People v. Gilbert

• Decision Date: 19 November 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-2678
• Citation: 300 N.W.2d 604,101 Mich.App. 459
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph John GILBERT, Defendant-Appellant. 101 Mich.App. 459, 300 N.W.2d 604
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 604

300 N.W.2d 604

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph John GILBERT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 78-2678.

101 Mich.App. 459, 300 N.W.2d 604

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Nov. 19, 1980.

Released for Publication Jan. 29, 1981.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, P. E. Bennett, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

[101 MICHAPP 463] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Robert L. Kaczmarek, Pros. Atty., Patrick M. Meter, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and KELLY and CORSIGLIA, ^* JJ.

KELLY, Judge.

Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction and sentence on three counts of first-degree murder, contrary to M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, following a bench trial concluded December 19, 1977. On April 17, 1978, defendant was sentenced to the mandatory three concurrent terms of life imprisonment.

On October 10, 1977, defendant was hunting with a companion, Theodore Kryzaniak, in the Dice Lake area of Saginaw County. Defendant was armed with a Huntmaster .22-caliber pump action rifle and a Puma Werk hunting knife. After entering a wooded area, the two men proceeded to their [101 MICHAPP 464] respective hunting blinds. While seated in his blind, Kryzaniak heard several shots emanating from the direction of defendant's blind. Kryzaniak proceeded to the defendant's blind, where he discovered two dogs which had been shot. The defendant admitted he shot the dogs.

At about 5:30 p. m., Kryzaniak and the defendant took a walk up to Dice Lake, where they observed a woman (later identified as Jeanne Gehrcke) and two small children preparing to fish. Upon finishing the walk, Kryzaniak returned to his blind. Defendant said he preferred to hunt in a different area and proceeded in a northerly direction away from the location of his blind. At about 6 p. m. defendant was seen by three persons, who testified defendant was approaching the small peninsula from which the woman and two children were fishing. Kryzaniak later heard a single gunshot north of the area of his blind. Approximately one hour later, Kryzaniak proceeded to defendant's blind, to which defendant Prior to trial, the defendant was examined by four expert psychiatric witnesses, two for each side. The defendant's statements to these experts disclosed the following specifics regarding the three murders. Defendant said that he had been walking behind Jeanne Gehrcke as she was leaving the Dice Lake area and had been toying with the idea of having sex with her. He had the urge to shoot something, so he flipped off the safety of [101 MICHAPP 465] his rifle and shot Mrs. Gehrcke in the back of the head. He dragged her off to the side of the road and had intercourse with her. He killed the boys so there would be no surviving witnesses and slashed Jeanne Gehrcke's throat either in an attempt to conceal the true cause of her death or to make sure that she was dead.

had returned. The two men then went home. At 5 p. m. the next day, the bodies of the woman and her two children were found near a small dirt fireroad near the lake. The woman had been shot in the back of the head, sexually assaulted and her throat slashed. The boys were each found stabbed in the chest and their throats had been slashed.

At trial, defense counsel admitted that defendant perpetrated the three homicides, but argued that the defendant did not at the time exhibit sufficient malice, intent or premeditation necessary for first-degree murder. Defendant's expert psychiatric witnesses asserted that defendant had panicked during the murders and had acted impulsively and without premeditation. They did not, however, testify that defendant was insane or had acted out of an irresistable impulse.

In its findings of fact, the trial court rejected the defense witnesses' testimony. The court concluded that defendant intentionally murdered the three victims, that the murders were premeditated and deliberate and that defendant thought out and consciously reflected upon his decision to murder and the means to effect it. On appeal, the defendant raises five issues.

Defendant first argues that the trial court made insufficient findings of fact to support its verdict. (See Appendix.) Specifically, defendant alleges that the trial judge made inadequate findings of fact on the elements of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant also asserts as error the trial judge's failure to make factual findings on first-degree felony murder during commission of a rape, an offense for which defendant was charged in the alternative for the murder and sexual assault of Jeanne Gehrcke.

The adequacy of a trial court's findings of fact is [101 MICHAPP 466] governed by GCR 1963, 517.1, which provides in relevant part:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the fact specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. It will be sufficient if the court makes brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters without over elaboration of detail or particularization of facts."

See People v. Jackson, 390 Mich. 621, 627, 212 N.W.2d 918 (1973). See also People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich.App. 468, 280 N.W.2d 565 (1979), and People v. Brooks, 75 Mich.App. 448, 450, 254 N.W.2d 926 (1977), for cases interpreting the Jackson finding of fact requirement as an application of the requirements GCR 1963, 517.1 to criminal cases in accordance with the provisions of GCR 1963, 785.1(1). In 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p. 594, the authors suggested an oft-quoted analysis of the rule's mandate:

"The findings must disclose the basis for each ultimate fact necessary to sustain the court's conclusions of law. But a mere recital of the conclusory facts which constitute the elements of the cause of action or defense will often be too general and not specific enough. Findings that defendant was 'negligent' and that plaintiff was not 'contributorially negligent,' unsupported by more specific factual findings, would not satisfy the purpose of the rule.

"The findings of fact must include as much of the subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue. The findings should be made at a level of specificity which will disclose to the reviewing [101 MICHAPP 467] court the choices made as between competing factual premises at the critical point that controls the ultimate conclusion of fact. That is, at the point where a given choice as to the concrete facts leads inevitably to the ultimate conclusion, the findings should disclose the choice which was made, so that the appellate court may test the validity of its evidentiary support."

See also People v. Jackson (After Remand), 63 Mich.App. 249, 253, 234 N.W.2d 471 (1975), and People v. Stanford, 68 Mich.App. 168, 174, 242 N.W.2d 56 (1976), applying the same suggested analysis to findings of fact in criminal cases.

Exclusive to a finding of guilt for first-degree murder are the elements of premeditation and deliberation. M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, People v. Germain, 91 Mich.App. 154, 284 N.W.2d 260 (1979). The testimony at trial was conflicting as to these elements. We do not, however, find the trial court's factual findings insufficient. The trial judge concluded that defendant thought out in advance and consciously reflected on his intent to murder the victims and the means to accomplish the acts. The trial judge also noted an adequate period of time over which the defendant's plan was established. These findings implicitly reject defendant's claim that his acts were the result of a sudden impulse. As such, the lower court's conclusion in favor of that evidence suggesting a carefully planned, deliberate series of acts by the defendant is clear. We thus find no merit in the defendant's claimed error.

Defendant also argues as error the trial judge's failure to make specific findings on the alternate charge of felony murder during the commission of a rape. In People v. Jackson, supra, fn. 3 of 390 Mich. 627, 212 N.W.2d 918, the Supreme Court noted an exception to the requirements of GCR 1963, 517.1:

[101 MICHAPP 468] "A judge's failure to find the facts does not require remand where it is manifest that he was aware of the factual issue, that he resolved it and it would not facilitate appellate review to require further explication of the path he followed in reaching the result as, for example, where the only factual issue is identification."

Accord, People v. Jackson, 81 Mich.App. 18, 264 N.W.2d 101 (1978). In his findings, the trial judge expressly noted that defendant was charged in the alternative with felony murder. The subsequent verdict finding defendant guilty of the first-degree murder of Jeanne Gehrcke necessitates a conclusion that the felony murder charge was resolved in favor of defendant. Thus, a remand for more detailed fact finding is not required.

Defendant next argues that the trial court had before it insufficient evidence to establish premeditation and deliberation and that the corpus delicti of the offense was not established. He claims that the only evidence suggestive of these required elements was the statements made to various expert witnesses who later testified regarding defendant's mental capacity. Defendant correctly notes that the corpus delicti of first-degree murder must have been established independently of his out of court statements. People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973). However, the defendant's state of mind at the time of the murders must necessarily be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. People v. Burgess, 96 Mich.App. 390, 292 N.W.2d 209 (1980). To establish premeditation and deliberation a court must find a lapse of time sufficient to have...