People v. Gibson
| Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1-19-0137 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender; Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender; Douglas Hoff, Deputy Defender; Anna C. Carlozzi, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, County of Cook; (Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State's Attorney; Lesley D. Gool, Assistant State's Attorney; of counsel), for appellee.
¶ 1 Defendant, James Gibson, was convicted in a bench trial of two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated battery and sentenced to 29 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant requests we reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial, contending that his due process rights were violated when the trial court allowed him to be shackled during his bench trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with multiple counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated battery based on the allegation that on May 21, 2016, defendant personally discharged a firearm and caused injury to Cameron Brock. The State proceeded to trial on three counts of attempted first degree murder ( 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)) and one count of aggravated battery ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2016)).
¶ 4 Due to the limited issue on appeal, we only discuss those facts relevant to our disposition. The State's evidence at trial established that on May 21, 2016, Brock was standing in front of a friend's house when a vehicle drove by. Brock observed Darryl Kazee driving the vehicle with defendant sitting in the back seat holding a rifle. Brock then heard about 10 to 15 gunshots and was struck in the leg and arm. At the hospital, Brock reported to the police that defendant shot him. The State rested, and defendant called Kazee to the stand. Kazee testified that he shot Brock and not defendant. The defense rested, and the parties agreed to continue the trial for closing arguments.
¶ 5 On the final day of the five-day bench trial, and before closing arguments, the trial court became aware that defendant was in shackles and observed the following: The trial court continued, Defense counsel responded, The record does not indicate that defendant spoke during this exchange between the trial court and defense counsel. Further, the record does not indicate that defendant's shackles were removed during the final day of trial.
¶ 6 Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm. The trial court acquitted defendant on the other attempted first degree murder count. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.
¶ 7 At sentencing, the trial court heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation. After hearing the evidence, the trial court merged an attempted first degree murder count and aggravated battery count with the other attempted first degree murder count. The trial court sentenced defendant to 29 years’ imprisonment. This appeal follows.
¶ 9 On appeal, defendant argues that his due process rights were violated when the trial court allowed him to be shackled during the trial despite acknowledging that the shackles were unnecessary. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to raise this issue before the trial court and in a posttrial motion, but requests this court review his claim for plain error.
¶ 10 In response, the State concedes that allowing defendant to be shackled was an error but contends that defendant invited the error and because defendant invited the error, the plain-error doctrine does not apply. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the State.
¶ 12 We commence our analysis with a discussion of the general law surrounding the use of shackles on a defendant during a trial. Our case law is clear that defendants should not be shackled during trial except when there is a manifest need for the restraints. People v. Reese , 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 46, 421 Ill.Dec. 845, 102 N.E.3d 126 (citing People v. Allen , 222 Ill. 2d 340, 347, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349 (2006) ); Ill. S. Ct. R. 430 (eff. July 1, 2010). Allowing a defendant to be shackled during trial prejudices the jury against the defendant, restricts the defendant's ability to assist counsel during trial, and offends the dignity of the judicial process. In re Jonathon C.B. , 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 67, 354 Ill.Dec. 484, 958 N.E.2d 227. The fact that a jury may be prejudiced is not the only reason why shackles should be avoided; defendants should stand trial "with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man." Id. ¶ 68 (quoting In re Staley , 67 Ill. 2d 33, 37, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977) ). Therefore, the shackling of defendants should be avoided in jury trials as well as bench trials. Staley , 67 Ill. 2d at 37-38, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72.
¶ 13 As soon as the trial judge becomes aware that a defendant appears before the court in shackles, the judge "shall conduct a separate hearing on the record to investigate the need for such restraints." Ill. S. Ct. R. 430 (eff. July 1, 2010). At this hearing, the trial court "shall consider and shall make specific findings" as to 10 enumerated factors. Id. Under " Illinois Supreme Court Rule 430 (eff. July 1, 2010), a defendant must not be placed in restraints unless there is a manifest need to protect the security of the court, the proceedings, or to prevent escape. Id. The trial judge may only impose the use of restraints when the need for restraints outweighs the defendant's right to be free from them. Id. Whether there is a manifest need to restrain a defendant is within the trial court's discretion. In re Benny M. , 2017 IL 120133, ¶ 29, 422 Ill.Dec. 746, 104 N.E.3d 313 (citing Allen , 222 Ill. 2d at 348, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349 ).
¶ 15 On appeal, the parties agree that error was committed when defendant remained shackled during the last day of the bench trial. We too acknowledge that allowing defendant to remain shackled under these circumstances implicated his due process rights. See id. . Defendant, however, failed to raise this issue before the trial court or in a posttrial motion and thus forfeited the argument. He now requests we review it for plain error.
¶ 16 The failure to object to alleged error at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion ordinarily results in the forfeiture of the issue on appeal. People v. Enoch , 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Under the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error affecting substantial rights in two circumstances. First, where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury's guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preclude an argument that an innocent person was wrongly convicted. People v. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). Second, where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 179, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467. However, the plain-error doctrine does not apply in cases that involve invited error. People v. Schoonover , 2019 IL App (4th) 160882, ¶ 15, 441 Ill.Dec. 848, 158 N.E.3d 253. As discussed below, defendant invited the error in this case. Accordingly, we decline to review defendant's claim under the plain-error doctrine.
¶ 18 Under the invited-error doctrine, a defendant may not ask to proceed in one way and then on appeal contend it was error to proceed that way. People v. Spencer , 2014 IL App (1st) 130020, ¶ 26, 386 Ill.Dec. 409, 20 N.E.3d 785 (citing People v. Carter , 208 Ill. 2d 309, 319, 280 Ill.Dec. 664, 802 N.E.2d 1185 (2003) ). To allow a defendant to use the exact ruling or action procured in the trial court as a vehicle for reversal on appeal would offend notions of fair play and encourage defendants to become duplicitous. People v. Harding , 2012 IL App (2d) 101011, ¶ 17, 359 Ill.Dec. 116, 966 N.E.2d 437. It would also deprive the State of the opportunity to cure the alleged defect. People v. Bush , 214 Ill. 2d 318, 332, 292 Ill.Dec. 926, 827 N.E.2d 455 (2005).
¶ 19 As acknowledged in Rule 430, the circumstances surrounding the shackling of a defendant are considered on a Ill. S. Ct. R. 430 (eff. July 1, 2010). Here, the circumstances under which defendant became shackled are certainly unique. As noted by the trial court, defendant was placed in shackles because "the Sheriff had some issues downstairs with prisoners from Division 9." The trial court further observed that, while defendant was not involved in the Division 9 altercation, there was no key available to release defendant from his hand shackles. Then, before the trial court could conduct a full...
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