People v. Garner, D009532

• Decision Date: 02 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. D009532,D009532
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kelly Lafe GARNER, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 298

274 Cal.Rptr. 298

224 Cal.App.3d 1363

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kelly Lafe GARNER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. D009532.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 2, 1990.

As Modified Nov. 1, 1990.

[224 Cal.App.3d 1365] Paul A. Di Paolo, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Harley D. Mayfield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Holly D. Wilkens and Gil P. Gonzalez, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

KREMER, Presiding Justice.

Kelly Garner pleaded guilty to armed robbery (Pen.Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 12022.5) and assault with a firearm (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss for an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) (Pen.Code, § 1389) ¹. On appeal, he contends the court erred in denying his motion. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 1986, the San Diego District Attorney (SDDA) filed a felony complaint, charging Garner with crimes committed in El Cajon. Garner left San Diego. Later in April, Salt Lake City, Utah authorities arrested Garner for crimes committed there. Before Garner could be tried in Utah, he escaped. He was next arrested by Nevada authorities on May 31, 1986 and charged with crimes committed in Las Vegas, Nevada.

On June 3, 1986, the San Diego County Marshal's Office, at the request of SDDA, sent a letter to the Las Vegas authorities explaining San Diego's interest in Garner.

Garner was convicted of the Nevada crimes and began serving a prison term in Nevada for those crimes in September 1986.

Garner testified he filled out a "Request for Disposition of Detainers" in mid-October 1986, and turned it over to a law clerk at the Nevada prison who was authorized to take and prepare requests from inmates for disposition of detainers. The law clerk represented he would turn over the request to the appropriate authorities. This form was apparently never received by the warden nor sent to San Diego.

On November 12, 1986, with the aid of another inmate, Garner prepared a motion demanding a speedy trial on the San Diego charges, or, alternatively a dismissal of the charges. Garner cited Penal Code section 1381 as authority for his speedy trial motion. The San Diego Superior Court received this motion and forwarded it to SDDA which received it on November 18, 1986.

Meanwhile, Nevada authorities contacted SDDA to inform them that if they still had an interest in Garner the SDDA should forward appropriate documentation to the Nevada prison where Garner was serving his sentence because the June 2, 1986 detainer had not followed Garner to the prison from the county jail. On November 24, 1986, SDDA sent a letter of detainer to the Nevada authorities along with IAD Form III (Certificate of Inmate Status) and IAD Form IV (Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody).

On January 11, 1987, SDDA received from the Nevada prison authorities IAD Forms III and IV plus an IAD Form used by an inmate to initiate action on detainers, IAD Form II (Inmate's Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints).

SDDA responded by sending Nevada officials IAD form VII, "Prosecutor's Acceptance of Temporary Custody," a form used when an inmate initiates action on a detainer.

On January 5, 1987, Garner went to Alabama for trial on criminal charges. He returned to Nevada on June 3, 1987. Three weeks later, on June 30, 1987, he went to Utah for trial and did not return to Nevada until December 29, 1987.

On January 15, 1988, SDDA contacted Nevada prison authorities to ascertain Garner's status. The Nevada authorities asked SDDA to resubmit Form V. SDDA resubmitted Form V on January 22, 1988.

In early January 1988, Garner refused to re-sign Form II which would waive his extradition to California. He did not sign it until May 9, 1988, the date set for an extradition hearing. San Diego authorities took custody of Garner on July 25, 1988.

On August 30, 1988, an information was filed in San Diego charging Garner with five counts of armed robbery and an assault with a firearm. Garner moved to dismiss the charges because he had not been brought to trial within 180 days as required by Article 3 of the IAD. Following denial of his motion to dismiss, Garner pleaded guilty on October 24, 1988 to four counts of armed robbery and an assault with a firearm in exchange for dismissal of one armed robbery count. Garner was sentenced to six years.

DISCUSSION

I The Interstate Agreement on Detainers

The IAD is codified in Penal Code section 1389. It provides a method of transferring a prisoner from one jurisdiction to another for disposition of pending charges. Under the IAD, once a state has lodged a detainer based on an uncharged indictment, information or complaint against a prisoner in another jurisdiction, the authorities must notify the prisoner of the detainer and give the prisoner an opportunity to request a final disposition of the pending charges. (Art. 3, subd. (c).) Then, either the prisoner or the prosecutor may initiate procedures leading to transfer and disposition of the charges. (Arts. 3, 4.)

The prisoner may initiate final disposition under Article 3 by making a written request to the warden who must forward the request to the appropriate authorities in the other jurisdiction along with a certificate delineating the prisoner's sentence, the time already served and the time remaining to be served. (Art. 3, subds. (a), (b).) If the prisoner requests final disposition of the charges, he must be brought to trial within 180 days after the appropriate court and prosecutor have received formal notification. (Art. 3, subd. (a).) The 180-day period is tolled "as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter" or when the prosecutor obtains a continuance for good cause. (Arts. 6, subd. (a), 3, subd. (a).)

If the prosecutor initiates proceedings to obtain transfer of the prisoner under Article 4, then the prisoner must be brought to trial within 120 days of his arrival in the receiving state. (Art. 4, subd. (c).) The time period may be extended "for good cause shown in open court." (Arts. 3, subd. (a), 4, subd. (c).) If the prisoner is not brought to trial within the time periods of the IAD, then he is entitled to have the charges dismissed. (Arts. 3, subd. (d), 4, subd. (e).)

The IAD states it is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. (Art. 9.) The IAD's purpose is "to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or com plaints." (Art. 1.) Untried charges and detainers result in uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. (Art. 1; People v. Castoe (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 484, 487, 150 Cal.Rptr. 237.) As the court explained in People v. Brooks (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 866, 872-873, 234 Cal.Rptr. 573:

"The origins of the IAD date back to 1948 when the Joint Committee on Detainers By implementing a prisoner's right to a speedy trial, the IAD minimizes interference with such treatments and programs. (People v. Cella (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 905, 920, 170 Cal.Rptr. 915.)

addressed administrative problems arising from the use of detainers. At that time prosecutors were not legally bound to act on detainers at any specific time. It was common practice to lodge a detainer and postpone extradition until completion of the prisoner's sentence in the foreign jurisdiction. Because little information about the underlying charge accompanied the detainer, prison officials did not know whether the detainer was based on an arrest warrant, complaint or 'the mere desire on the part of the filing authority to interrogate the inmate.' [Citation.] These practices created problems for the inmate and prison officials. '... [I]nmates with detainers lodged against them are invariably subject to a more restrictive prison environment. Such inmates are generally classified as maximum-security risks by prison authorities because of the detainee's purportedly increased propensity to escape as a result of the perceived possibility of further incarceration. Accordingly, access to various rehabilitation programs is markedly impaired, if not entirely precluded. Educational opportunities, vocational training, and recreational privileges are consequently curtailed; likewise, eligibility for furlough and parole programs is frequently denied. The existence of a detainer may also adversely affect sentencing procedures, undermining opportunities for sentence commutation, as well as vitiating an inmate's chances for concurrent sentencing should the detainer remain outstanding until his present sentence terminates. Furthermore, psychological disabilities are manifold: indeterminate future imprisonment, as well as anxiety and concern accompanying the more restrictive conditions of confinement, creates motivational problems which needlessly frustrate rehabilitation efforts.' [Citation.]" (Fn. omitted.)

II

June 2, 1986 "Letter of Detainer"

The first issue is whether the June 2, 1986 "letter of detainer" sent to the Nevada authorities by the San Diego County Marshal's Office at SDDA's request was a "detainer" activating the IAD since " 'a formal detainer must be filed before an inmate ... may invoke the provisions of the IAD.' [Citation.]" (People v. Rhoden (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1251, 265 Cal.Rptr. 355.)

The Supreme Court has stated " '[a] detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.' " (United States v. Mauro (1978) 436 U.S. 340, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1846, 56 L.Ed.2d 329.) This definition...