Dec. 582, 44 N.E.3d 611.

¶ 15 Defendant maintains that a lack of testimony as to the motor scooter's style of engine, horsepower, or existence of fully...