People v. Garcia, 109886.
| Citation | 948 N.E.2d 32,241 Ill.2d 416,349 Ill.Dec. 929 |
| Decision Date | 28 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 109886.,109886. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of The State of Illinois, Appellant,v.Abraham GARCIA, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michele Grimaldi Stein and Annette Collins, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, and Deborah Nall, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.
[349 Ill.Dec. 930 , 241 Ill.2d 418] OPINION
The issue in this appeal is whether a defendant's wrongful delay of criminal proceedings by violating bond and becoming a fugitive from justice tolls the 10–year limitation on prior convictions used to impose an extended-term sentence under section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–5–3.2(b)(1) (West 1998)). The appellate court answered that question negatively, relying on the absence of statutory language specifically tolling
[349 Ill.Dec. 931 , 948 N.E.2d 34]
the 10–year limit based on a defendant's wrongful delay. 396 Ill.App.3d 792, 799, 337 Ill.Dec. 372, 922 N.E.2d 495. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the part of the appellate court's judgment construing the statute.
In November 1999, the State charged defendant, Abraham Garcia, with attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery, alleging that defendant beat the victim following a minor traffic incident on August 31, 1999.
Pertinent to this appeal, the circuit court of Cook County released defendant on bond, but later issued a bond forfeiture warrant when defendant failed to appear. The warrant was quashed when defendant appeared at a subsequent hearing. Defendant again failed to appear at another hearing. Thus, in November 2000, the court issued a second bond forfeiture warrant. For the next six years, defendant remained a fugitive from justice. Defendant was not rearrested until November 2006.
In 2008, defendant was tried in a bench trial. The State presented evidence that the victim, Roberto Rios, and his wife were driving on a public road when they encountered defendant's vehicle stopped on the road, blocking Rios' passage. After waiting briefly, Rios honked his car horn at defendant's vehicle. Defendant exited his vehicle and approached Rios' car. Defendant argued with Rios and unsuccessfully tried to hit Rios through an open car window. Rios and his wife then drove to a nearby restaurant.
Shortly afterward, defendant and another man entered the restaurant and attacked Rios. Defendant restrained Rios while the other man repeatedly hit Rios with a metal pipe. Rios eventually fell to the ground. While Rios was on the ground, defendant hit him in the head with a glass pitcher, breaking the pitcher. Defendant then cut Rios' face with pieces of broken glass. During the attack, Rios sustained a broken arm and serious permanent injuries to his face. Ultimately, the trial court convicted defendant of three counts of aggravated battery.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence based on his 1993 conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The trial court sentenced defendant to three extended 90–month prison terms, to be served concurrently.
Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing that he was not eligible for an extended-term sentence under section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) of the Code because that section authorized an extended-term sentence based only on prior convictions within the previous 10 years, but his 1993 conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle occurred more than 10 years before his 2008 conviction in this case. The trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider, finding that the statutory 10–year limit was tolled during the six years when defendant willfully violated his bail bond.
On appeal, the appellate court agreed with defendant's challenge to his extended-term sentence. The court recognized that section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) was intended to impose harsher sentences on offenders who had demonstrated their resistance to correction through repeated convictions but also noted, as a penal statute, it must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. Observing that the statute contained no express tolling language, the court declined to toll the 10–year time limit when a defendant wrongfully delayed the criminal proceedings. 396 Ill.App.3d at 798–99, 337 Ill.Dec. 372, 922 N.E.2d 495.
[948 N.E.2d 35 , 349 Ill.Dec. 932]
Accordingly, the appellate court determined that defendant was not eligible for an extended-term sentence when his 1993 conviction occurred more than 10 years before his 2008 conviction. Consequently, the court vacated as void the extended-term portion of his sentence, consisting of 2 1/2 years. The court also remanded the cause to the trial court to vacate one of defendant's aggravated battery convictions under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. 396 Ill.App.3d at 795–97, 337 Ill.Dec. 372, 922 N.E.2d 495.
We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb.26, 2010). The State challenges only the part of the appellate court's judgment on the extended-term sentence issue, and we thus limit our consideration in this case to that issue.
The State argues the appellate court erred when it held that defendant's wrongful delay of criminal proceedings by becoming a fugitive from justice did not toll the 10–year limit on prior convictions used to impose an extended-term sentence under section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) of the Code. Acknowledging that the statute does not specifically toll the 10–year time limit when a defendant wrongfully delays proceedings, the State nonetheless contends that the appellate court's construction of the statute was overly strict and directly conflicts with both legislative intent and well-established public policy prohibiting a criminal defendant from benefitting from his own wrongdoing.
We review de novo the State's claim because it presents a question of statutory construction. People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill.2d 150, 156, 337 Ill.Dec. 877, 923 N.E.2d 728 (2010). When construing a statute, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, best indicated by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Tidwell, 236 Ill.2d at 157, 337 Ill.Dec. 877, 923 N.E.2d 728. A reviewing court may also consider the underlying purpose of the statute's enactment, the evils sought to be remedied, and the consequences of construing the statute in one manner versus another. People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery, 235 Ill.2d 73, 79, 335 Ill.Dec. 592, 919 N.E.2d 311 (2009). It is always presumed that the legislature did not intend to cause absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill.2d 32, 44, 332 Ill.Dec. 334, 912 N.E.2d 1220 (2009).
Section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) of the Code allows for imposition of an extended-term sentence based on a defendant's prior conviction when:
“[A] defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois or any other jurisdiction of the same or similar class felony or greater class felony, when such conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous conviction, excluding time spent in custody, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts[.]” 730 ILCS 5/5–5–3.2(b)(1) (West 1998).
Initially, we note that the legislature's intent underlying this provision is settled. As a recidivist statute, the goal of section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) People v. Robinson, 89 Ill.2d 469, 476, 60 Ill.Dec. 632, 433 N.E.2d 674 (1982); see also People v. Lemons, 191 Ill.2d 155, 160, 246 Ill.Dec. 116, 729 N.E.2d 489 (2000) (). Consistent with this purpose, the plain language of the statute authorizes an extended-term sentence based on a
[349 Ill.Dec. 933 , 948 N.E.2d 36]
defendant's prior criminal conviction within the preceding 10 years, excluding time spent in custody. Although the language allows exclusion of time spent in custody, it does not refer to time spent as a result of a defendant's wrongful delay.
We find instructive our decision in People v. Harden, 113 Ill.2d 14, 21, 99 Ill.Dec. 109, 495 N.E.2d 490 (1986). In Harden, we construed an earlier version of section 5–5–3.2(b)(1) to determine whether a prior federal conviction could serve as the basis for imposition of an extended-term sentence. The version of the statute in Harden did not specifically reference a federal conviction. Instead, the statutory language allowed imposition of an extended-term sentence “ ‘[w]hen a defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois of the same or greater class felony, within 10 years, excluding time spent in custody.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Harden, 113 Ill.2d at 21, 99 Ill.Dec. 109, 495 N.E.2d 490 (quoting Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1005–5–3.2(b)(1)). In other words, the statute was silent on the issue of whether it applied to a prior federal conviction.
While noting that the statutory language did not reference federal convictions, we also observed that the statute did not confine its application only to Illinois convictions. To resolve the issue, we focused on the legislative objective underlying the extended-term sentencing statute, namely, to punish repeat criminal offenders more severely. Harden, 113 Ill.2d at 21, 99 Ill.Dec. 109, 495 N.E.2d 490.
In light of the legislature's intent, we determined that, despite the...
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