People v. Gensler
Citation | 72 N.Y.2d 239,532 N.Y.S.2d 72,527 N.E.2d 1209 |
Parties | , 527 N.E.2d 1209 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Mark W. GENSLER, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 06 July 1988 |
Court | New York Court of Appeals |
Defendant, by plea of guilty, was convicted of several felonies, including robbery and assault in the second degree, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The issue is whether reversible error was committed by the trial court's refusal to conduct, sua sponte, a competency-to-stand-trial hearing after the Director of Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center certified defendant as competent.
At his arraignment and at the request of his counsel, defendant was ordered to undergo a competency examination pursuant to CPL 730.30 because of the unusual occurrences leading up to and including the crimes charged and because defendant had a history of psychiatric instability. He was examined by two psychiatrists and determined to be competent. Defense counsel challenged these findings, moved for a competency hearing, and submitted the report of a privately retained psychiatrist concluding that defendant was incompetent. The Trial Judge then ordered a reexamination by court-appointed psychiatrists who reported that defendant was an incapacitated person. The trial court then found defendant lacked capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his own defense and executed an order committing him to treatment for up to one year or until no longer incapacitated (CPL 730.50).
The argument and the focus of the issues presented on this appeal center on the events which followed. After defendant's 14-day placement at Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center, the Director of that Center, relying on a clinical summary report, issued a notification of fitness to proceed declaring defendant was no longer incapacitated. At the court date following the notification, 2 1/2 weeks later, the People urged that a judicial order of fitness to proceed be made predicated on that most recent fitness report from Mid-Hudson. Defendant's attorney asked the Trial Judge to hold a competency hearing on his own motion, reasoning that the Trial Judge had a special additional obligation to ensure defendant's competence in view of the lack of unanimity among the various psychiatric evaluations.
The entire colloquy on the subject at issue shows:
The court later reiterated: "THE COURT: On the basis of my having seen Mr. Gensler on several occasions and on the reports which have been received and from his statements here today, I have no reason not to believe that he does not understand the nature of the charges against him and that he is not able to help you or other counsel in assisting in his defense."
The court granted defense counsel's request for a two-day adjournment for client consultation. At the adjourned date, defense counsel, pursuant to her client's instruction, joined in accepting the report from Mid-Hudson finding defendant fit to proceed. Prior to allocuting the defendant and accepting his plea, the Trial Judge reaffirmed his finding that, "after talking with the Defendant and after having examined the report from Mid-Hudson, [the court] is of the opinion that the Defendant does understand the nature of the charges and is competent to assist in his defense and the Court at this time accepts the report." At no time did defense counsel refer to a due process right or to any Federal or State constitutional entitlement and did not address or even imply any constitutional infirmity on the face of or with respect to the application of the provisions of article 730 of the CPL.
The Appellate Division necessarily adopted the findings of competence in affirming the judgment of conviction. ( People v. Gensler, 132 A.D.2d 941, 942, 518 N.Y.S.2d 271).
New York's meticulously detailed procedure governing this complex area of law and medicine is governed by CPL article 730. Following a determination of fitness to proceed (CPL 730.60[2] ), (CPL 730.30[2] [emphasis added] ). CPL 730.60 makes no provision for an in-all-instances hearing under CPL 730.30(4) based on a difference between a precommitment finding of incapacity and a postcommitment declaration of fitness because the circumstances of each vary by their very nature.
Although defendant's argument before us is draped in the semantical garb of due process, the unconstitutionality of no provision of CPL article 730 was ever asserted and is not argued even before us at this time. In effect, therefore, defendant's argument concedes the legislatively prescribed trial court authority exercised on a proffered state of facts in the record. Yet, from that necessarily accepted premise, defendant's argument leaps to a mandatory due process hearing requirement and the dissent endorses the leap.
Notably from a defense strategy standpoint, neither defendant nor his counsel affirmatively requested a hearing. Indeed, defendant insisted he did not want one and wished to conclude the criminal proceeding. Defense counsel, when held to the record before us, expressly refrained from asking for a hearing, instead urging the court to grant one only on the court's own initiative, and then two days later expressly "accepted" the Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center report finding defendant competent as a basis for the court's judicial determination of competency.
The Trial Judge cannot be said to have erred under these circumstances and under this statutory scheme, predicated as we get the case on undisturbed findings supported in the record by expert evidentiary material and judicial observations. The undisturbed findings were based upon the most recent psychiatric report at the hospital and on the strategic stance of defense counsel before the trial court. This all culminated in the court's decision that defendant was able to understand the nature of the charges against him and that he was capable of assisting counsel in his own defense. "The fact that defendant had a previous history of mental disturbance does not in itself prove that he was insane at the time of this judgment" ( People v. Boundy, 10 N.Y.2d 518, 521, 225 N.Y.S.2d 207, 180 N.E.2d 565; People v. Flora, 306 N.Y. 615, 116 N.E.2d 79).
The Trial Judge in such circumstances has, under the statute, the authority to adopt expert medical proof available to him, coupled with all other evidence and his own observations of the defendant, and then to come to a right and fair judicial determination of fitness to proceed. A Trial Judge should be upheld when he complies with the letter and spirit of a set of governing statutes. This is different from People v. Armlin 37 N.Y.2d 167, 371 N.Y.S.2d 691, 332 N.E.2d 870 w...
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