People v. French

• Decision Date: 16 May 1944
• Docket Number: No. 27846.,27846.
• Citation: People v. French, 387 Ill. 16, 55 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1944)
• Parties: PEOPLE v. FRENCH.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

387 Ill. 16

55 N.E.2d 53

PEOPLE

v.FRENCH.

No. 27846.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 16, 1944.

Error to Circuit Court, Winnebago County; Arthur E. Fisher, Judge.

Otto French, on his plea of guilty to an indictment charging stealing of an automobile of the value of $400, and which indictment bore endorsement ‘For larceny of motor vehicle’, was found ‘guilty of larceny of motor vehicle as charged in the indictment’ and sentenced to reformatory for not less than one year nor more than 20 years, and he brings error.

Judgment reversed and cause not remanded.Charles S. Thomas, of Rockford, for plaintiff in error.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and Max A. Weston, State's Atty., of Rockford (William H. Gates, of Rockford, of counsel), for the People.

GUNN, Justice.

Plaintiff in error has sued out a writ of error to the circuit court of Winnebago county upon the common-law record of his conviction, in April, 1929, and sentence to the penitentiary. The crime alleged in the indictment is stealing and carrying away one Buick Master Six Sedan of the value of $400. The indictment is endorsed ‘For larceny of motor vehicle.’ The plea was guilty to the charge in the indictment and the finding of the court ‘defendant is guilty of Larceny of Motor Vehicle as charged in the indictment.’ The judgment entered by the court is as follows: ‘That the said Defendant Otto French * * * who is convicted of the crime of Larceny of Motor Vehicle herein, be sentenced to the Reformatory of this State, at Pontiac; * * * and the said Superintendent is hereby required and commanded to take the body of the said defendant * * * and confine him in said Reformatory * * * from and after the delivery thereof until discharged by due course of law, provided such term of imprisonment * * * shall not be less than the minimum term, nor exceed the maximum term for the crime for which the said Defendant was herein convicted and sentenced, to-wit: not less than one year, nor more than twenty years, subject to the Department of Public Welfare.’

The contention of plaintiff in error is that said judgment on its face discloses that it is a conviction of the crime of grand larceny and not a conviction of the crime of stealing a motor vehicle, and that since the punishment for the former crime under the statute is a maximum sentence of ten years in the penitentiary, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 38, par. 389, and for the latter a maximum term of twenty years, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 38, par. 388a, that manifest error appears upon the face of the record requiring a reversal of the judgment.

The contention of the People is that the indictment was sufficient to sustain a judgment either of grand larceny or of a crime of larceny of a motor vehicle, and that our former decisions holding that an indictment for larceny of a motor vehicle alleging value is an indictment for grand larceny should be modified or overruled. It is further contended the facts in this case can be distinguished from the facts appearing in former cases decided by this court, and that they do not disclose plaintiff in error was indicted, pleaded guilty and was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, as asserted by plaintiff in error.

In the cases of People v. Crane, 356 Ill. 276, 190 N.E. 355;People v. Parker, 356 Ill. 301, 190 N.E. 358; and People v. Smithka, 356 Ill. 624, 191 N.E. 211, the question arose upon convictions under the Habitual Criminal Act as existing prior to 1941. Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 38, par. 602. In all of these cases it was held the crime of stealing a motor vehicle was a different offense than grand larceny; hence conviction of stealing a motor vehicle did not justify punishment under the Habitual Criminal Act when there was a subsequent conviction of another felony.

In People v. Crane the automobile stolen was alleged to have a value of $2500, and the defendant had previously been convicted of grand larceny. The judgment of conviction sentenced him for the theft of the motor vehicle for a period not exceeding the maximum term provided by law. We held that under these facts defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, and hence, as an habitual criminal, should be sentenced as such under the provisions of the statute. In People v. Parker, the indictment was for burglary, alleging a previous conviction, which was for the theft of a motor vehicle of the value of $150. The defendant was sentenced as an habitual criminal to life imprisonment, and we held the judgment should be reversed because the conviction of theft of a motor vehicle did not constitute grand larceny, and hence not one of the enumerated prior convictions bringing the defendant under the Habitual Criminal Act. It will be noticed there is an inconsistency between these two cases in that the Crane case held the indictment for stealing a motor vehicle charged grand larceny, justifying a sentence as an habitual criminal, while the Parker case held the sentence as an habitual criminal could not be sustained because the prior conviction was of motor-vehicle stealing instead of grand larceny. The point that the indictment charged grand larceny was not raised in the Parker case, and thus is only relevant here as holding grand larceny and larceny of a motor vehicle are separate offenses.

In the case of People v. Smithka the indictment contained two counts, the first of which charged the theft of a motor vehicle, and the second the larceny of an automobile of the value of $150, and also charged a former conviction of grand larceny. The jury found him guilty of the crime of the larceny of a motor vehicle fixing no value, and also that he had been previously convicted, and he was accordingly sentenced to the penitentiary for the term of twenty years. The court held that the absence of a finding of value by the jury made the crime for which he was convicted theft of a motor vehicle and not grand larceny, and therefore the sentence as an habitual criminal was invalid in fixing a term of twenty years, and that the cause should be remanded and the defendant sentenced to the penitentiary for an indeterminate period.

While the facts in these three cases are different, there is a uniformity in the holding that the crime of stealing a motor vehicle is a different crime from grand larceny, and where the value of the automobile stolen is alleged in the indictment and found by the jury or the court, the conviction is of grand larceny. It is to be observed in the Smithka case there were two distinct charges, one of which authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of either the larceny of the automobile, or grand larceny. As pointed out, all three of the cases just mentioned arose in construing the Habitual Criminal Act.

In People v. Stacey, 372 Ill. 478, 24 N.E.2d 378, 380, the Habitual Criminal Act was not involved. The indictment charged the larceny of a motor vehicle of the value of $150. A plea of guilty was held to be an admission he had stolen a motor vehicle of that value, and in the judgment it is...