People v. Gentile

• Decision Date: 30 September 2022
• Docket Number: 21120052
• Citation: 2022 NY Slip Op 50965 (U)
• Parties: The People of the State of New York v. Marc V. Gentile, Defendant.
• Court: New York Justice Court

2022 NY Slip Op 50965(U)

The People of the State of New York v. Marc V. Gentile, Defendant.

No. 21120052

Justice Court of the Town of Webster, Monroe County

September 30, 2022

Unpublished Opinion

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Monroe County (John LaDuca of Counsel), for plaintiff.

James W. Cole, Rochester, for defendant.

Thomas J. DiSalvo, J.

History of the Case.

The defendant was charged with driver's view obstructed, VTL § 375 (30), VTL § aggravated unlicensed operation 3rd, VTL § 511 (1) (a), driving while ability impaired by drugs, VTL § 1194 (4) on December 2, 2021 at 11:52 P.M. on Ridge Road in the Town of Webster. Defense counsel submitted Omnibus Motions wherein, among other things, he requested probable cause and Huntley hearings. Said hearings were conducted on August 12, 2022.

Facts of the Case.

Probable Cause Hearing.

At that hearing the People called one witness, to wit: Webster Police Officer Timothy Brewer. Said officer testified that he and other Webster Officers responded to a 911 call requesting that Webster Police respond to the Kwik Mart on the southwest corner of Ridge Road and Five Mile Line Road. The call was the result of a store clerk's observation of the defendant whom he described in his deposition as being either drunk or on drugs. According to the said supporting deposition of the said store clerk, the defendant asked for $11.00 of gas and eventually pulled out a credit card to make said purchase. However, the credit card was denied. While waiting for the credit card transaction to be approved, the defendant appeared to fall asleep while standing at the counter. He stepped aside as another customer came up to the counter. As he was waiting on the next customer the clerk observed that the defendant walked down one of store aisles. Whereupon he heard a bunch of items fall to the floor from that location. Upon walking over to that spot, the clerk observed the defendant hunched over a rack of cookies and chips that he had knocked over. The store clerk directed the defendant to leave the store. Upon paying cash for the gas the defendant walked out of the store. It was at that time the clerk texted his girlfriend asking her to call 911 for assistance. After pumping the gas he purchased the defendant reentered his truck.

Officer Brewer was dispatched to the convenience store in question. Upon arrival he observed a red Ford Ranger parked across a couple of parking spaces in the middle of the lot. As the officer walked past the vehicle he saw one individual inside the truck who "appeared out it". The officer stated that he shined his flashlights on that person, who was later identified as Marc V. Gentile. The officer testified that said person was asleep. The store clerk confirmed to Officer Brewer that the individual in the truck was the reason for the 911call. When the Officer left the store he saw that the defendant had driven out of the parking lot and that he was heading Westerly on Ridge Road. The three Webster Police Officers, including Officer Brewer, pursued the truck.

The said truck was stopped down the road near the intersection of Ridge Road and Staci Lane. Officer Brewer testified that upon the vehicle being stopped he approached the said driver. At that time the other officers were speaking to the defendant. Officer Brewer observed that the defendant was drooling from the right side of his mouth. The defendant was directed to exit his vehicle, which he did. It was at that time that the defendant was identified as the operator of the truck. Officer Brewer observed various indicia of intoxication and/or impairment such as incoherent, mumbling, slurred speech and a thick tongue. Upon being asked to walk to a nearby parking lot, the defendant was seen to be swaying and unsteady on his feet as he walked. The officer had testified to his training in detecting the common characteristics of persons driving while intoxicated or ability impaired by drugs. He also testified that he was ARIDE certified ^[1].

The defendant was then asked to perform various roadside sobriety tests. There was no impairment demonstrated by the horizontal or vertical gaze nystagmus tests or the lack of convergence test. However his performances on the walk and turn, one-leg stand, the Romberg and finger-to-nose tests indicated to Officer Brewer that the defendant showed significant signs of impairment.

Upon the completion of the field sobriety tests Officer Brewer arrested the defendant for driving while ability impaired by drugs.

Huntley Hearing.

Officer Brewer then testified to reading the defendant his Miranda rights. A copy of his Miranda warning card was entered into evidence. The officer testified that he did nothing to coerce the defendant into speaking with him. He further testified that after being read his rights, the defendant agreed to speak with the officer. Whereupon he admitted to ingesting a bump of heroin.

Defense counsel did not cross-examine the officer. There were no further witnesses by the People. The defendant did not put on any witnesses.

Issues Presented.

Were the Webster Police justified in stopping the defendant's vehicle?

Was there probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving while ability impaired by drugs?

Were the statements of the defendant voluntarily made?

Legal Analysis.

Stop of the Vehicle.

The defense contends that the Webster Police officers did not have probable cause to stop the defendant's truck and detain the defendant. In fact, it is defense counsel's position that probable cause is the only basis upon which a police officer may stop a vehicle. In New York probable cause is more accurately described as reasonable cause. "The CPL uses the phrase 'reasonable cause' See e.g. CPL § 70.10(2). However, it is well settled that '[r]easonable cause means 'probable cause'". ^[2]

Defense counsel's reliance on the position that probable cause is the sole basis permitting the stop of a vehicle by the police is mistaken. In a case where the stop of the vehicle was upheld even though there was no probable cause to stop the vehicle, the court stated

"Contrary to the suggestion made by the defendant at the hearing... neither Robinson, nor its progeny (i.e People v. Sluszka, 15 A.D.3d 421 [2d Dept 2005]) altered the long-standing rule that a police officer may stop a car if he has a reasonable suspicion that a suspect therein is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime (2-19 New York Criminal Practice § 19.10 (3))." (People v. Ilardi, 13 Misc.3d 1210(A), 2006 NY Slip Op 51769[U], *2 [2006])

Reliance on People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2002) under the facts of the instant case is misplaced. In fact, Robinson does not stand for the proposition that probable cause is the sole basis on which the police must rely to stop a vehicle. The holding in Robinson is more limited in its scope.

"In People v. Robinson (97 N.Y.2d 341 [2001]) the Court of Appeals adopted Whren v. United States (517 U.S. 806 [1996]), and held that a stop based on probable cause of a traffic violation was not invalid merely because the officer used the otherwise lawful stop as a pretext for a different investigative end. Stated differently, the Court held that the officer's subjective motivation in stopping the vehicle was not relevant where the stop was predicated on probable cause." ^[3]

Nevertheless a stop of a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause must , ab initio, be reasonable based on the circumstances of the particular case. "Thus, since the stop of defendant's automobile was a limited seizure within the meaning of constitutional limitations, if it were unreasonable, the subsequent discoveries... would constitute derivative evidence obtained by an illegal seizure and therefore should have been suppressed...." (People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 418-419, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67,73 [1975]) Certainly,

"... a motorist has the general right to be free from arbitrary State intrusion on his freedom of movement even in an automobile.... (see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 ("'the citizen who have given no good cause for believing he is engaged in (criminal) activity is entitled to proceed on his way without inference'"); see, also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1876, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889...)." ^[4]

In order to determine if the Webster Police acted reasonably in stopping the defendant herein, or in other words was there...