People v. Gaines, s. 57843

• Decision Date: 01 August 1974
• Docket Number: Nos. 57843,58985,s. 57843
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven Brooks GAINES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 14

316 N.E.2d 14

21 Ill.App.3d 839

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven Brooks GAINES, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 57843, 58985.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Aug. 1, 1974.

Edward M. Genson, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Kenneth L. Gillis, Dennis J. O'Hara, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

DEMPSEY, Justice.

The defendant, Steven Gaines, was charged with the offense of deviate sexual assault. He withdrew his plea of not guilty, entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of four to six years at the Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard. This is a consolidated appeal from the judgment rendered on his guilty plea and from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The two phases of the appeal have been commingled in his argument and brief. The legal issues pertaining to each phase are different and we will consider them separately. People v. McCarroll (1973), 10 Ill.App.3d 249, 294 N.E.2d 52.

Gaines contends that: (1) his prosecution as an adult was based on a sex classification and thus violated his right to equal protection under the law; (2) his guilty plea was neither intelligently nor voluntarily made; (3) his sentence was influenced by the court's considering improper testimony concerning previous criminal behavior for which he had been arrested but not convicted; (4) his sentence was excessive because the court misapprehended the permissible punishments and, (5) his post-conviction hearing was unfair because the judge who presided at his trial conducted the hearing.

When Gaines' case was called for trial, his counsel requested a conference with the assistant State's attorney and the judge. Gaines' approval of the request appears of record. After the court reconvened, the People read into the record a short narrative of the facts of the case. Gaines, through his counsel, stipulated to those facts. The court then explained the charge of deviate sexual assault and the punishment that could be imposed upon him: imprisonment from four to fourteen years. Gaines acknowledged his understanding of the charge and of the potential punishment. There followed an explanation by the court of the defendant's rights and the consequences of their waiver, and an inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea. Gaines at that point hesitated, saying that the plea was not a result of his own decision, but rather 'my attorney's and my mother's and my father's.' He was then questioned, first by counsel and then by the court:

'Counsel: Mr. Gaines, your mother and I have had a discussion a few moments ago in the jury room of this courtroom?

Gaines: Did we?

Counsel: Yes.

Gaines: Yes.

Counsel: Did we discuss the possibilities of entering pleas and not entering pleas?

Gaines: Yes.

Counsel: And was it your decision with our conversation that a plea of guilty should be entered?

Gaines: No Counsel: It is your wish not to enter a plea of guilty?

Gaines: No.

Counsel: You do not wish to enter a plea of guilty?

Gaines: No.

Counsel: You wish to enter a plea of not guilty?

Gaines: No.

Counsel: What is your desire, Mr. Gaines?

Gaines: When you asked me if I was guilty, I could honestly say I don't know, so. . . .

Counsel: Is it your desire to have a plea of not guilty entered before this court, or a plea of guilty?

Gaines: A plea of guilty because of the circumstances that we talked about.

The Court: The question I am asking you, Mr. Gaines, is whether you are doing this voluntarily? Are you making the decision?

Gaines: Okay, I am, yes.'

Gaines twice repeated that the plea was his own and was made voluntarily. After he had executed a written jury waiver, the court inquired whether his plea had been induced by promises, threats or coercion from any person. He replied twice that it had not and acknowledged that if any promises had been made, they would not bind the court. Before the colloquy ended, Gaines again affirmed his plea of guilty:

'The Court: Now, Mr. Gaines, knowing the nature of the charge against you, the consequences thereof, and the penalty that may be imposed upon you; knowing of your rights that you have just waived, do you still desire to enter a plea of guilty to the crime of deviate sexual assault?

Gaines: Yes.'

At the hearing in aggravation and mitigation a number of witnesses testified to the circumstances of the assault. The victim stated that on July 13, 1971, as she and two female companions were leaving a tavern on Chicago's southwest side, Gaines forced his way into their auto and committed a deviate sexual assault upon her. She related that he held a knife at her side and threatened to kill her if she did not perform the acts which he commanded. He also threatened her companions, instructing one of them to drive the car and ordering the other to disrobe. The latter woman, who had been riding alone in the auto's back seat, corroborated the victim's story. She added that her signals of alarm drew the attention of a group of men who had left the tavern at the same time as the three women. The men followed the auto until it stopped at an intersection. They then left their own car and ran to the women's aid; one of them dragged Gaines into the street. Gaines got loose and ran away, but was apprehended shortly afterward. The man who had pulled Gaines from the auto testified and identified him as the man who had been in the women's car.

The prosecution called two additional witnesses. The first was a young woman who, over objection by defense counsel, described an attempted deviate sexual assault on herself by Gaines in October 1970. In many ways Gaines' behavior at this earlier incident paralleled his conduct at the later one. However, the earlier victim had screamed, which frightened Gaines away. A police officer testified that he had arrested Gaines moments after the October attack and had shown him to the previous witness, who positively identified him as her assailant. The record does not disclose whether Gaines was convicted for this offense.

Also received in evidence was a psychologist's report. The report stated that Gaines, although possessing average to above-average intelligence, displayed 'a combination of syndromes often found in hospitals for the mentally disturbed,' and recommended a long-term psychiatric sypervision and counseling. A letter from Dr. Littner of the Institute for Psychoanalysis, said of the defendant:

'It was my impression, both from his history as well as from my examination, that his emotional illness was of such a degree and nature that he could be considered potentially dangerous to others--particularly if his emotional condition should worsen.

'He seemed fully aware of the nature of the charges against him; he seemed perfectly capable of cooperating with his counsel; and he seemed quite capable of distinguishing right from wrong.'

A Dr. Tilkin testified for the defendant that he had treated him since his arrest in July of 1971. He concurred with the psychologist's chologist's report and with the opinion of Dr. Littner that the defendant required a long period of treatment for his emotional problems. However, he could not predict whether Gaines would or would not commit this type of offense again. He limited his assurances to a statement that among his patients seven of ten responded well to treatment. The defendant's father testified that he had previously sought psychiatric help for him in 1969, 'when my son got in his first trouble,' and in 1970, first 'to try to find help for Steven with the dope situation,' and then after his arrest for the October assault.

The court stated that it was impressed with Gaines' chances for rehabilitation, but noted that he had obtained drugs while hospitalized under Dr. Tilkin's care. The court concluded that incarceration could not be avoided:

'. . . You have weaknesses. If you were just going to destroy yourself I would take the chance and let you destroy yourself or straighten yourself out. My responsibility is not only to you but to the other members of society.

'The odds of seven to three just aren't good enough.'

Promising to seek assurances that Gaines would receive psychiatric care and expressing his willingness to 'personally go to bat' for him before the parole board when he had shown satisfactory progress, the court sentenced him to four to six years in the Menard penitentiary.

Gaines, who was 17 years of age at the time of the 1971 offense, claims that his prosecution as an adult denied him the equal protection of the law, because a female of the same age would have been prosecuted under the Juvenile Court Act as it was then written. Ill.Rev.Stat., 1969, ch. 37, para. 702--7(1). This issue has been settled in People v. Ellis (1974), 57 Ill.2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98. It was held that the differential classification according to sex was invalid, but that the effect of its invalidity was to render the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act inapplicable to both males and females who were not under the age of 17 years at the time they committed an offense. Therefore, the failure to consider Gaines eligible for treatment as a minor did not deprive him of equal protection of the law.

Nor do we agree that Gaines' plea of guilty was secured in violation of his constitutional right to due process. He alleges involuntariness because of the inmproper influence of his parents, counsel, and the court, and also that the plea was not made understandingly, due to his youth and emotional instability.

No evidence appears of record to support the allegation that the defendant was subject to any pressure by the court in his decision to enter a guilty plea. Therefore, we address ourselves only to the alleged pressure exerted by his parents and his attorney.

Constitutional guarantees of due process require that a plea of guilty be intelligent and voluntary. If the plea is to withstand...