People v. Fyfe

• Decision Date: 25 February 1957
• Citation: 6 Misc.2d 524,166 N.Y.S.2d 976
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Christopher FYFE, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 976

166 N.Y.S.2d 976

6 Misc.2d 524

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Christopher FYFE, Defendant.

County Court, Westchester County.

Feb. 25, 1957.

Joseph F. Gagliardi, Dist. Atty. of Westchester County, White Plains, M. Morton Edmiston, Jr., Yonkers, of counsel, for the People.

Robert E. Dempsey, Peekskill, for defendant.

HAROLD T. GARRITY, Judge.

In this prosecution under Section 1053-a of the Penal Law (criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle resulting in death) there is now before the Court a motion to dismiss made by the defendant at the close of the People's case.

Shorn of all extraneous matter, the issue of law confronting us, as part of the question of failure to establish a prima facie case, is simply: Is intoxication, coupled with an accident occurring on the wrong side of a highway, in and of itself 'culpable negligence' within the meaning of the statute?

The statute reads: 'A person who operates or drives any vehicle of any kind in a reckless or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is killed, is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death.'

The pertinent testimony adduced on behalf of the prosecution can be summarized as follows: The two police officers, Sergeant Lafaro and Patrolman McKechnie and the hospital nurse, testified that in their opinion the defendant was intoxicated. A physician, Dr. Elbert Loughran, who was driving his car in the immediate area and was present at the scene within moments of the accident, would not venture an opinion as to whether the defendant was drunk or sober.

This defendant had been involved in a head-on collision that demolished both automobiles. When found by the police, he was hanging out of the car with his head on the payment and his leg caught in the automobile. He could not be questioned at the scene. Defendant had sustained a severe laceration of the head and a dislocated hip which required surgery.

There has been no admissible evidence as to any scientific test to determine the defendant's being sober or intoxicated.

Defendant had been observed as he drove along the Parkway some one mile from the accident by Officer McKechnie. The officer, although following defendant's and several other cars, had observed no improper driving or violation of any rule of the road. He further testified that defendant had reduced his speed to 35 miles per hour at Leighton's, approximately one mile from the accident.

Defendant's car was being followed by one, Eugene Jacobs, who testified that at one point he had passed defendant's car, driving about 40 miles per hour, at which time the police car, a sports car and defendant's car were all within view of each other. He observed no reckless or improper driving or speeding by defendant. The defendant's car then drifted from the north lane nearest the curb to the curb side of the opposing lane where it collided with a car proceeding in the opposite direction on the latter lane.

A young girl died as a result of this accident. We must, however, consider the matter dispassionately as is the obligation imposed upon the court under our law. We must not decree guilt because of the tragic death.

We would be less than candid were we not to admit being tempted to declare that this issue is one of fact, thereby placing the burden of determining the defendant's fate upon the jury. If that course were to be followed, under the circumstances, we would be evading our solemn obligation as a judge however difficult and soul-searching the task.

A homicide has occurred. The question is whether it is excusable. If it is 'homicide per infortunium', there is no criminal responsibility as homicide by misfortune is not a crime. People v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394, 395.

In People v. Angelo, supra, 246 N.Y. at page 457, 159 N.E. at page 396, there is a most learned review of the pertinent authorities. The Court of Appeals there laid down the rule which has since been cited repeatedly. It defined 'culpable negligence' as 'more than the slight negligence necessary to support a civil action for damages. It means disregard of the consequences which may ensue from the act, and indifference to the rights of others.'

The evidence must establish 'a consciousness on the part of the driver of impending dangerous consequences if he persists in his conduct.' Jenson v. Fletcher, 277 App.Div. 454, 458, 101 N.Y.S.2d 75, 79. And in Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., 'recklessness' is defined as 'The state of mind accompanying an act, which either pays no regard to its probably or possibly injurious consequences, or which, though foreseeing such consequences, persists in spite of such knowledge.'

Many legal authorities have grappled with the difficult problem of precise definition in this field. In the Restatement on Torts, Section 500-g, 'recklessness' is described as 'a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man.'

In applying the several definitions it is well to recall the admonition of Chief Judge Cullen in People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 123, 102 N.E. 530, 533, 46 L.R.A.,N.S. 977, that: 'A long distance separates the negligence which renders one criminally liable from that which establishes civil liability.' This very admonition was re-iterated by the Court of Appeals in People v. Bearden, 290 N.Y. 478, 482, 49 N.E.2d 785, in setting aside a...