People v. Gansley
| Decision Date | 01 June 1916 |
| Docket Number | No. 138.,138. |
| Citation | 158 N.W. 195,191 Mich. 357 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. GANSLEY. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Circuit Court, Ingham County; Chas. B. Collingwood, Judge.
Jacob Gansley was convicted of violation of corrupt practices act, and brings exceptions. Affirmed by divided court.
Argued before STONE, C. J., and KUHN, OSTRANDER, BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, and PERSON, JJ. Warner & Raudabaugh, of Lansing (Fred A. Baker, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellant.
Leland W. Carr, Asst. Atty. Gen, Grant Fellows, Atty. Gen., and William C. Brown, Pros. Atty., of Lansing, for the People.
This case is brought here upon exceptions by the respondent, after conviction, and before sentence, for an alleged violation of section 14 of Act No. 109 of the Public Acts of 1913, entitled:
‘An act to regulate and limit nomination and election expenses, to define and prevent corrupt and illegal practices in nominations and elections, to secure and protect the purity of the ballot, and to require accounts of nomination and election expenses to be filed, and providing penalties for the violation of this act.’
The accusation set forth in the information reads as follows:
‘That heretofore, to wit, on the 1st day of April, A. D. 1914, at the city of Lansing, and in the county aforesaid, one Jacob Gansley, being then and there an official, director, and manager of the Lansing Brewing Company, a Michigan corporation, and acting for said Lansing Brewing Company, a Michigan corporation, did pay, give, and lend to a certain political committee, to wit, the Personal Liberty League of Lansing, Michigan, the sum of five hundred ($500.00) dollars, in money belonging to the said Lansing Brewing Company, for the payment of election expenses incurred in opposing local option at an election to be held and which was held on the 6th day of April, A. D. 1914, in the said county of Ingham, to ascertain the will of the electors of said county, whether or not the manufacture of liquors and the liquor traffic should be prohibited within the limits of said county, the said Lansing Brewing Company being then and there a corporation incorporated and existing under the laws of the state of Michigan and doing business at the city of Lansing in said state, and not being a corporation formed for political purposes; the said Personal Liberty League then and there being a committee opposing local option at the election to be held and which was held in said county of Ingham on the 6th day of April, A. D. 1914, to ascertain the will of the electors of said county, whether or not the manufacture of liquors and the liquor traffic should be prohibited within the limits of said county-contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of Michigan.’
Upon arraignment the respondent stood mute, but moved the court to dismiss the information for the reason: That it set forth no offense known to the law. That said section 14 is unconstitutional and void because: (1) Said section is not within the title to the act, and is in conflict with the provision of the Constitution of this state requiring the object of an act of the Legislature to be set forth in its title. (2) That said section 14 is in conflict with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. That corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and said section 14 denies to all corporations, domestic or foreign, other than corporations organized for political purposes, the right secured to natural persons by section 3 of said act to make expenditures of money for nomination or election expenses. (3) That the title of said act confines it to the nomination and election of candidates for office, and it can have no application to local option elections in the several counties of the state, under the local option prohibitory liquor laws of this state. (4) That said section 14 is in conflict with section 4 of article 2 of the Constitution of this state. (5) That the act is indefinite, uncertain, and vague, and the intent and meaning of the same cannot be interpreted. (6) That it is class legislation, especially section 14 of the act.
The trial court overruled the motion, to which ruling respondent duly excepted, and thereupon a plea of not guilty was entered by order of the court. The assignments of error are to the effect that the court erred in overruling respondent's motion to dismiss the information, which motion was made at the time said respondent was arraigned, and renewed after the evidence had been submitted; also in adjudging the respondent guilty, contrary to the objections to said information. In this court counsel for respondent argued the questions presented under the following heads:
(1) Whether the act has any application to elections under the local option prohibitory liquor law.
(2) That section 14 of the act is unconstitutional and void, first because it denies to corporations, as artificial persons, the right granted to natural persons to make the legitimate expenditures authorized by section 3 of the act; and, second, it denies to corporations the right to make such lawful expenditures as may be necessary to protect their interests in contests to be determined by the people at the polls.
(3) That section 14 is also in conflict with the provision of the Constitution of this state, which (section 4, art. 2) reads:
‘Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.’
(4) That the whole act should be declared unconstitutional and void.
It may be said at the threshold of this opinion that the construction and validity of the act in question, in so far as it affects the conduct of the respondent, are here involved.
1. As we understand the first position of counsel for the respondent, it is that this act, which is generally spoken of as the ‘Corrupt Practices Act,’ has no application to what may be termed local option elections; ‘that, looking at the title and body of the act together, neither should be construed as applying to local option elections.’ We have with some care made an analysis of this act, copying such sections as are particularly relevant, and, as that is the first time we have been called upon to examine the act, we include such analysis here:
Section 1 of the act limits the sum of money to be paid, or expenses authorized or incurred, by or on behalf of any candidate, to be paid by him in order to secure or aid in securing his nomination to any public office or position in this state. It also provides that no sums of money shall be paid, and no expense authorized or incurred, by or on behalf of any candidate who has received a nomination to any such office or position, in excess of a stated amount; further, that no sum of money shall be paid, and no expense authorized or incurred, by or on behalf of any candidate contrary to the provisions of the act.
Section 2 provides that every political committee shall appoint a treasurer, who shall receive, keep, and disburse all sums of money which may be collected or received by such committee, or by any of its members, for election expenses; and unless such treasurer is first appointed, it shall be unlawful for a political committee or any of its members to collect, receive, or disburse money for any such purpose.
Section 3 provides that no candidate, and no treasurer of any political committee, shall pay, give, or lend, or agree to pay, give, or lend, either directly or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing for any nomination or election expenses whatever, except for the 11 purposes therein specified. It also provides that none of the provisions of the act shall be construed as relating to the rendering of services by speakers, writers, publishers, or others, for which no compensation is asked or given.
Section 4 provides that every candidate and every treasurer of a political committee shall file within the time specified a full, true, and detailed account and statement of all money received or disbursed by him for nomination or election expenses, and specifies what such statement shall contain.
Section 5 makes it unlawful to administer the oath of office, or to issue a commission or certificate of nomination or election, to any person nominated or elected to any public office until he has filed an account as required by the act, and provides that no such person shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed such account, nor shall he receive any salary or fees for any period prior to the filing of the same.
Section 6 provides that such accounts shall be open to public inspection.
Sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 relate to the statement, and what may be done in case it is not filed, or is not conformable to the statute.
Section 11 is as follows:
‘No person who is not a candidate, or the treasurer of a political committee, shall pay, give or lend, or agree to pay, give or lend, any money whether contributed by himself or by any other person, for any election expenses whatever, except to a candidate or to a political committee.’
Section 12 provides that no money paid shall be credited to any person other than the one furnishing it.
Section 13 makes it unlawful for any candidate, or treasurer of a political committee, or person acting as such treasurer, to disburse money received from any anonymous source.
Section 14 is the section which respondent is charged with having violated. It reads as follows:
‘No officer, director, stockholder, attorney, agent or any other person, acting...
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Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 11
...such corporation to any candidate or to any political committee for the payment of any election expenses whatever.'28 People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195 (1916), decided by an equally divided Court.29 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).30 Katzen......
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Smith v. Higinbothom
...... chosen by the Legislature; but the wave of Jacksonian. Democracy eventually led to the election of Judges by the. people. This movement began in Mississippi in 1832. New York. and Iowa changed to the elective system in 1846; Illinois,. Arkansas and Wisconsin in 1848; ... Practices Act. They may freely speak, write and publish their. views. People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195, 201, Ann.Cas.1918E, 165. . . The. punishment prescribed for a violation of Section 172 (now. ......
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Smith v. Higinbothom
...are not prohibited by the Corrupt Practices Act. They may freely speak, write and publish their views. People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.W. 195, 201, Ann.Cas.1918E, 165. The punishment prescribed for a violation of Section 172 (now Section 157) is a fine of not more than $5,000 and im......
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