People v. Garland

• Decision Date: 19 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 12,12
• Citation: 224 N.W.2d 45,393 Mich. 215
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arville Douglas GARLAND, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 45

224 N.W.2d 45

393 Mich. 215

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arville Douglas GARLAND, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 19, 1974.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Dept., Michael R. Mueller, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kraizman & Kraizman, for defendant-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

WILLIAMS, Justice (To Reverse).

I concur in the result reached by my brother Levin but do not agree that the discussion in the introductory matter or Sections I, II, and III of his opinion is necessary to reaching the proper result in this case.

As my brother Levin notes, this Court stated less than three years ago in People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 425, 192 N.W.2d 215 (1971):

'We conclude that a psychiatrist who conducts such a forensic psychiatric examination may not be called to testify in the criminal trial if there is an objection to the admission of such testimony by defendant.'

There is no need to consider whether this is a correct or incorrect interpretation of M.C.L.A. § 767.27a(4); M.S.A. § 28.966(11)(4), inasmuch as in the instant case, as my brother Levin points out, there is a clear waiver of the statute on the record. Defense counsel made specific reference to the Forensic Center competency diagnosis in the questioning of their own expert witness, Dr. Miller (98a--100a). The defense introduced a videotape of defendant's sodium brevital examination at the Forensic Center. The defense introduced into evidence the Forensic Center file.

My brother Levin contends that the waiver of the statute is not a waiver of the testimony of the psychiatrists in question because there is a 'separate Martin-declared statutory right to prevent' such testimony. The Martin rationale is: There is only one statute and one statutory right. There is no 'separate Martin-declared statutory right.' ¹ Without the statute there is no right; with the statute there is no reference to the competency transaction, and this includes reports, recommendations and examining psychiatrist or psychiatrists. As a consequence waiver of the statute waives all.

This finding of statutory waiver resolves this case and obviates the necessity of this Court reviewing the above analysis in Martin. I agree fully, therefore, with Section V of Justice Levin's opinion on waiver. I would not, however, go further in Obiter dicta to discuss aspects of this case involving constitutional issues where there is no necessity to do so.

Accordingly, I concur in my brother Levin's disposition of this case. The Court of Appeals is reversed; the defendant's conviction is affirmed.

T. M. KAVANAGH, C.J., and COLEMAN and SWAINSON, JJ., concur.

LEVIN, Justice (concurring).

Arville Douglas Garland shot and killed his daughter, Sandra, a young man who was in bed with her and two other young men who were sleeping in the same apartment. He was convicted of manslaughter for the death of his daughter and of second-degree murder for the deaths of the three young men. ¹

The principal issue at trial was Garland's sanity at the time of the killings.

The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, ² on the authority of People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 425, 192 N.W.2d 215 (1971), because psychiatrists associated with the Center for Forensic Psychiatry, one of whom had examined Garland to determine his competency to stand trial, were permitted to testify on the issue of his sanity.

A statute provides that upon a showing that a defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall commit him to the forensic center for evaluation, diagnostic report and recommendations. The statute further provides: 'The diagnostic report and recommendations shall be admissible as evidence in the hearing (to determine competency to stand trial) but not for any other purpose in the pending criminal proceedings.' ³

In Martin, supra, this Court declared in reference to this statute limiting the use of Diagnostic report and Recommendations:

'We conclude that a Psychiatrist who conducts such a forensic psychiatric examination may not be called to testify in the criminal trial if there is an objection to the admission of such testimony by defendant.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The prosecutor appeals claiming 'that Martin does not hold that psychiatrists from the forensic center who have conducted a psychiatric examination on the defendant pursuant to M.C.L.A. § 767.27a; M.S.A. § 28.966(11) are not allowed to testify at trial as to the issue of the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime' and that the statutory language should be read to prohibit examining psychiatrists from testifying as to guilt or innocence, but not as to sanity. ⁴

Garland maintains that, in allowing the forensic center psychiatrists to testify on the issue of sanity, the trial judge derogated both the statutory restriction against use of the 'diagnostic report and recommendations' and the constitutional right against self-incrimination which, he contends, the statute is designed to protect.

We all agree that the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the convictions reinstated, but disagree as to the basis of that disposition.

The majority states that they are in accord with the result of this opinion--reversal of the Court of Appeals and affirmance of defendant's convictions--but do not agree that the discussion in Sections I--III of this opinion 'is necessary to reaching the proper result in this case.'

In Part I we address the contentions of the parties revolving around the previously quoted words of the Martin opinion, and conclude that this statute, limiting the use of diagnostic report and recommendations, does not--contrary to the declaration in Martin--prohibit a psychiatrist who conducts a competency examination from testifying at trial. In Part III we state that the purpose of the statutory limitation on the use of diagnostic report and recommendations is simply 'to prevent prejudice possibly resulting if the jury were to learn that the defendant recently had been found competent and were to infer erroneously that he was, therefore, sane at the time the offense was committed.' In Part II we address Garland's self-incrimination claim and conclude that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not bar the psychiatrist who examines to determine competency from testifying at trial on the sanity issue.

The majority states that there is no need to consider whether Martin 'is a correct or incorrect interpretation' of the statute because 'as my brother Levin points out, there is a clear waiver of the statute on the record.'

The waiver of the statute which we find in Part V is a waiver of the purpose of the statute declared in Part III, a purpose with which the majority declines to associate themselves.

If one reads the statutory purpose as we do (Part III), a defendant who himself brings to the attention of the jury that he was examined and found competent to stand trial cannot properly complain of prosecutorial reference to the competency examination.

As stated in the majority opinion and in Part V, Garland's counsel referred to the competency examination in questioning their own expert witness, introduced a video tape of the sodium brevital examination conducted at the forensic center and introduced into evidence the forensic center file. Garland thereby waived the statutory protection against use of the Diagnostic report and recommendations.

However, If a purpose of the statute is, as the Martin Court declared, the prohibition of testimony on the issue of sanity by the psychiatrist who examined to determine competency, then merely because a defendant waives the right to prevent the jury from learning that he had been found competent would not constitute a waiver of his separate Martin-declared statutory right to prevent the examining psychiatrist from testifying concerning sanity. Waiver of one right does not constitute waiver of the other.

Garland repeatedly objected to the trial court's ruling that the psychiatrist who had conducted the competency examination would be permitted to testify on the issue of sanity. Those objections were voiced both before and during the people's presentation, before the defendant introduced any evidence whatsoever. Those objections cannot properly be construed as a waiver of the statutory purpose declared in Martin; the waiver of the Part III-declared purpose occurred during Garland's presentation.

One cannot waive except knowingly and intelligently. We cannot associate ourselves with the conclusion that Garland, who did all that he reasonably could have been expected to do to assert his Martin-declared right, waived it 'on the record.'

And, If, as Garland claims, his constitutional right against self-incrimination bars the psychiatrist who examined him to determine competency from testifying on the issue of sanity then, again, merely because he waived his right to complain about the jury learning that he was examined and found competent would not constitute a waiver of his Fifth Amendment right.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that Garland's waiver of the statutory protection against disclosure of the fact of examination and its result, elucidated in Part III, does not dispense with the 'need to consider whether this (Martin) is a correct or incorrect interpretation' of the statutory limitation. The majority's finding of statutory waiver does indeed 'resolve this case' but it does not 'obviate the necessity of this Court reviewing the above analysis in Martin.' To properly resolve this case, it is necessary to decide whether Garland was deprived of the Martin-declared and asserted constitutional rights to bar the psychiatrist from testifying on the issue of sanity.

The issue is of continuing importance in the administration of justice. In People v. Schneider, 39 Mich.App. 343, 197 N.W.2d 539 (1972), the Court of Appeals declared,...