People v. Galarza

• Decision Date: 19 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2-04-1075.,2-04-1075.
• Citation: 391 Ill. App.3d 805,910 N.E.2d 1160
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Miguel A. GALARZA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

910 N.E.2d 1160

391 Ill. App.3d 805

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Miguel A. GALARZA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-04-1075.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

May 19, 2009.

Melissa S. Barnhart, Yorkville, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, Gregory L. Slovacek, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Kathleen J. Hammill, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

In the early morning of July 11, 2004, defendant, Miguel A. Galarza, was eating a Taco Bell meal while sitting in the front passenger seat of a vehicle driven by Scott Valencia. After the vehicle drifted over the center line of the road (625 ILCS 5/11-701(a) (West 2004)), Officer John Collins stopped it and asked Valencia for his driver's license. Because Valencia's driving privileges were suspended, he was arrested. After Valencia's arrest, Collins approached defendant, whom the officer did not see doing anything unusual, and asked him whether he could drive. Defendant replied that he could not. Collins then asked defendant for his driver's license or identification card, because the officer needed to record defendant's information in case he was needed as a witness to Valencia's arrest. Defendant produced an Illinois identification card, and Collins returned to his squad car and asked his dispatcher to investigate defendant. The dispatcher informed the officer that there was a warrant for defendant's arrest. Collins arrested defendant and proceeded to inventory the vehicle pursuant to the police department's tow policy. In the trunk of the vehicle was a bowling bag that contained a gun. Valencia denied ownership of the weapon; however, defendant allegedly made statements to Collins that connected defendant to the weapon. Defendant was subsequently charged by information with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2004)), and he moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence seized. Following a hearing, the trial court quashed defendant's arrest and suppressed the statements defendant made to Collins, but the court did not suppress the gun. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed the suppression order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)).

In a prior decision, we affirmed. People v. Galarza, No. 2-04-1075 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The Illinois Supreme Court has entered a supervisory order directing us to vacate our judgment and reconsider our decision in light of People v. Harris, 228 Ill.2d 222, 319 Ill.Dec. 823, 886 N.E.2d 947 (2008), and People v. Cosby, 231 Ill.2d 262, 325 Ill.Dec. 556, 898 N.E.2d 603 (2008). People v. Galarza, 229 Ill.2d 677, 324 Ill. Dec. 839, 896 N.E.2d 1058 (2008). After reconsideration, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

At the suppression hearing, Collins was the only witness who testified. He stated that on July 11, 2004, at approximately 1:09 a.m., he was on duty when he saw a 2004 Toyota Camry pull off to the side of the road. The Camry's headlights were on, but not its hazard lights. Although Collins did not observe anything unusual inside the vehicle, he decided that he would check on the driver's well-being. Before the officer could do so, the Camry pulled back onto the road. Collins followed the vehicle and soon observed the car swerve to the left and over the dotted center line. Collins subsequently activated his overhead lights and stopped the Camry.

When Collins approached the driver's side of the Camry, he observed two men sitting inside the vehicle. Collins illuminated the inside of the Camry with his flashlight and saw defendant sitting in the front passenger seat, eating a Taco Bell product. Collins asked the driver, Valencia, for proof of insurance and his driver's license. Although Valencia was able to produce proof of insurance, he did not have a driver's license, and, instead, he gave Collins his state identification card.

Collins took those documents back to his squad car, and, using his mobile data computer, he learned that Valencia's driving privileges were suspended. Collins informed Valencia about the status of his driving privileges and arrested him. Defendant remained seated in the vehicle, and Collins did not observe defendant doing anything unusual.

Collins informed Valencia that the Camry would be towed, and Valencia asked if he could call his mother to see if she could retrieve the vehicle. Collins allowed Valencia to contact his mother on a cellular phone, and his mother declined to come get the Camry. While Valencia phoned his mother, defendant remained seated in the vehicle. Collins then handcuffed Valencia, and, after approaching defendant, Collins inquired whether defendant could drive the Camry. Defendant replied, "I can't drive," and Collins asked defendant for a driver's license or other form of identification. Defendant produced an Illinois state identification card, which listed defendant's name, address, and date of birth and had a picture of defendant on it. Defendant remained seated in the Camry during this exchange.

Collins returned to his squad car with Valencia, seated Valencia in the backseat of the squad car, and contacted his dispatcher. After verifying defendant's information, the dispatcher informed Collins that there was a warrant for defendant's arrest for failing to appear in court in Aurora. Collins testified that, from the time he obtained defendant's identification through the time he contacted his dispatcher defendant remained seated in the Camry and he never observed defendant exhibiting any unusual or suspicious behavior.

Collins then approached the passenger side of the Camry, informed defendant about the outstanding warrant, handcuffed defendant, and placed him in the rear seat of the squad car. Although defendant did not make a statement at that time, he did make statements to Collins at some point thereafter.

After defendant was taken into custody, Collins proceeded to search the vehicle pursuant to the police department's tow policy. That policy also requires an officer to identify a vehicle's passengers in the event that the passengers need to be located to serve as witnesses to the arrest. Collins testified that, once defendant produced his state identification card, he possessed the information he needed to identify defendant as a witness.

During the search of the Camry, Collins found a bowling bag in the trunk of the vehicle. The bag contained a bowling ball, bowling shoes, and a handgun. Pursuant to a firearm owner's identification card check, Collins learned that Valencia was authorized to own a firearm, but defendant was not. Collins asked Valencia about the firearm, and Valencia, who appeared confused, asked, "[W]hat firearm?"

The trial court quashed defendant's arrest and suppressed the statements defendant made to Collins after he was taken into custody. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found that Collins could properly ask defendant for his identification, but the officer could not investigate defendant via dispatch because, when that investigation occurred, Collins did not possess reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was involved in any criminal activity. Because defendant made the statements at issue after he was improperly detained, the trial court suppressed them. Nevertheless, the trial court did not suppress the weapon, as it was found solely as a result of the proper inventory search.

The State moved to reconsider, contending that defendant made his statements to Collins after the officer had probable cause to support an arrest for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Thus, the State claimed, the statements were sufficiently attenuated from any improper detention. The trial court denied the motion, and the State appealed.

On appeal, the State advanced two alternative reasons why defendant's motion to quash and suppress should have been denied in toto. First, the State claimed that conducting a warrant check on a passenger is permissible if such investigation does not prolong the passenger's detention. The State then contended that, if the warrant check was improper, the subsequent statements could nevertheless be used in prosecuting defendant for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, because intervening probable cause attenuated the taint of the unlawful detention. In February 2006, we determined that the warrant check was unreasonable and that no attenuation arose. People v. Galarza, No. 2-04-1075 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The State appealed to our supreme court.

In a supervisory order issued November 26, 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition for leave to appeal but remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of Harris and Cosby.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, we consider whether the warrant check of defendant was proper and, if not, whether intervening probable cause attenuated the taint of the unlawful detention. However, before addressing those issues, we reexamine defendant's claim that this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, and then we address defendant's motion to cite additional authority.

1. Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that, because the substance of the statements defendant made to Collins is unknown, an appeal pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1) is improper because it is not known whether the suppression of those statements substantially impaired the State's ability to prosecute this case. See People v. Young, 82 Ill.2d 234, 247, 45 Ill.Dec. 150, 412 N.E.2d 501 (1980). We find defendant's argument unpersuasive. Rule 604(a)(1) provides that the State may appeal from an order the substantial effect of which results in, among other things, suppressing evidence. 210 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1). In determining whether that...