People v. Gallegos
| Citation | 946 P.2d 946 |
| Decision Date | 22 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96SC373,96SC373 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Eric Anthony GALLEGOS, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Enforcement Section, Denver, for Petitioner.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Beth L. Krulewitch, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Respondent.
We granted certiorari in People v. Gallegos, 926 P.2d 156 (Colo.App.1996), to review the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the second-degree murder conviction of the respondent, Eric Gallegos. 1 The trial court dismissed two of the three counts against Gallegos at the preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause. The prosecution appealed the dismissal, but eventually chose to withdraw its appeal. Prior to trial, Gallegos moved to dismiss the remaining charge, claiming he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to section 18-1-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1996 Supp.). The trial court denied the motion and a jury convicted Gallegos. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and directed the trial court to dismiss the charges with prejudice. It concluded that Gallegos was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial because the speedy trial period continued to run during the prosecution's appeal of the trial court's probable cause determination. See Gallegos, 926 P.2d at 158.
We hold that the prosecution's appeal of a trial court's partial dismissal of a multi-count information at a preliminary hearing is an interlocutory appeal, within the meaning of the speedy trial statute, which tolls the running of the six-month statutory speedy trial period. See § 18-1-405(6)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Because of our resolution of this issue, we do not reach the issue of whether the prosecution's appeal was proper under section 16-12-102(1), 8A C.R.S. (1996 Supp.). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to that court for further proceedings.
On September 18, 1992, Gallegos and a juvenile were charged by information with first-degree murder, 2 felony murder, 3 and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, 4 based on the stabbing death of Jason Gutierrez. Pursuant to section 16-5-301, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1996 Supp.), and Crim. P. 7, both defendants requested a preliminary hearing, which was held on November 4 and 5, 1992. The trial court dismissed the felony murder count against Gallegos, and the conspiracy counts against both Gallegos and the juvenile, due to a lack of probable cause.
On November 18, 1992, Gallegos entered a plea of not guilty to the remaining charge of first-degree murder. Pursuant to section 18-1-405(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986), Gallegos was entitled to a trial by May 18, 1993, six months from the date of his plea.
On December 22, 1992, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal in the court of appeals challenging the trial court's dismissal of the felony murder count and the conspiracy counts. The prosecution cited section 16-12-102, 8A C.R.S. (1986), and People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo.1988), as authority for the jurisdiction of the court of appeals to hear the appeal. The prosecution also filed a motion in the trial court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. Gallegos objected, arguing to the trial court that its probable cause determinations were clearly correct and that the prosecution had taken the appeal in bad faith, as a stalling tactic. Gallegos also maintained that the prosecution's appeal of the trial court's probable cause determinations could take over a year while he remained in custody. The trial court granted the stay.
On March 2, 1993, the court of appeals sent notice to the parties that the record on appeal had been filed and that the prosecution's opening brief was due on April 7. On April 5, 1993, the prosecution asked the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. The prosecution had reached a plea disposition with the juvenile defendant, making him available for testimony, and did not wish to proceed with the appeal. On April 8, 1993, the court of appeals granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss the appeal. On the same day the appeal was dismissed, Gallegos filed a motion in the court of appeals for sanctions against the prosecution for the filing of a frivolous appeal. The appeal was frivolous, Gallegos argued, because the ruling at the preliminary hearing was correct. This motion was denied by the court of appeals. The defendant did not raise the question of whether the prosecution's appeal was proper under section 16-12-102(1) in the appeal from the probable cause determination. The mandate of the court of appeals was issued on May 10, 1993.
On May 14, 1993, Gallegos filed a motion with the trial court demanding a speedy trial. Gallegos noted that he had entered his plea of not guilty on November 18, 1992, that he had not waived his right to a speedy trial, that the speedy trial period would expire on May 18, 1993, and that no trial date had been set. On May 19, 1993, Gallegos filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him for lack of a speedy trial. Gallegos argued that his speedy trial right was violated for two reasons: under section 18-1-405, a direct appeal to the court of appeals does not toll the speedy trial period; and even if the speedy trial period was tolled, it was ineffective in this case because the prosecution's appeal was taken in bad faith.
In denying Gallegos' motion, the trial court determined that the prosecution's appeal had tolled the speedy trial period. Also, the court found that the decision to file the appeal was the only remedy available to the prosecution to challenge its dismissal of two counts of the information. Thus, the trial court found that the appeal was not taken in bad faith and reset the trial for August 23, 1993. Trial commenced as scheduled and a jury convicted Gallegos of second-degree murder and accessory after-the-fact to manslaughter.
On appeal, Gallegos argued that his conviction should be reversed because he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial. The prosecution maintained that its appeal of the trial court's probable cause determination was an interlocutory appeal, so the delay it caused was excludable from the speedy trial period under section 18-1-405(6)(b).
The court of appeals held that although the statutory speedy trial period is tolled by an interlocutory appeal, the appeal in this case did not qualify as interlocutory because it was not authorized by statute or rules, and was materially different from other types of interlocutory appellate proceedings. See Gallegos, 926 P.2d at 160-63. The court of appeals also held that it had jurisdiction to hear appeals only of final judgments under section 13-4-102(1), 6A C.R.S. (1987), and an interlocutory order is by definition not a final judgment. Id. at 163-64. The court of appeals concluded that Gallegos' right to a speedy trial had been violated and remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the charges with prejudice. Id. at 164.
We first address whether the dismissed appeal in this case was an interlocutory appeal within the meaning of that term as used in section 18-1-405(6)(b) of the speedy trial statute.
The speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986), provides that if a trial is not commenced within six months from the date of the defendant's entry of a plea of not guilty, the pending charges shall be dismissed. However, certain periods of delay are excluded in section 18-1-405(6), 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.), which provides in pertinent part:
(6) In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time shall be excluded:
...
(b) The period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether commenced by the defendant or the prosecution....
See also Crim. P. 48(b). The six-month period continues to run unless the nature of the delay fits within one of the exclusions under the statute. See People in the Interest of N.P., 768 P.2d 706, 708 (Colo.1989). The language of section 18-1-405(1) is mandatory and leaves no discretion for the court to make exceptions to the six-month rule beyond those delineated in section 18-1-405(6). See People v. Byrne, 762 P.2d 674, 676 (Colo.1988). The speedy trial statute was intended to complement and render constitutional speedy trial guarantees more effective. See People v. Bell, 669 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Colo.1983). However, we must also avoid applying the speedy trial provisions in a "wooden or mechanistic fashion" which would defeat the important countervailing interest in effective enforcement of criminal laws. See People v. Runningbear, 753 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo.1988) (citing II ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial, § 12-2.1, Commentary (1986)).
The prosecution maintains that the appeal of the trial court's partial dismissal must be construed as an interlocutory appeal, which is excludable under section 18-1-405(6)(b). To resolve this issue, we examine the meaning of "interlocutory appeal" as the term is used in section 18-1-405(6)(b).
While section 18-1-405(6)(b) excludes delays caused by interlocutory appeals from the speedy trial period, the term "interlocutory appeal" is not defined in the speedy trial statute. In considering whether the prosecution's appeal in this case should be characterized as interlocutory for speedy trial purposes, we must construe the language of the speedy trial statute and other related statutes in order to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. See Runningbear, 753 P.2d at 767. Because certain conflicts inhere in the existing statutory scheme, we must...
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