People v. Garcia

Decision Date07 December 1976
Docket NumberNo. 55926,55926
Citation398 Mich. 250,247 N.W.2d 547
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. 398 Mich. 250, 247 N.W.2d 547
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Lee Wm. Atkinson, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee.

Norris J. Thomas, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

LINDEMER, Justice.

In the early morning hours of December 15, 1969, Mrs. Eileen Garcia and Mr. Blevins Rinehart were shot to death outside the Peerless Gear Company in Clinton, Michigan. The slayings took place in the factory parking lot as the employees reported for the day shift. Both victims died of gunshot wounds to the head. Later that same day defendant was apprehended by the police and charged with the murder of his wife. In May of 1970, defendant was bench-tried before Lenawee County Circuit Judge Rex B. Martin. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. In his appeal of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. 33 Mich.App. 598, 190 N.W.2d 347 (1971). Leave to appeal that decision to this Court was denied. 386 Mich. 766 (1971). Defendant then filed a motion for a new trial with the trial court. Defendant appealed the denial of that motion to the Court of Appeals which again upheld the conviction. 51 Mich.App. 109, 214 N.W.2d 544 (1974). This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal. 392 Mich. 803 (1974). We affirm.

Initially, we consider defendant's claim that the trial court improperly refused to direct a verdict of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's proofs. An appellate court tests the correctness of the denial of such motion by taking the evidence Presented by the prosecution in the light most favorable to the prosecution and deciding if there was any evidence upon which the trier of fact could predicate a finding of guilty of murder in the first degree. People v. Vail, 393 Mich. 460, 227 N.W.2d 535 (1975). People v. Abernathy, 253 Mich. 583, 235 N.W. 261 (1931). To the extent that the case of People v. Qualls, 9 Mich.App. 689, 158 N.W.2d 60 (1968), holds to the contrary, it is expressly overruled.

When moving for acquittal, defense counsel argued that there was no evidence linking defendant to the perpetration of the crime. We disagree. A number of persons who witnessed the slayings testified but were unable to positively identify defendant as the assailant. However, it was established that defendant had made several recent threats to kill his wife and anyone found with her; the assailant escaped in the defendant's car; and a police officer testified that when apprehended the defendant admitted being in sole possession of his car during the time of the slayings. Defendant was known to have been in possession of a .22 caliber revolver and some ammunition. A police expert testified that the bullet recovered from the wife's body is of the type which could have been fired from such a pistol. The murder weapon was never recovered so a match between the bullet and the pistol could not be accomplished.

Witnesses testified that the slayings took place between 6:30 and 6:45 a.m. One witness observed that the assailant was wearing a dark topcoat. After the shooting, the assailant entered defendant's car and calmly drove from the parking lot (in Clinton) towards Tecumseh, approximately 4 miles south. Defendant was observed driving his car in Adrian, 15 miles south of Clinton, sometime between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. Defendant, wearing a dark trench coat, arrived at James McClarren's house, about 10 miles from the prior sighting, sometime between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. We believe this chain of circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow the trial judge to deny the motion. In our opinion these proofs contained some relevant evidence on each of the elements of the crime charged and that defendant was the perpetrator of that crime. The trial judge properly denied the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case.

The next of defendant's four raised issues concerns the defense of voluntary intoxication. Defendant argues that the crime of first-degree murder requires the specific intent to kill. Defendant then argues that the law of this State is such that voluntary intoxication can be a defense to crimes which require a specific intent. Defendant concludes by arguing that the trial judge erroneously concluded that defendant was not so intoxicated that he did not form the specific intent to kill. In related subarguments, the defendant alleges that the trial court failed to find all of the necessary elements of first-degree murder; that the defendant was acting under diminished mental responsibility sufficient to negate the elements of specific intent and premeditation and deliberation; and that the evidence was insufficient for a finding of guilt of any crime greater that the crime of voluntary manslaughter. M.C.L.A. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553. We find these related issues to be without merit.

Murder is homicide committed with malice aforethought. At the common law, the crime of murder was not divided into degrees. The present statutory scheme providing for the separation of murder into degrees was 'for the purpose of graduating the punishment'. People v. John Doe, 1 Mich. 451, 457 (1850). This classification of murder by degree was first enacted by the state of Pennsylvania in 1794. In 1838, motivated by a concern that the more culpable forms of murder should be punished more severely, this state adopted a similar statutory scheme. People v. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 6 (1858); People v. Morrin, 31 Mich.App. 301, 325, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971).

Courts in Pennsylvania have consistently held that their first-degree murder statute requires a specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 41 (Phila. O. & T., 1834); Commonwealth v. Fostar, 455 Pa. 216, 317 A.2d 188 (1974).

Michigan courts have not been so consistent. In People v. Scott, 6 Mich. 287, 294 (1859), this Court stated:

'Except in cases expressly named in the statute, Murder in the first degree requires the existence of a deliberate intention to take life; and any slaying in which a jury should find either the absence of deliberation, or that the intent was to commit another and a lesser injury, must be either murder in the second degree or one of the lighter grades of homicide.' (Emphasis supplied).

However, confusion began when this Court, on policy grounds, rejected the defense of voluntary intoxication in a prosecution of first-degree murder. People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (1868). Broad statements from cases involving second-degree murder convictions added to the confusion. Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16 (1874).

Another problem with some of the cases is that the crime charged was not a homicide. An example is Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870), which involved an assault with intent to commit murder. In hopes of ending the confusion and on the authority in Potter and Scott, we hold that nonfelony first degree murder is a specific intent crime requiring an intention to take life.

Our holding is supported by the language of the first degree murder statute.

'All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing * * * shall be murder of the first degree.' M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548.

A reading of the statute mandates the construction that 'wilful * * * killing' means the intent to accomplish the result of death.

Voluntary intoxication can be a defense to crimes which require a specific intent.

'While it is true that drunkenness cannot excuse crime, it is equally true that when a certain intent is a necessary element in a crime, the crime cannot have been committed when the intent did not exist.' People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156, 158 (1878).

In the case at bar, however, the trial judge rejected the defense of voluntary intoxication. We believe he did so properly. In his finding of facts, the trial judge stated:

'I think he formed an intent to do away with her (his wife) if he caught her with someone else. I think he went to Clinton early Monday morning with his pistol to kill her if the occasion arose and he thought he should.'

These findings of fact support he conclusion that the murder was premeditated and deliberated upon. The record also supports the trial judge's conclusion the defendant acted with wilfulness. The trial judge found the killing to be intentional rather than accidental:

'The physical facts themselves, the place where the bullet went in each person, the fact there were no powder burns, the path of the bullet, the type of gun, the fact that it had to be cocked every time it was fired would completely belie this story, so there wasn't any accidental killing.'

Defendant argues that certain remarks of the trial judge indicate that defendant was found to have been operating under a diminished mental capacity due to consumption of alcohol and lack of sleep. Specifically defendant points to these statements:

'I am convinced his ability to form a proper judgment was impaired by his voluntary consumption of intoxicants. * * * I am convinced he wouldn't have killed them, either one of them, if he had been sober.'

However, the entire passage from which those comments were excised evidences an entirely different conclusion. Our review of the transcript leads us to believe that the trial judge was properly convinced that, in spite of his drinking spree, the defendant had the ability to and did actually premeditate and deliberate over his wife's death.

'Now, the People must convince the Court beyond a reasonable doubt of premeditation and malice to have first degree murder. Dr. Dukay stated very emphatically among some of his other testimony that when you take the total picture of the alcoholism, the lack of sleep, the lack of food, etc., the Defendant didn't have the ability to specifically form an intent to...

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