People v. Garrett

• Decision Date: 15 May 2013
• Citation: People v. Garrett, 964 N.Y.S.2d 652, 106 A.D.3d 929, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 3498 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Mark GARRETT, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

106 A.D.3d 929

964 N.Y.S.2d 652

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 03498

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Mark GARRETT, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 15, 2013.

Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, N.Y., for appellant.

Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Anne E. Oh of counsel), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant, by permission, from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County(Hudson, J.), dated March 31, 2010, which denied, without a hearing, his motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County(Copertino, J.), rendered June 13, 2000, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing in accordance herewith and a new determination of the defendant's motion thereafter.

At the defendant's trial for murder, the evidence against him consisted primarily of his confession to police.At a suppression hearing held in November 1999, before his trial, he contested, inter alia, whether his confession was voluntarily given.He took the stand at the hearing and testified that he signed the confession only after the detectives conducting the interrogation handcuffed him to a chair and, among other things, slapped him, hit him, and shocked him twice in the back with a stun gun or taser.He also presented the testimony of a nurse practitioner, who examined him at the Suffolk County jail and testified that, approximately one week after the interrogation, the defendant had two “healing round excoriations” on his back, but she could not determine whether they were caused by a stun gun.The suppression court credited the testimony of the People's witnesses, including Detective Vincent O'Leary, that the defendant was not physically abused during the interrogation, and denied the defendant's suppression motion.At trial, defense counsel cross-examined O'Leary as to whether he had ever been involved in a case with a “false confession.”The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to this line of inquiry.The defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder and felony murder, and was sentenced on June 13, 2000.

The defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate his judgment of conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to fulfill its obligations pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.Specifically, he contended that the People failed to disclose to him that a civil action had been brought against O'Leary and Suffolk County in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York(hereinafter EDNY) alleging that O'Leary procured a false confession to an arson by repeatedly striking the handcuffed plaintiff in the head with a telephone book until he confessed.According to an EDNY docket printout submitted by the defendant in support of the motion, the civil complaint was filed on June 1, 1998, and was answered by O'Leary and Suffolk County on June 18, 1998.The attorney of record for O'Leary and Suffolk County in that action was the Suffolk County Attorney.The civil case against O'Leary was settled in March 2001, after the defendant's trial and sentencing for murder had been concluded.

In opposition to the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief, the People submitted, inter alia, an attorney's affirmation, based on a review of files in the Suffolk County District Attorney's office, claiming that the District Attorney did not have knowledge of the civil action against O'Leary until January 2001, a date after the defendant's trial had concluded.The basis for this claim was the same EDNY docket printout submitted by the defendant in support of his motion, indicating that on January 18, 2001, the EDNY directed the District Attorney to unseal some unspecified files and make them available to the plaintiff in that action.

In an order dated March 31, 2010, the County Court, without conducting a hearing, denied the defendant's motion to vacate his judgment of conviction.A Justice of this Court granted the defendant leave to appeal, and we now reverse the order and remit the matter for a hearing.

A defendant is entitled, under the state and federal constitutions, “to discover favorable evidence in the People's possession material to guilt or punishment”( People v. Fuentes,12 N.Y.3d 259, 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286, citingBrady v. Maryland,373 U.S. at 87andPeople v. Bryce,88 N.Y.2d 124, 128–129, 643 N.Y.S.2d 516, 666 N.E.2d 221).Indeed, the law requires that Brady material be produced whether or not the defendant requests any such evidence ( seeStrickler v. Greene,527 U.S. 263, 280–281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286).To establish a Brady violation, the “evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued” because the evidence was material ( Strickler v. Greene,527 U.S. at 281–282, 119 S.Ct. 1936;seePeople v. LaValle,3 N.Y.3d 88, 109–110, 783 N.Y.S.2d 485, 817 N.E.2d 341;People v. Fuentes,12 N.Y.3d at 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286).

Here, the allegedly suppressed evidence clearly fell within the ambit of the prosecutor's Brady obligation because it constituted impeachment evidence ( seePeople v. Fuentes,12 N.Y.3d at 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286;see alsoGiglio v. United States,405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104).Moreover, the People's failure to disclose the existence of the civil action may have denied the defendant the opportunity to conduct an investigation leading to additional exculpatory or impeaching evidence ( seeUnited States v. Gil,297 F.3d 93, 104, citingUnited States v. Gleason,265 F.Supp. 880, 886), for instance, providing a basis for the disclosure of police personnel records otherwise unavailable ( seePeople v. Gissendanner,48 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 423 N.Y.S.2d 893, 399 N.E.2d 924;People v. Puglisi,44 N.Y.2d 748, 750, 405 N.Y.S.2d 680, 376 N.E.2d 1325;People v. Vasquez,49 A.D.2d 590, 370 N.Y.S.2d 144).

“In New York, where a defendant makes a specific request for a document, the materiality element is established provided...