People v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 01 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. S069783,S069783
• Citation: People v. Garcia, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 280, 20 Cal.4th 490, 976 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1999)
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 21 Cal.4th 85A, 976 P.2d 831, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4094, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5235 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jerry GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant

Page 280

85 Cal.Rptr.2d 280

20 Cal.4th 490, 21 Cal.4th 85A, 976 P.2d 831,

99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4094,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5235

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.Jerry GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S069783.

Supreme Court of California

June 1, 1999.

Rehearing Denied and Opinon Modified July 21, 1999.

As Modified July 21 and Aug. 11, 1999.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Sanjay T. Kumar, Kenneth C. Byrne, Pamela C. Hamanaka and Alene M. Games, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

In this case, we consider whether a trial court, when applying the "Three Strikes" law (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),1170.12, subds. (a)-(d),)¹ may exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a), so as to dismiss a prior conviction allegation with respect to one count but not another.We conclude that a court may exercise its discretion in this way and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so here.Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 19, 1996, Barbara Gantt left her home suddenly to go to the hospital and inadvertently left a window open.She returned home less than two hours later and found the place ransacked.Various items were missing, including a translating machine, jewelry, and a videocassette recorder.As she was cleaning up, she found a wallet with defendant's driver's license on the floor among some of her papers.

On September 4, 1996, Grace Kobel returned home to find defendant bicycling out of her driveway.A window was broken, the screen was lying on the ground, and her front door was open.Kobel called the police, who arrived a few minutes later.She entered the house with the police and found various items missing, including a telephone, jewelry, and a toy airplane.About the same time, police officers spotted defendant riding a bicycle several blocks away and stopped him.Defendant was holding two plastic bags that contained many of the items missing from Kobel's home.He also had jewelry in his pockets.

Defendant admitted burglarizing the Gantt and Kobel homes.He described the burglaries in detail and pointed out their locations as police drove him around in a van.He also admitted a third burglary and pointed out its location.

The district attorney charged defendant with three counts of burglary (§ 459), but moved to dismiss the second count in exchange for defendant's waiving his right to a jury trial.The court granted the motion.The remaining counts related to the burglaries of the Gantt and Kobel homes.The court found defendant guilty on both counts.The court also found true an allegation that defendant had five prior serious felony convictions qualifying as "strikes" for purposes of the Three Strikes law.(SeePeople v. Fuhrman(1997)16 Cal.4th 930, 932, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 941 P.2d 1189, fn. 2["We use the term 'strike' to describe a prior felony conviction that qualifies a defendant for the increased punishment specified in the Three Strikes law."].)These convictions, all on July 17, 1991, were for five burglaries (§ 459) that took place on separate occasions during a short crime spree.The court also found that the same five burglary convictions qualified as one prior serious felony conviction for purposes of the five-year enhancement set forth in section 667, subdivision (a)(1).Finally, for purposes of the one-year enhancement set forth in section 667.5, subdivision (b), the court found true an allegation that defendant had served three prior prison terms.The first of these terms was for a January 10, 1985, conviction for receiving stolen property (§ 496), the second for a February 19, 1987, conviction for possession of heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), and the third for the five 1991 burglary convictions already mentioned.

At the sentencing hearing, the court considered a probation report indicating defendant had a history of burglarizing homes and then trading stolen property for drugs.Barbara Gantt and Grace Kobel then described the impact defendant's crimes had on them and asked the court to give defendant the maximum sentence.Next, defendant's girlfriend described defendant's difficult life, saying he grew up in foster homes and was addicted to heroin by age 12.Finally, defendant expressed remorse about the burglaries and asked for forgiveness.

Defense counsel then asked the court to exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a)(seePeople v. Superior Court(Romero )(1996)13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628(Romero )), and dismiss, or "strike," four of the five prior conviction allegations as to both counts, thereby making the case a "second strike" case and reducing defendant's sentence to a term of 22 years and 8 months.The court responded that "the interests of justice would not be served by striking four strikes in this case," and to do so "would be for the sole purpose of avoiding the sentence I'm required to hand down by law."The court noted that defendant committed five separate residential burglaries, went to state prison, and then, shortly after his release and while still on parole, committed two more residential burglaries."[I]f the Three Strikes law was meant for anyone it was meant for Mr. Garcia,"the court said.The court also concluded that the crimes "were not committed out of a need by Mr. Garcia to support a drug habit."However, the court granted defendant's request for a continuance to present further evidence connecting the crimes to drug addiction.At a subsequent hearing, defendant's aunt testified about defendant's difficult childhood and drug use at age 12 or 13.Then, in argument, defense counsel further stressed defendant's long history of drug abuse.

After hearing this additional evidence and argument, the court agreed that defendant's drug addiction was "a factor in mitigation."The court also noted that all defendant's prior serious felony convictions arose from a single period of aberrant behavior for which he served a single prison term.The court commented that defendant had cooperated with police both in 1991 and when they arrested him for the current offenses.Finally, the court stated that defendant had no record of violence.

As to the Kobel burglary, the court sentenced defendant to a term of 30 years to life in state prison.This sentence included 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law plus the mandatory (§ 1385, subd. (b)) 5-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).The court initially imposed three 1-year enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b), for the prior prison terms, but then exercised its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a), and struck these enhancements.As to the Gantt burglary, the court exercised its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a), and struck all the prior conviction allegations.In a minute order, the court stated it was striking the prior conviction allegations because they"all refer [to] one case, defendant has cooperated with police in both cases, is addicted to drugs and has not suffered any violent priors."The court calculated a sentence of 16 months, which was one-third the middle term of 4 years.²The court ordered that this sentence be served cosecutively to the sentence on the Kobel burglary, because the two counts reflected "two separate incidents on two separate dates."Nevertheless, the court stated that a sentence of 30 years to life was "appropriate" and that, but for the constraints of the Three Strikes law, it would have ordered that the 16-month sentence on the Gantt burglary be served concurrently.Defendant's total sentence on both counts was 31 years and 4 months to life.The court imposed a $200 restitution fine and also ordered $400 restitution to Grace Kobel and $20,000 restitution to Barbara Gantt, less the value of any property returned.

Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions.The Attorney General responded to defendant's argument.He also asserted that the trial court lacked authority under section 1385, subdivision (a), to strike the prior conviction allegations as to the Gantt burglary while not striking them as to the Kobel burglary, claiming that therefore defendant's sentence was unauthorized.The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General, reversed the judgment, and remanded for resentencing.The court reasoned that striking prior conviction allegations as to some, but not all, current counts was inconsistent with the requirement in the Three Strikes law that sentences be consecutive for current felonies relating to separate criminal episodes.(§§ 667, subds. (c)(6), (c)(7),1170.12, subds. (a)(6), (a)(7).)The court discussed People v. Garcia(1997)59 Cal.App.4th 834, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 463(Garcia ), which authorized trial courts to strike prior conviction allegations on a count-by-count basis.(Id. at p. 838, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 463.)The court argued that the holding in Garcia "eviscerates the requirements of the Three Strikes law that trial courts impose harsh terms for recidivists by sentencing consecutively."The court also distinguished Garcia because in that casethe prosecution had agreed to the sentence, calling it a " 'fair disposition.' "(Ibid.)The court did not address defendant's claim of cruel and unusual punishment, finding that issue "premature until the trial court has resentenced [defendant]."

We granted review in order to address whether, and in what circumstances, a trial court in a Three Strikes case may strike prior conviction allegations as to one count, but not as to another.

DISCUSSION

Section 1385, subdivision (a), authorizes a trial court to act on its own motion to dismiss a criminal...