People v. Frieberg

Decision Date12 March 1992
Docket NumberNo. 71319,71319
Citation168 Ill.Dec. 108,589 N.E.2d 508,147 Ill.2d 326
Parties, 168 Ill.Dec. 108 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Todd L. FRIEBERG, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

J. Steven Beckett, of Beckett & Crewell, of Champaign, and Urbana, Rex L. Reu, Thomson & Weintraub, Bloomington, for appellant.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Sol. Gen., and Terence M. Madsen and Bradley P. Halloran, Asst. Attys. Gen.), Chicago, for the People.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of McLean County, defendant, Todd L. Frieberg, was convicted of one count of controlled substance trafficking and one count of possession of a controlled substance under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 56 1/2, pars. 1401.1(a), 1402(a)(2).) Defendant was assessed a fine of $50,000 and sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 years' imprisonment for the controlled substance trafficking offense and 15 years' imprisonment for the possession offense. Defendant was, however, acquitted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1401.) Defendant appealed the convictions and the appellate court affirmed. (202 Ill.App.3d 1115 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).) We subsequently granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 134 Ill.2d R. 315.

Defendant contends that the jury verdict finding him guilty of controlled substance trafficking is legally inconsistent with a finding of not guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Defendant maintains that, on grounds of double jeopardy, his acquittal of the possessory offense requires acquittal of the trafficking offense. We are not persuaded that such is the case. Neither are we persuaded that, as defendant further contends, reversible trial errors occurred; the evidence was insufficient to support conviction; or the jury was improperly instructed. We therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate court for reasons which follow.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following general facts were adduced at trial. During the fall of 1988, defendant worked as bar manager at "Traditionz," a newly opened nightclub located in Bloomington, Illinois. At defendant's urgings, his parents and aunt had become investors in the nightclub which was also owned by Brad Maloney, the general manager. Defendant's parents invested because they believed it would prove beneficial to defendant by providing him financial independence. Throughout the fall, however, the new business experienced severe cash-flow problems. Maloney requested that defendant's parents invest additional funds in the business, but they declined.

In December 1988, defendant and his parents went to Florida for a vacation. While defendant was there, Maloney contacted him and asked that he join Maloney in Fort Myers, Florida, in an attempt to acquire additional investment capital from Mark Zwieg, a friend of Maloney. Defendant and Maloney met with Zwieg, who expressed an interest in investing, but they did not obtain any investment monies from him. Defendant shortly returned to Bloomington.

Sometime in late December, Todd Hayes, another employee of Maloney, had several On January 1, 1989, Maloney called defendant and advised him that Zwieg was prepared to invest, but that they would need to travel immediately to Florida to obtain the money. Defendant tried to make air travel arrangements for Maloney alone. Defendant also tried unsuccessfully to interest Scott Scheidenheim and John Garcia, his roommates, in traveling by auto to Florida with both him and Maloney. That evening, defendant and Maloney left Bloomington for Florida, traveling in an auto rented by Maloney. The pair arrived in Fort Meyers and met with Zwieg. While Zwieg never made any final decision concerning investing, Maloney and defendant continued to stay at Zwieg's house.

                [168 Ill.Dec. 112] conversations with Maloney concerning the purchase of a kilo of cocaine.  Unbeknown to Maloney, Hayes was working as an undercover agent for the Illinois State Police Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI).  Maloney advised Hayes that he was thinking about taking a trip to Florida and would bring back a kilo of cocaine to sell to Hayes.  They agreed upon a price of $38,500.  Hayes and Maloney also agreed that if Maloney was successful in obtaining the cocaine, he was to call Hayes and refer to the cocaine as a "bottle of wine."   The focus of the State's investigation was Maloney.  Maloney made no mention of defendant to Hayes
                

On January 2, 1989, Maloney advised defendant that he knew a person named Eddie Seaz, from whom they could obtain some money. On January 4, Maloney told defendant that Seaz would "front" a kilo of cocaine which Maloney could sell in Bloomington to a particular individual. According to defendant, he told Maloney that he thought that the plan was a bad idea, but Maloney gave assurances that he would carry out the plan alone. That evening, Maloney and defendant drove to the Seaz residence where Maloney met outside with Seaz. According to defendant, he was told by Maloney to go into Seaz's house and wait. While he was inside, defendant heard the sound of the spare tire and jack being removed from the trunk of the car which he and Maloney had driven. Maloney and defendant then drove to another location where Enrique Felix joined them. During the drive there, Maloney told defendant that Seaz had put the kilo of cocaine into the trunk of the car. Maloney also told defendant that Felix would travel with them on the return trip to Illinois to guard the kilo of cocaine and eventually collect a designated sum of money for it.

After Felix joined defendant and Maloney, they immediately traveled to Bloomington, arriving the next day around 6:30 p.m. They drove to defendant's apartment, where Maloney and Felix followed defendant inside. Scott Scheidenheim and John Garcia, defendant's roommates, were also present in the apartment. Defendant's apartment consisted of several levels. A kitchen, bathroom and several bedrooms were upstairs; and defendant's bedroom, a bathroom, and the living room area were in the lower, basement level.

Once inside the apartment, defendant went to his bedroom. Maloney also went inside defendant's bedroom with the briefcase containing the cocaine. Defendant was in and out of his bedroom. Felix, for the most part, remained in the living room watching television. At some point, Maloney telephoned Hayes and told him that "the bottle of wine was ready." Some time later, defendant and Maloney were alone in defendant's bedroom. Defendant called Garcia into the room, and Garcia and Maloney ingested several "lines" of cocaine. Defendant may also have ingested some cocaine.

Hayes subsequently arrived at the apartment. At the time, defendant was upstairs in the kitchen. Garcia and Scheidenheim were also upstairs. Felix was watching television in the lower level living room. Hayes spoke with Maloney privately in defendant's bedroom, received some scrapings from the kilo of cocaine hidden in a pillowcase on the bed, and shortly departed. Hayes took the scrapings of cocaine to DCI agents, who immediately obtained a search warrant for defendant's apartment. By this time, Scheidenheim and Garcia had left the apartment.

At approximately 9 o'clock that evening, Hayes returned to defendant's apartment accompanied by police officers. Defendant opened the door, and the officers entered, discovered the kilo of cocaine in a washing machine located on the lower level of the apartment, and arrested defendant, Maloney, and Felix for violations of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1101 et seq.). Subsequent laboratory analysis revealed that the substance recovered was in excess of 900 grams of cocaine.

Mark Bagnell, an investigator assigned to the DCI, interviewed defendant shortly after his arrest. After receiving his Miranda rights, defendant indicated that he wished to waive those rights and talk to Bagnell. Defendant related that he and Maloney had traveled to Florida for purposes related to "Brad's" business. They had returned to Bloomington with Enrique Felix. When questioned about the cocaine, defendant denied knowing anything about it or knowing that it had been present in his apartment. When Bagnell told defendant that he did not believe him, defendant requested an attorney and the interview ceased.

Defendant was returned to a holding cell, but later made a request to authorities to speak with Bagnell again. During this second interview, defendant gave a detailed account of the trip to Florida with Maloney. Defendant indicated that he had been aware that the cocaine was in the car on the return trip to Illinois and later in the bedroom of his apartment. He related an understanding of the cocaine transaction between Maloney and Seaz, as well as the role that Felix played in the transport of the cocaine.

Felix was subsequently brought to trial in May 1989 on charges of possession of a controlled substance, controlled substance trafficking, and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At his trial, Felix testified that he had no knowledge of the cocaine in the car on the return trip from Florida or in defendant's apartment. The jury was unable to reach a verdict. Police authorities, however, conducted additional investigation into Felix's drug dealings in Florida. Witnesses who had Federal charges pending against them were prepared to testify against Felix should he be retried in Illinois. In addition, Federal authorities wished to interview Felix. Consequently, Felix's attorney proposed a plea agreement with the McLean County State's Attorney's office. An agreement was reached whereby Felix pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and received a 12-year...

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