People v. Gibson, No. 79SA125

• Docket Nº: No. 79SA125
• Citation: 623 P.2d 391
• Case Date: February 02, 1981
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

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623 P.2d 391 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Gary Michael GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 79SA125. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. Feb. 2, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 23, 1981.

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J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Kathleen M. Bowers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Joseph P. McMahon, Jr., Sp. Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

ERICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Gary Michael Gibson, appeals his conviction for second-degree assault. Section 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). He asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to his good faith, but his unreasonable belief that he acted in self-defense. He also claims that the jury should have been instructed as to the lesser offense of third-degree assault. We affirm.

On the date of the assault, Gibson was an inmate at the Colorado State Penitentiary.

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The incident which formed the basis of the assault centered on an attempt by prison guards to move Gibson to a new cell. When Gibson refused to move to his new cell, two guards grabbed his arms in an attempt to force him out of the cell. Gibson reacted by kicking a guard in the groin and inflicting serious injury. Gibson claims, however, that the guards' prior threats and the fact that he had filed several pro se legal actions against prison officials, caused him to believe that the guards intended to assault him and not to merely move him from one cell to another.

An information was filed charging Gibson with second-degree assault. ¹ Second-degree assault is a class 4 felony punishable by a maximum sentence of ten years. ² The information also charged Gibson under sentencing alternatives set forth in section 16-11-101(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) to enhance possible punishment. ³

Gibson contended that he was entitled to an instruction on the affirmative defense of self-defense. As a result, the court gave the jury the following instruction on self-defense:

"It is an affirmative defense to the crime of Assault in the Second Degree that the defendant used the physical force upon another person

(1) In order to defend himself from what he reasonably believed to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by others against him, and

(2) He used a degree of force which he reasonably believed to be necessary for that purpose."

"In passing upon the question as to whether or not the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that there was imminent danger that the complainant and others were about to do him bodily harm, you should determine this question from the standpoint of the defendant at the time he acted, under his surrounding at the particular instant of time, and determine whether or not he acted as a reasonable and prudent person would

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have acted under like circumstances. It is not enough that the defendant believed himself in danger, unless the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence and known to the defendant at the time, or by him then believed to be true, are such that you can say that as a reasonable person he had grounds for such belief." ⁴

The jury was also given the following instruction on second-degree assault:

"A person commits the crime of 'assault in the second degree' if: While lawfully confined or in custody, he violently applies physical force against the person of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties, and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties.

"The elements of 'assault in the second degree' are therefore:

(1) While lawfully confined or in custody

(2) With specific intent

(3) Violently applying physical force against a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties and

(4) Knowing or reasonably should know the victim is a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties.

"If, after considering all of the evidence, you find that the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Gary Michael Gibson acted in such a manner so as to satisfy all of the above elements at or about the date and place stated in the information, you should find the defendant guilty of assault in the second degree; if you do not so find, you should find the defendant not guilty of assault in the second degree."

The jury found Gibson guilty of second-degree assault and a sentence of two to ten years was imposed. See section 16-11-101(1)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8).

I.

Gibson relying on People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978), asserts that if he committed the assault with the good faith, but unreasonable belief that his actions were justified, the sentence imposed can be no greater than that which can be imposed under the criminally-negligent homicide statute. Section 18-3-105, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). ⁵ Criminally-negligent homicide is a

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class 1 misdemeanor that carries a sanction of six months to two years imprisonment. ⁶

The prosecution, on the other hand, argues that the rationale of People v. Bramlett, supra, does not apply because section 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) (assault while in custody) proscribes conduct which has no relationship to the unlawful acts set forth in either the criminally-negligent homicide statute, or section 1(a) of the first-degree assault statute.

We agree with the prosecution. In People v. Bramlett, supra, we concluded that the intent and the conduct defined in the first-degree assault statute and the criminally-negligent homicide statute were not sufficiently distinguishable to justify a greater penalty for the infliction of serious bodily injury which would be imposed when death occurred. In reversing Bramlett's conviction for first-degree assault, we stated:

"A statute which prescribes different degrees of punishment for the same acts committed under like circumstances by persons in like situations is violative of a person's right to equal protection of the laws." (Citations omitted.) Id. 194 Colo. at 208, 573 P.2d 94.

The issue here is whether the intent and the conduct proscribed by the second-degree assault statute and the criminally-negligent homicide statute, are sufficiently distinguishable to justify a greater penalty when the conduct proscribed by the assault statute results in the application of violent physical force as contrasted with death under the...