People v. Garcia, No. 03SC675.

• Decision Date: 13 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03SC675.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Steve David GARCIA, Jr., Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

113 P.3d 775

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Steve David GARCIA, Jr., Respondent.

No. 03SC675.

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 13, 2005.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Patricia R. Van Horn, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, Criminal Justice Section, Denver, for Petitioner.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Cynthia Camp, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Respondent.

BENDER, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

We review the court of appeals' decision in People v. Garcia, 87 P.3d 159 (Colo.App. 2003), which reversed Steve David Garcia, Jr.'s convictions for the attempted second degree murder and first degree assault of his wife.

Garcia, an insulin-dependent diabetic, asserted before trial that he had suffered from hypoglycemia, or low blood sugar level, at the time of the crimes and that he intended to raise involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense. Hypoglycemia is a medical condition resulting from a diabetic's ingestion, or injection, of insulin coupled with a failure to eat appropriately. The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that evidence of Garcia's hypoglycemic condition could not be presented under the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication but, rather, could be presented only if Garcia entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. As a result, Garcia entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, abandoning his defense of involuntary intoxication. Pursuant to statute, the court then ordered a mental health examination on the issue of Garcia's sanity.

As a matter of law, we hold that the medical condition of insulin-induced hypoglycemia may, depending upon the particular facts and circumstances, constitute the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. We also hold that insanity and involuntary intoxication are legally separate and distinct defenses. Because the trial court ruled that insulin-induced hypoglycemia cannot constitute involuntary intoxication as a matter of law, it committed error. As a result of this improper ruling, the trial court deprived Garcia of the opportunity to meet his burden of going forward with evidence to raise his claimed affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. Because Garcia was not given the opportunity to introduce evidence to raise this defense, we view the record before us as being limited on this issue. We therefore remand to the trial court to permit both parties to supplement, through offers of proof or evidence, the trial record on the issue of Garcia's claimed involuntary intoxication defense.

In view of all of the evidence and proffers, the trial court shall determine whether Garcia is entitled to raise the defense of involuntary intoxication for jury consideration. If he is so entitled, the trial court shall conduct a new trial. If the trial court concludes that Garcia has not met his burden of going forward with evidence to raise this defense, then Garcia's convictions shall be affirmed. Hence, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case to the court of appeals with directions to return it to the trial court to permit both parties the opportunity to supplement the record.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Garcia was charged with attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, domestic violence, and two counts of mandatory sentence for violent crimes for allegedly having hit his wife, Johnie Garcia, on the head with a hammer and then having run over her with a van.

Before trial, Garcia's counsel informed the court that Garcia would be asserting the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication because he had suffered from hypoglycemia at the time of the alleged crimes. Hypoglycemia occurs when a diabetic injects, or ingests, insulin and then fails to eat properly. As part of this defense, Garcia's counsel proposed to call an endocrinologist, Dr. Daniel Bessesen, to testify that Garcia's injection of insulin on the morning of the alleged crimes, coupled with a lack of food, resulted in his hypoglycemic condition. Defense counsel stated that Dr. Bessesen would testify, based on Garcia's medical records, that Garcia suffers from diabetes, that he takes insulin for the condition, and that he has had prior occasions of hypoglycemia. According to counsel, Dr. Bessesen would not be able to testify as to whether Garcia was hypoglycemic at the time of the crimes. However, counsel stated that Dr. Bessesen would testify as to how hypoglycemia, in general, can affect a person, and coupled with evidence from other sources which would be presented at trial, counsel would be able to establish that Garcia was hypoglycemic at the time of the crimes: "Basically I will have to draw a link between the testimony of Dr. Bessesen and the testimony of the other evidence and other witnesses that I anticipate I will be bringing in about the events of that day."¹ From defense counsel's description of Dr. Bessesen's proposed testimony, the trial court concluded that Dr. Bessesen would have testified that Garcia's hypoglycemia affected his "rational thought processes to a degree [so as to] ... affect the mens rea of the Defendant or his ability to form a specific culpable mental state." The prosecution requested that the trial court exclude Dr. Bessesen's testimony, arguing the proposed testimony was tantamount to a "temporary insanity" defense and thus not permitted under Colorado law.

The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, insulin-induced hypoglycemia could not constitute the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication, under any circumstance, as that defense is defined by section 18-1-804(3), C.R.S. (2004). The court also ruled that evidence pertaining to Garcia's hypoglycemia could be presented only if Garcia entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity: "[T]his would be an affirmative defense of impaired mental condition [or insanity] as set forth under [section] 16-8-102."²

Defense counsel objected, arguing that Garcia was not insane and thus could not enter such a plea: "[Hypoglycemia is] not a mental disease or defect.... I never discussed with Mr. Garcia insanity ... I never discussed with him that that was a potential plea.... It doesn't fit at all in this.... [I]f the Court takes the position ... that this is really an IMC/insanity defense, then anything that the defense ever raises to challenge the prosecution's element of mens rea becomes an insanity defense, and that cannot be."

The trial court rejected defense counsel's objection and advised Garcia that if he entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court would order him to be psychiatrically evaluated pursuant to section 16-8-105.5(1), C.R.S. (2004).

Before Garcia entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, his counsel renewed his objection to the trial court's ruling and expressly noted that the court had made the admission of evidence of Garcia's hypoglycemia conditional upon the entry of such a plea: "[W]e don't agree that this is IMC [impaired mental condition], it's not within the definition of the statute. But the evidence that we want to bring in does challenge the mens rea and my client's ability to deliberate in this alleged crime." Following Garcia's entry of his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court ordered him to undergo a mental health examination.

The court-appointed examiner, Dr. Robert Miller, concluded that Garcia had suffered an amnestic disorder due to insulin-induced hypoglycemia at the time of the crimes and that this disorder had caused him to be legally insane. At the request of the prosecution, the court ordered a second mental health evaluation by a second independent court-appointed examiner, Dr. Karen Fukutaki. Contrary to the findings of Dr. Miller, Dr. Fukutaki concluded that Garcia was legally sane at the time of the crimes.

Evidence at trial revealed that three days before the alleged crimes, Garcia's wife, Johnie Garcia, told him that she wanted a divorce, and Garcia moved out of their home. On the morning of July 11, 1999, in anticipation of eating cake and ice cream at his teenage daughter's afternoon birthday party, Garcia, who was a diagnosed diabetic and had been treated for diabetes for five years, injected himself with a large dosage of insulin. Garcia did not eat anything following this insulin injection. While he and Johnie were running errands in Johnie's van before the party, Johnie noticed that Garcia was "real quiet" with an "along-for-the-ride type attitude." She asked him at least three times during this timeframe: "Are you okay? Do you need something to eat?" He responded, "No, I'm fine, okay."

When they were exiting a store parking lot in the van at approximately 11:30 a.m., Garcia hit Johnie, who was driving the van at the time, on the right side of her head with what Johnie later learned was a hammer. Garcia did not say anything when he hit her. Johnie immediately got out of the van and began running. Garcia met her at the back of the van and tried to shove her into it through the back door. When an owner of a nearby shop came out and talked to Garcia, Johnie retrieved her purse from the van and ran away. As she was running through parking lots along the main road, Johnie saw Garcia drive past her and turn into a driveway in front of her. After she turned and ran in the opposite direction, Johnie looked to see where Garcia had driven to and discovered that he was directly behind her in the van. Before she could get away, Garcia ran over her with the van and then drove away. Johnie sustained a depressed skull fracture and abrasions and bruises to her entire body.

At trial, Garcia did not dispute that he committed these acts against Johnie. However, he argued that, as a result of his hypoglycemia at the time of the incident, he had no recollection of what had happened and was not legally responsible for his acts because he was insane at the time the acts were committed. Both ...