People v. Free

• Decision Date: 19 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 57213,57213
• Citation: 347 N.E.2d 505,37 Ill.App.3d 1050
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Moses FREE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 505

347 N.E.2d 505

37 Ill.App.3d 1050

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Moses FREE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 57213.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

April 19, 1976.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Cook County, Dennis E. Urban and Donald S. Honchell, Asst. Public Defenders, for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Cook County, Laurence J. Bolon, Kevin Sweeney and Bertina E. Lampkin, Asst. State's Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.

O'CONNOR, Justice:

On April 28, 1971, Alvin Payton was shot and killed by defendant, Moses Free. Defendant was convicted of murder following a bench trial. The issues raised by defendant on appeal are whether he should have been convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder either because he was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the deceased or because defendant had an unreasonable belief that he had to use deadly force to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself.

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on the day of the incident, defendant was at the apartment of McArthur Edwards, brother-in-law of the decedent. Defendant gave the keys to his car to Alvin Payton so that Alvin could retrieve a baby's bottle from the defendant's car. A short time later defendant noticed that his car was missing. Defendant went out to look for his car, then returned and he and Edwards went to a tavern for a drink. About fifteen minutes later, they returned to the apartment to wait for Alvin. Sometime after 9:00 p.m. Alvin returned with the car. Although the testimony is somewhat vague, it appears that defendant walked out to the street and approached the car as Alvin was making a 'U' turn to park. Defendant testified:

'When I stepped out on the street he acted like he didn't want to stop and so the car was near me and on my impulse I jumped back and the car slowed down.

'I told him to get out of the car and so he looked at me for a second and I said, 'Come on, get on out of the car, man.' So, he said, 'I don't have to get out.' He said, 'You punk m..... f....., I'll get out and beat your ass.' I said, 'No, you won't do it.' He said, 'I beat a punk like you to death,' and in fear of my life I pulled the gun and shot him.'

Defendant shot at Alvin five times through the rolled-up window of the car. Defendant then dragged the body from the car and drove off.

The State argues that defendant's failure to raise the issue of voluntary manslaughter either at trial or in his written motion for a new trial constitutes a waiver of the question. We agree. The law on this point is not in dispute:

'The general rule followed by this court is that the failure by the defendant to raise an issue in the written motion for a new trial constitutes a waiver of that issue and it cannot be urged as a ground for reversal on review. (Citations omitted.)' People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill.2d 280, 282, 296 N.E.2d 856, 857. (See also People v. Sanders, Ill.App., 345 N.E.2d 757 (1976).

However, even considering the merits of defendant's arguments, as we may under Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110A, par. 615(a)), we do not believe the evidence warranted defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder.

The first portion of the voluntary manslaughter section of the Criminal Code states:

'(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:

(1) The individual killed . . .

'Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 9--2.)

The only types of provocation recognized as serious enough to reduce the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter are:

'. . . 'substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender's spouse; but not mere words or gestures or trespass to property. " (People v. Crews (1967), 38 Ill.2d 331, 335, 231 N.E.2d 451, 453.)

As trespass to property is not recognized as sufficient provocation, the fact that the deceased took the defendant's car is of no aid to defendant. The alleged threatening words of the deceased fall in the same category. The only remaining provocation cited by the defendant is the alleged assault with the car, but viewing the totality of the circumstances we do not...