People v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 15 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90SC416,90SC416
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Pete GARCIA, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 937

815 P.2d 937

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Pete GARCIA, Respondent.

No. 90SC416.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

July 15, 1991.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 16, 1991.

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Paul Koehler and Douglas J. Friednash, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for petitioner.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, and Robin Desmond, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for respondent.

Justice QUINN delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals erred in People v. Garcia, 799 P.2d 413 (Colo.App.1990), when it ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claim of the defendant, Pete Garcia, that his conviction on the charge of accessory to first degree assault was constitutionally infirm as violative of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Garcia's Crim.P. 35(c) claim alleged that his defense attorney failed to properly advise him regarding the effect of a guilty plea on his contemplated civil action against law enforcement officers for his arrest and prosecution, and that if he had been properly advised he would not have made the decision to plead guilty. In denying Garcia's motion, the trial court ruled that the acceptance of the guilty plea necessarily barred any civil claim arising out of the incident underlying the plea and that Garcia accordingly failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice as a result of his attorney's erroneous advice. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether defense counsel's advice fell below the standard of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and whether there is a reasonable probability that defense counsel's erroneous advice caused Garcia to enter the guilty plea. We conclude that the court of appeals' resolution of this case is in accord with controlling legal standards, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

I.

Garcia and his brother were charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder, ¹ two counts of first degree assault, ² and two counts of committing a crime of violence. ³ The charges arose out of a shooting incident on March 27, 1987, when officers of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department were in the process of executing a no knock search warrant for drugs at a residence in which Garcia and his brother were present. Garcia was arrested at the scene and remained in jail during the pendency of the proceedings against him. The sequence of events occurring thereafter is based on affidavits filed in connection with Garcia's Crim.P. 35(c) motion and testimony elicited at the hearing on the motion.

Following his arrest, Garcia retained an attorney to defend him on the charges. The defense attorney and the district attorney entered into plea negotiations, which culminated in the prosecution's offer to accept a guilty plea to the charge of accessory to commit first degree assault in exchange for the dismissal of the other pending counts. Defense counsel met with Garcia on December 19, 1987, to discuss the terms of the offer. During the course of their conversation, Garcia informed defense counsel that he did not want to jeopardize his right to file a civil action against the officers involved in the incident resulting in his arrest and prosecution. Following defense counsel's assurance that a plea of guilty would not bar any civil action, Garcia agreed to plead guilty to the charge of accessory to commit first degree assault.

On December 21, 1987, Garcia appeared in court with defense counsel and again inquired of counsel whether the guilty plea would adversely affect his contemplated civil action. After receiving reassurance from defense counsel that it would not, Garcia signed a written acknowledgement that he had been adequately advised by his attorney of his rights, that he understood his rights, as well as the nature of the charges and the elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty, that he understood the possible penalties applicable to his guilty plea, and that his plea was voluntary. The trial court arraigned Garcia on the accessory charge and accepted his plea of guilty. ⁴ Several weeks later, at a presentence hearing, the court entered a judgment of conviction on the guilty plea and ordered Garcia to pay restitution in the amount of $252.07 as well as court costs and a probation supervision fee.

In March 1988 Garcia filed in the United States District Court a pro-se civil complaint against several law enforcement officers for his arrest and prosecution resulting from the incident of March 27, 1987. Garcia later retained the services of an attorney, who filed an amended complaint but later dismissed the civil action on the basis that Garcia's claims were barred as a result of his guilty plea. ⁵ Thereafter on September 29, 1988, Garcia filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Crim.P. 35(c). Garcia asserted in his motion that prior to entering his guilty plea he specifically inquired of defense counsel on at least two occasions whether a guilty plea would affect his ability to initiate a civil action against the law enforcement officers involved in the incident on March 27, 1987, that he was advised by defense counsel that his guilty plea would have no effect on his civil remedies, and that he would not have entered the guilty plea if he had been aware and correctly advised of his inability to bring a civil claim in connection with his arrest and criminal prosecution. Garcia's motion was supported by his own affidavit as well as the affidavit of the attorney who represented him when the guilty plea was entered. Defense counsel's affidavit averred as follows:

During our discussions concerning the plea agreement, Mr. Garcia inquired of me as to whether or not he would still be able to pursue civil remedies for claims arising as a result of the incident for which I was representing him even though he was entering a plea of guilty.

At that time, I believed that Mr. Garcia's civil remedies would not be barred if he ple[d] guilty in the case and I advised him of this.

Subsequent to our discussions, Mr. Garcia executed a Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty and did in fact enter a plea of guilty in that case.

During the hearing on the Crim.P. 35(c) motion, the prosecution called defense counsel as a witness. Defense counsel testified that he advised Garcia that his conviction "could be used for impeachment purposes," but that he did not believe the conviction would bar Garcia's civil remedies. The attorney acknowledged that, although he had never filed a claim for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, he consulted with several other attorneys on this matter before advising Garcia of the effect of his plea on any contemplated civil action.

The trial court denied Garcia's motion. Noting that Garcia was not contesting the validity of the court's advisement at the providency hearing, the court ruled that its acceptance of the guilty plea was a determination that the charge against Garcia was true, that guilty plea constituted a bar to Garcia's civil action, and that Garcia failed to show any actual prejudice resulting from any alleged incompetency of defense counsel.

Garcia appealed the judgment to the court of appeals, which reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The court of appeals concluded that defense counsel gave Garcia incorrect advice regarding the consequences of a guilty plea and failed to base that advice on adequate research. The court accordingly directed the trial court to determine whether defense counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. The court of appeals also was of the view that the trial court's resolution of the prejudice issue incorrectly focused on whether Garcia's "civil claims were dismissed because of 'truths' he admitted by virtue of his guilty plea" rather than by evaluating whether "there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's error." 799 P.2d at 415. We thereafter granted the People's petition to consider the correctness of the court of appeals' resolution of this case.

II.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to effective assistance of counsel. The purpose of this constitutional guarantee is to ensure the accused a level of assistance calculated to produce a fair and just result in a criminal prosecution. E.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2044-45, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The constitutional standards for resolving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel provide the analytical framework for resolving this case.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court outlined the standards for evaluating a claim that a criminal conviction was obtained in violation of an accused's right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court held that any such claim must satisfy two components: first, defense counsel's performance must have been constitutionally deficient; and second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. While an ineffective-assistance claim involves an inquiry into matters of historical fact, the proper resolution of both the performance and prejudice components of the claim is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. Unless the defendant establishes both components, "it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that...