People v. Garvin

Decision Date23 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 99031.,99031.
Citation847 N.E.2d 82,219 Ill.2d 104
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Raymond E. GARVIN, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Miriam Sierig, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State's Attorney, Wheaton (Gary Feinerman, solicitor General, and Linda D. Woloshin and David H. Iskowich, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

In this case, defendant Raymond E. Garvin challenges the circuit court of Du Page County's denial of his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and, in an issue of first impression before this court, the constitutionality of section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2002)). The latter argument challenges the statute both on its face and as applied in this case under the search and seizure provisions of our state and federal constitutions. We affirm the appellate court's judgment affirming the trial court's denial of the motion, albeit on a different basis, and upholding the constitutionality of the statute.

I. BACKGROUND

Sometime prior to 4:45 a.m. on December 29, 2001, Gerhardt Roth called the Franklin Park police to report he had seen a license plate stolen from one of his company's vehicles on a white van with a "CompUSA" logo on its side. He tracked the van after it left the company's property and noticed a white car also following the van. Ultimately, both vehicles pulled into a gas station. Pursuant to Roth's call, Officer Henninger was dispatched to the gas station and observed a white car and a white CompUSA van in the parking lot.

At the gas station, Roth told the officer that he had seen the two vehicles on his company's property and that defendant and two other men had been in or around the van. One of the other two men was still in the car. Defendant and the other man came out of the convenience store adjoining the gas station and walked up to the officer. While they were talking, Henninger obtained the names of the three men and ran those names through the police computer. He received a radio message that the Bensenville police department was looking for a similar van and a white Ford Thunderbird in connection with a possible theft from Emery Worldwide. Henninger requested officers from Bensenville be dispatched to the scene. In addition, the officer checked the van's vehicle identification number and discovered it, too, had been reported stolen.

Henninger also received information that one of the men with defendant was wanted on an outstanding warrant, and he arrested that man. Defendant was later arrested without a warrant. Defendant subsequently asked the Bensenville police to remove his wallet from the van and admitted he had been in the vicinity of Emery Worldwide earlier in the evening.

Defendant was charged with burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2000)), theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2000)), and possession of burglary tools (720 ILCS 5/19-2(a) (West 2000)). He filed a motion in the circuit court of Du Page County seeking to quash his arrest for lack of probable cause and to suppress his postarrest statements. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied defendant's motion. The State subsequently dropped the charge of possession of burglary tools.

Defendant entered into a stipulation that included both his postarrest statements to the Bensenville police and the discovery of his wallet in the white van by the Franklin Park police. Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant was convicted of burglary and theft. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 6½ years and ordered to submit to the State a blood sample for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis pursuant to section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2002)). The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial alleging the court improperly declined to quash his arrest and suppress his statements.

On appeal, defendant first argued the trial court should have granted his motion to quash and suppress. While the appellate court agreed no probable cause existed for defendant's arrest, it deemed the erroneous probable cause finding harmless because it believed sufficient evidence of guilt was adduced at trial without the admission of the improper evidence. 349 Ill.App.3d 845, 851-52, 285 Ill.Dec. 953, 812 N.E.2d 773. The appellate court also concluded defendant could not attack the admission of his inculpatory statement placing his wallet inside the stolen van because he had stipulated the wallet found in the van was his. 349 Ill.App.3d at 852, 285 Ill.Dec. 953, 812 N.E.2d 773.

Defendant also challenged, both on its face and as applied, the constitutionality of section 5-4-3, mandating the submission of a DNA sample for analysis and entry into a computer database. Applying a balancing test, the appellate court found the statutory provision constitutional both because the blood test required minimal physical intrusion and because the state's interest in collecting and storing DNA to deter and prosecute recidivists outweighed defendant's diminished privacy interest as a convicted felon. 349 Ill.App.3d at 855-56, 285 Ill.Dec. 953, 812 N.E.2d 773. Defendant's petition for rehearing was denied. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant raises two distinct issues on appeal. First, he argues the appellate court correctly recognized the lack of probable cause for his arrest but erroneously believed the admission of his subsequent police statements was harmless error. 349 Ill.App.3d at 851, 285 Ill.Dec. 953, 812 N.E.2d 773. Next, he contends the mandatory submission of blood for DNA analysis pursuant to section 5-4-3 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2002)) is unconstitutional because it violates, both on its face and as applied, his protections against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Illinois and United States Constitutions, an issue not previously considered by this court. We address these issues in turn.

A. Probable Cause

Initially, defendant asserts the trial court should have granted his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence based on a lack of probable cause. He maintains probable cause was absent because the police had no particularized suspicion that he was involved in any criminal activity and instead relied on his proximity to another man named in an unrelated warrant. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 227-28, 92 L.Ed. 210, 219-20 (1948). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 245 (1979). Defendant claims the only evidence linking him to the charged crimes was Roth's eyewitness statement identifying him as one of three men who had been "in or around" the stolen van in the gas station parking lot.

Reviewing the denial of defendant's motion alleging a lack of probable cause de novo (People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill.2d 425, 431, 256 Ill.Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001)), we agree that mere proximity to another individual is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause (see Di Re, 332 U.S. at 592-94, 68 S.Ct. at 227-28, 92 L.Ed. at 219-20). We disagree, however, with defendant's characterization of the relevant evidence.

Officer Henninger was the only witness at the hearing on defendant's motion. He arrived at the gas station in response to a call from Roth reporting a white van with a "CompUSA" logo on its side bearing license plates stolen from Roth's company. When the officer arrived, he saw a van matching that description parked on the west side of the lot. He also noted a white car located approximately 2½ car lengths away from the van, parked directly behind the convenience store adjoining the gas station. It was an early winter morning the lot was well lit, and Henninger did not recall any other customers present.

Roth approached Officer Henninger and pointed out the van with the stolen plates, stating he had noticed the unauthorized van near his company prior to recognizing the stolen license plate. Roth also indicated he had seen the white car follow the van and that the vehicles had pulled into the gas station together.

Officer Henninger then ran the license plate number on the van and verified the plate was stolen. While the plate was being run, defendant and another man came out of the convenience store together and approached Henninger. Roth identified the men as two of the three he had seen in or around the van. The officer talked to the men as he continued to investigate Roth's report. Henninger then received a message that the Bensenville Police were looking for two vehicles possibly stolen from Emery Worldwide: a van matching the description of the one in the lot and a white sedan. He responded by requesting the dispatch of Bensenville officers to the scene. At some point, the officer also ran a check on the van's vehicle identification number and discovered it, too, had been reported stolen. Henninger believed that defendant was arrested without a warrant between 4:30 a.m. and 5 a.m.

Contrary to defendant's claim, there was far more evidence linking him to the stolen license plates than Roth's bare statement that he had observed defendant in or around a van bearing those plates. Before noticing the stolen plates, Roth had observed the unauthorized van on his company property during the early morning hours. After recognizing the plates on the van as belonging to his company, he reported the theft to police and personally trailed the van and the white car that was following it to the gas station, where the two vehicles parked near each other. Although Officer Henninger could not recall if Roth had indicated whether defendant...

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