People v. Fredericks

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: TROUTMAN, J.
• Citation: People v. Fredericks, 238 N.Y.S.3d 133, 264 N.E.3d 1264, 43 N.Y.3d 551 (N.Y. 2025)
• Decision Date: 20 February 2025
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Divine FREDERICKS, Appellant.

238 N.Y.S.3d 133

264 N.E.3d 1264

43 N.Y.3d 551

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Divine FREDERICKS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Decided February 20, 2025

Jenay Nurse Guilford, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (V. Marika Meis of counsel), for appellant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Nicole Neckles, Yael V. Levy and Rafael Curbelo of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TROUTMAN, J.

₅₅₄This appeal presents us with two primary issues. The first is whether defendant’s complaints about his assigned counsel were factually specific and serious enough to require the trial court to engage in a “minimal inquiry” as to “the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution” (People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822, 825, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233 [1990]). The second is whether defendant was entitled to substitution of counsel based on defense counsel’s statements on the record responding to those complaints. Because we conclude that no minimal inquiry was required and that the trial court properly denied defendant’s request for new counsel, we affirm.

I.

Defendant and a friend of his were riding in the backseat of a vehicle early one morning after a night of drinking. While still inside the car, defendant allegedly shot the front-seat passenger in the back of the head and the driver in the chest and jaw. Defendant and his friend fled. The front-seat passenger died from his injuries, but the driver survived. Defendant thereafter was indicted on numerous counts and assigned counsel.

Several months into the proceeding, defendant wrote a letter to the trial court, expressing frustration with his attorney:

“Your Honor my assigned attorney isn’t in fact working in my best interest[.] I do not want to keep prolonging these proceedings any longer[.] [M]y attorney disregarded my request of counsel visit even via Video [sic]. He also hung up the phone on me [and] [d]isrespected my wife as well as myself[.] [M]y attorney is aware that I do not want him on my case any longer[,] which is why he keeps prolonging the proceedings[,] as well as my November 13, 2018 court appearance. Your Honor it is clear he is not working in my best interest to where I believe you noticed it when you have been addressing the District Attorney on not being ready for the pre-trial hearings[,] and my attorney is in fact arguing the issue for the District Attorney.”

In the same letter, defendant requested that he “be assigned a new attorney that is going to fight to get the truth out … ₅₅₅because [he was] in fact innocent.” Defendant stated that “all” counsel was telling him was to “help [him]self or accept a plea,” and that “these are not statements an attorney should in fact make to his client when the client is in fact innocent.”

At the next court appearance, the court informed defense counsel that defendant had filed a pro se letter application and asked if counsel had an opportunity to review it and whether he was adopting it. Counsel responded that he had never seen the letter. The court thus gave counsel a chance to “examine” the motion and “make a determination whether it has legal merit for [counsel] to adopt it.” When the case was recalled, the court stated that it had reviewed the motion and that “one of the items contained in the motion [was] a request for a new attorney.” A colloquy ensued, during which defense counsel stated as follows:

“Well, I’m opposing to that [sic]. I want to put on the record, Judge, that, you know, sometimes you want to shoot the messenger as opposed—you know, because you don’t like the message. I, and my investigator, … have gone over this stuff with [defendant] any number of times. And we have gone through everything and [defendant] just doesn’t like what I have to tell him. I’m required to give him an honest assessment of the case.”

The court stated that defense counsel was “correct,” noting that the investigator to whom counsel referred was a “well respected” former police officer. The court then asked defendant whether he wished to retain a private attorney. Defendant responded that he wanted a new attorney but lacked the funds to hire one. The court explained to defendant that the State was paying for an experienced attorney on defendant’s behalf. The court thus denied defendant’s request for a new attorney but advised defendant that, should he “come into funds,” he could hire defense counsel of his choice.

A jury trial was held with the same counsel serving as defendant’s attorney. The jury ultimately returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25), attempted murder in the second degree (id. §§ 110.00; 125.25), and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (id. § 265.03).

Following sentencing, defendant, acting pro se, moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPL 440.10. Defendant argued, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective₅₅₆ for allegedly failing to prepare him for trial, failing to impeach the driver’s testimony at trial, and failing to contact or call as a witness defendant’s friend who had been riding with him in the backseat. The People opposed, observing that defendant’s allegations regarding counsel’s ineffectiveness were not supported by anything other than defendant’s self-serving affidavit.

Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion without holding a hearing. The court observed that many of defendant’s contentions concerning ineffective assistance of counsel were based on and contradicted by the record. To the extent defendant raised arguments that were not record based, the court observed that defendant failed to provide, or explain his failure to provide, an affidavit substantiating the essential facts supporting his claim through sworn allegations by his trial counsel (see CPL 440.30[l]). Although the court acknowledged that “[a]n affidavit from counsel is not necessary where a defendant’s claim is hostile and adverse to trial counsel, where [the] defendant sufficiently explains the absence of an affidavit, and where [the] defendant’s allegations are corroborated by other parts of the record,” the court concluded that there was nothing in the record or defendant’s submissions corroborating his allegations regarding counsel.

The Appellate Division affirmed both the judgment and the order (see 217 A.D.3d 582, 191 N.Y.S.3d 630 [1st Dept 2023]). As relevant here, the Appellate Division held that the trial court “providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request for new counsel” and that “[d]efendant ‘failed to proffer specific allegations of a seemingly serious request that would require the court to engage in a minimal inquiry’ ” (id. at 583, 191 N.Y.S.3d 630, quoting People v. Porto, 16 N.Y.3d 93, 100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283 [2010]). Additionally, the Appellate Division concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion without conducting a hearing, acknowledging that defendant failed to obtain an affidavit from defense counsel or indicate that he unsuccessfully attempted to do so and, in any event, defendant failed to raise a factual dispute warranting a hearing.

A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal.

II.

[1, 2] Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying his request for new counsel without conducting a minimal in quiry.₅₅₇ We reject that contention. It is well settled that, under both the Federal and New York State Constitutions, an indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel (see US Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; see also People v. Medina, 44 N.Y.2d 199, 207, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588, 375 N.E.2d 768 [1978]). However, “[t]he right of an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at [the] defendant’s option” (People v. Washington, 25 N.Y.3d 1091, 1095, 13 N.Y.S.3d 343, 34 N.E.3d 853 [2015], quoting Sides, 75 N.Y.2d at 824, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233; see People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 18-19, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 438 N.E.2d 1133 [1982] [“(T)he right to assistance of counsel … is not to be equated with a right to choice of assigned counsel”]). Rather, a defendant may be entitled to new counsel only “upon showing good cause for a substitution, such as a conflict of interest or other irreconcilable conflict with counsel” (Washington, 25 N.Y.3d at 1095, 13 N.Y.S.3d 343, 34 N.E.3d 853, quoting Sides, 15 N.Y.2d at 824, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233; see Medina, 44 N.Y.2d at 207, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588, 375 N.E.2d 768).

[3–5] “While a court has a duty to investigate complaints concerning counsel, ‘this is far from suggesting that an indigent[ ] [defendant’s] request that a court assign new counsel is to be granted casually’ ” (Porto, 16 N.Y.3d at 99, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283, quoting Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d at 19, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 438 N.E.2d 1133). The decision to substitute counsel remains “within the ‘discretion and responsibility’ of the trial judge” (id., quoting Medina, 44 N.Y.2d at 207, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588, 375 N.E.2d 768), and the trial court’s obligation to consider a motion to substitute counsel arises only where the defendant makes a “seemingly serious request” (Sides, 75 N.Y.2d at 824, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233). Thus, where the defendant comes forth with “specific factual allegations of ‘serious complaints about counsel’ ” (Porto, 16 N.Y.3d at 100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283, quoting Medina, 44 N.Y.2d at 207, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588, 375 N.E.2d 768; see People v. Smith, 30 N.Y.3d 1043, 1044, 67 N.Y.S.3d 575, 89 N.E.3d 1255 [2017]), the trial court must conduct “at least a ‘minimal inquiry,’ and discern meritorious complaints from disingenuous applications by inquiring as to ‘the nature of the disagreement or its potential for resolution’ ” (Porto, 16 N.Y.3d at 100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283, quoting Sides, 75 N.Y.2d at 825, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, ...