People v. Gibson

• Decision Date: 20 January 1944
• Docket Number: No. 27605.,27605.
• Citation: 52 N.E.2d 1008,385 Ill. 371
• Parties: PEOPLE v. GIBSON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

385 Ill. 371

52 N.E.2d 1008

PEOPLE

v.GIBSON.

No. 27605.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 20, 1944.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Julius H. Miner, Judge

Cleo Gibson was convicted of murder, and she brings error.

Affirmed.Ellis & Westbrooks and Joseph J. Attwell, Jr., all of Chicago (Richard E. Westbrooks, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe, and Joseph A. Pope, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Upon a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County, the defendant, Cleo Gibson, was found guilty of the murder of Missouri Perkins, otherwise called Missouri Perkins, and her punishment fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for twenty years. Her motion for a new trial was overruled and judgment entered on the verdict. Defendant now seeks a reversal, claiming the evidence was not sufficient to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in the giving of certain instructions and in the rulings upon evidence.

Accused and deceased were negro women and had been friends and associates for a number of years. The killing occurred between three and four o'clock on the morning of May 15, 1941, in the apartment occupied by deceased and Juanita Jones at 4615 Michigan avenue, in Chicago. Earlier in the night deceased had been at a tavern and about two o'clock on that morning, accompanied by her friends, Richard Tapley and Blanche Taylor, returned to her apartment. After they had been there a while, Juanita Jones and the defendant also came in, and in about five minutes after their arrival Blanche Taylor departed. There was drinking and conversation, and deceased, becoming angry at defendant, hit her on the head with a small wooden baseball bat, about twelve inches in length. The blow inflicted a flesh wound which bled profusely. Tapley went to her assistance, gave her a towel, and went with her to the bathroom, which was a distance of some twenty feet down the hall from the apartment. At her request he returned to the apartment for some salt to stop the flow of blood, took the salt from a shelf, gave it to the defendant in the bathroom, and then left the building. When he left the apartment after obtaining the salt, deceased shut and locked the door after him. At that time defendant was in the bathroom, and deceased and Juanita Jones were alone in the apartment. Juanita Jones, who was called as a witness by the court and cross-examined by both sides, testified that defendant banged on the door for about three minutes, saying, ‘Open that door. Give me my purse, chubby and hat;’ that deceased told her not to open the door, but that she did so and ran out because she was afraid she might get hurt as the room was so small; that deceased went to the front porch opening off the apartment and yelled for the police; and that when witness opened the door she ran out at once before the defendant came in. She testified, ‘I wasn't taking time to give her her coat and purse. I was getting out.’ She fled from the room to the end of the hall and stood there until defendant passed her going down the stairs a few minutes later, after which she returned to the room where she found deceased lying on the bed, covered with blood. Deceased was then living, but died before the police officer arrived at 3:30 A. M. Her death was caused by multiple stab wounds.

Edna Shaw, who lived in room 19, adjoining room 20, which was the apartment of the deceased, testified that she was awakened about three o'clock in the morning, that deceased called to her about three times, and that witness then went downstairs and asked the landlady to call the police. She testified that as she went through the hall she saw defendant banging on the door of room 20 with a garbage can lid and heard her say, ‘Open that door and give me my purse.’ She testified that she heard nothing further, but admitted that at the coroner's inquest she had testified she heard the defendant threaten to break the door down.

Della Julian, who lived in another apartment which also adjoined that of deceased, testified she was awakened by someone pounding on the door, that she heard and recognized defendant's voice, and heard deceased say, ‘Don't you answer that door, I'm going out of here and call 19 and tell her to call Mrs. Holland to call the police;’ that witness heard the door to deceased's apartment open and heard the defendant rush in saying, ‘Come on here, bitch, I am going to kill you.’

Lucy Holland, the landlady, testified that while in her room on the first floor she heard someone banging on a door on the third floor with what sounded like a garbage-can lid, and heard the defendant threaten to break in the door.

Defendant testified that while she was in the bathroom she asked Richard Tapley to go back to the room and get her things, but he left without doing so; that she then went to the room, knocked on the door and said, ‘Missouri, give me my coat and hat;’ that deceased replied, ‘I'm not going to give you nothing;’ that defendant said, ‘Juanita, give me my things,’ and Juanita said, ‘I haven't got any thing to do with it;’ that she knocked again and said, ‘Juanita, please give me my pocket-book if you won't give me my things, because I am about to bleed to death;’ that then the door opened and Juanita ran out, and she (the defendant) went in to get her coat and pocketbook. Defendant further testified that deceased then started beating her with the same club and in the fight the deceased grabbed a knife and told her she would kill her; that they fought around the room, and that as soon as she could get away from deceased, she grabbed her coat and ran out.

Defendant contends that the court erred in giving People's instructions 10, 16, 17, 18, and 20. Instruction 10 defined murder and express and implied malice in the words of the statute. Objection is made to it on the ground that it is inapplicable and ignores the plea of self-defense. People v. Clark, 368 Ill. 183, 13 N.E.2d 269, and People v. Dascola, 322 Ill. 473, 153 N.E. 710, are cited in support of this contention. It is true this instruction, in the cases cited by defendant, was criticised and condemned as ignoring the right of self-defense. It was stated in those cases that instructions defining murder and malice should never be given without calling attention to the element of self-defense where it is involved in the case, because liable to be misleading. In this case other instructions given, both for the People and the defendant, fully covered the subject of self-defense. Instruction No. 10 did not direct a verdict. It simply consisted of the definition of the crime of murder and the definition of the malice which constitutes one of the elements of the crime. The instructions given in a case are to be read and considered as a series. A particular instruction need not contain all the law either of the case or upon a given subject. It is sufficient if the instructions, considered as a whole, fully and fairly announce the law applicable to the theories of the People and of the defendant, respectively. People v. DeRosa, 378 Ill. 557, 39 N.E.2d 1. When instruction 10 is considered with reference to other instructions given on the subject of self-defense, it neither ignores nor nullifies this theory. It was held in People v. Grady, 381 Ill. 224, 44 N.E.2d 880, and in People v. Andrews, 327 Ill. 162, 158 N. E. 462, that an instruction defining murder and malice is not erroneous as ignoring the element of self-defense where other instructions are given covering that subject. The Jury could not have been misled by this instruction.

Objection is made to People's instruction No. 16. Defendant claims this instruction assumes she had admitted causing the death of deceased, and says there is a difference between admitting that she stabbed her and admitting that she stabbed her to death. There is, however, in this case no possible doubt as to the cause of the death of Missouri Perkins. That defendant stabbed and fatally wounded her is not questioned. The only question presented to the jury was the claim of self-defense. The case of People v. Biella, 374, Ill. 87, 28 N.E.2d 111, cited by defendant, is not applicable here. There the deceased died five days after his fight with the defendant and one of the controverted questions in the case was whether the injuries received in the fight were the cause of his death. There was no evidence as to what serious wounds, if any, he sustained during the fight or as to his physical condition immediately thereafter, the only evidence bearing on his condition being that he went back to his room after the fight, locked the door, and opened it two hours later, without assistance, to admit a friend. Here the deceased, as soon as the affray was over, was found lying on the bed in a pool of blood and died in a very few minutes thereafter. Defendant also claims that this instruction is erroneous because of the use of the term ‘justifiable self-defense.’ The use of the qualifying adjective in this expression has been criticised as neither necessary nor proper. There is no self-defense except that which is justifiable. If it is self-defense it is justifiable. People v. Biella, 374 Ill. 87, 28 N.E.2d 111; People v. Triolo, 332, Ill. 410, 163 N.E. 784. But the erroneous use of the term ‘justifiable self-defense’ does not require reversal where other instructions fully define the circumstances under which the defense is available. People v. Biella, 374 Ill. 87, 28 N.E.2d 111;People v. Triolo, 332 Ill. 410, 163 N.E. 784. We are of the opinion that none of the language complained of in this instruction resulted in prejudice to the defendant.

People's instruction No. 17 is identical in language with the instruction appearing on page 17 of the opinion...