People v. Gibson
| Decision Date | 03 April 1972 |
| Citation | 354 N.Y.S.2d 273,77 Misc.2d 49 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Daniel GIBSON, Victor Echavarry, Jr., Daniel Siciliano, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Burton B. Roberts, Dist. Atty. (Robert M. Moll, New York City, of counsel), for People.
Morris Weissberg, New York City, for defendants.
The motions addressed to the three indictments present common issues and are therefore considered together. Each of the defendants is charged with obstruction of governmental administration, official misconduct and with having criminally tampered with a particular bridge maintained by the City of New York so as to cause a substantial interruption and impairment of service. Except for the name of the defendant and the name of the bridge, the three count indictments are identical. They arose out of a strike by certain municipal employees on June 7, 1971. The defendants, employed by the City as bridge operators, went off their jobs, leaving the bridges in an open position so that traffic over the bridges was halted.
The first count of each indictment charges a violation of section 145.20 of the Penal Law, which reads as follows:
'A person is guilty of criminal tampering in the first degree when, with intent to cause a substantial interruption or impairment of a service rendered to the public, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he damages or tampers with property of a gas, electric, sewer, steam or waterworks corporation, telephone or telegraph corporation, common carrier, or public utility operated by a municipality, or district, and thereby causes such substantial interruption or impairment of service.
Criminal tampering in the first degree is a class D felony.'
The determinative issue, with respect to the first counts, is whether the bridges were public utilities operated by the City within the purview of the statute. The term 'public utility' is not defined in the Penal Law. It is, however, an elastic term which cannot be defined with such precision that one may readily determine whether a given facility falls within it or not.
In People ex rel. City of Pauls Valley v. Williamson, 202 Okl. 338, 213 P.2d 852, a bridge and its approaches to afford a continuous route of travel over a creek were held not to be a public utility. Again in Hester v. Louisiana, 227 La. 1022, 81 So.2d 381, a bridge owned and maintained by Warren County, Mississippi, was held not to be a public utility for tax purposes. On the other hand, a bridge was found to be a public utility for rate-making purposes (Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 67 App.D.C. 44, 89 F.2d 788). In Woodmansee v. Kansas City, 346 Mo. 919, 144 S.W.2d 137, a city market was held not to be a public utility within the Public Service Law, but to be a public utility within the provisions of the City Charter authorizing the issuance of bonds on the credit of income from 'public utilities' owned or operated by the City. A cemetery was said to fall within the 'public utilities' which the City could purchase (Denton v. City of Sapulpa, 78 Okl. 178, 189 P. 532) and in Belton v. Ellis, Tex.Civ.App., 254 S.W. 1023, a pool and slide were found to be a public utility within the provisions of a statute authorizing the City to own and operate a 'public utility'.
Many cases can be cited showing the elasticity of the term, as well as the conflicting interpretations that have been placed upon it (See Words and Phrases, Vol. 35A, pages 85 to 118). The term has been held to include a public park (Derr v. City of Fairview, 121 Okl. 23, 247 P. 45), a golf course (Golf View v. Sioux City, 222 Iowa 433, 269 N.W. 45), a municipal parking lot (City of Shawnee v. Williamson, Okl., 338 P.2d 355), a library (Bekins v. City of Tulsa, Okl., 299 P.2d 792), and a museum (City of Tulsa v. Williamson, Okl., 276 P.2d 209).
It has been held not to include streets and highways (Coleman v. Frame, 26 Okl. 193, 109 P. 928; Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 N.E.2d 557), garbage removal (Olsen v. City of N.Y., 177 Misc. 99, 29 N.Y.S.2d 426), a school building (Grimes v. Bd. of Ed., 186 Okl. 665, 99 P.2d 876), a municipal auditorium (State v. City of Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 230, 181 N.E. 24), parking meters (Bd. of City of Newark v. Local Govt. Bd. of N.J., 133 N.J.L. 513, 45 A.2d 139), and off-street parking facilities (Parr v. Ladd, 323 Mich. 592, 36 N.W.2d 157).
It is clear, therefore, that the meaning to be given the term 'public utility' depends on where it is found and the sense in which it is used. Where it appears as part of a statutory provision, it must be given its intended meaning as reflected by the statute. Especially is this so where, as here, we are dealing with a criminal statute, the violation of which would subject a violator to possible incarceration for a term of seven years.
A criminal statute must be unequivocal and must describe the offense with such clarity that all who read it would be made aware of the acts prohibited. The words used must be given their usual and ordinary meaning, and not construed so as to spell out a...
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