People v. Giles, No. S129852.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: Chin
• Citation: 152 P.3d 433,55 Cal.Rptr.3d 133,40 Cal.4th 833
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dwayne GILES, Defendant and Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. S129852.
• Decision Date: 05 March 2007

55 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 40 Cal.4th 833 152 P.3d 433 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Dwayne GILES, Defendant and Appellant. No. S129852. Supreme Court of California. March 5, 2007.

[55 Cal.Rptr.3d 134]

Marilyn G. Burkhardt, under appointment by the Supreme Court, West Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels,

[55 Cal.Rptr.3d 135]

Kristofer Jorstad, Susan D. Martynec, Joseph P. Lee and Russell A. Lehman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Nancy K.D. Lemon and Timna A. Sites, for California Partnership to End Domestic Violence as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Douglas Beloof, Margaret Garvin, Kim Montagriff, Joanna Tucker Davis; Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant and Laura J. Marabito, Sacramento, for National Crime Victim Law Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

In this case, defendant admitted that he killed his ex-girlfriend, but claimed that the killing was committed in self-defense. Over defendant's objection, the trial court admitted the victim's prior statements to a police officer who had been investigating a report of domestic violence involving defendant and the victim. The prior incident had occurred a few weeks before the killing. The victim related that, during that incident, defendant had held a knife to her and threatened to kill her.

Did defendant forfeit his right to confront his ex-girlfriend about the prior incident of domestic violence by killing her and thus making it impossible for her to be at the murder trial? Does the doctrine of "forfeiture by wrongdoing" apply where the alleged "wrongdoing" is the same as the offense for which defendant was on trial? Under that equitable doctrine, a defendant is deemed to have lost the right to object on confrontation grounds to the admission of out-of-court statements of a witness whose unavailability the defendant caused.

As explained below, we conclude that defendant forfeited his right to confront his ex-girlfriend when he killed her.

FACTS¹

A. The shooting.

Defendant dated Brenda Avie for several years. On the night of September 29, 2002, he was staying at his grandmother's house along with several other family members. Defendant was in the garage socializing with his niece Veronica Smith, his friend Marie Banks, and his new girlfriend, Tameta Munks, when defendant's grandmother called him into the house to take a telephone call from Avie. He returned to the garage and spoke to Munks, who then left.

Avie arrived at the house about 15 minutes later, after Munks had already left. She spoke with Smith and Banks in the garage for about half an hour. Smith went into the house to lie down and heard Avie and Banks leaving the garage together. A few minutes later, Smith heard defendant and Avie speaking to one another outside in a normal conversational tone. Avie then yelled "Granny" several times, and Smith heard a series of gunshots.

Smith and defendant's grandmother ran outside and discovered defendant holding a nine-millimeter handgun and standing about 11 feet from Avie, who was bleeding and lying on the ground. Defendant's grandmother took the gun from him and called 911. Smith drove defendant away from the house at his request, but he jumped out of her car and ran away after they had traveled several blocks. Defendant did not turn himself in to the police and was eventually arrested on October 15, 2002.

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Avie had been shot six times in the area of her torso. Two of the wounds were fatal; one was consistent with her holding up her hand at the time she was shot; one was consistent with her having turned to her side when she was shot; and one was consistent with her being shot while she was lying on the ground. Avie was not carrying a weapon when she was shot.

Defendant testified at trial and admitted shooting Avie, but claimed he had acted in self-defense. He explained that he had a tumultuous relationship with Avie and was trying unsuccessfully to end it. Avie would get very jealous of other women, including Tameta Munks, whom he had been dating. Defendant knew that Avie had shot a man before she met him, and he had seen her threaten people with a knife. He claimed that Avie had vandalized his home and car on two separate occasions.

According to defendant, he had a "typical" argument with Avie when she called him on the telephone on the day of the shooting. He told her Munks was at the house and Avie said, "Oh, that bitch is over there. Tell her I'm on my way over there to kill her." Defendant told Munks to leave because he was worried about the situation, and Avie arrived soon afterwards. Defendant told everyone to leave and began closing up the garage where they had congregated. Avie walked away with Marie Banks, but she returned a few minutes later. Avie told defendant she knew Munks was returning and she was going to kill them both. Defendant stepped into the garage and retrieved a gun stowed under the couch. He disengaged the safety and started walking toward the back door of the house. Avie "charged" him, and defendant, afraid she had something in her hand, fired several shots. Defendant testified that it was dark and his eyes were closed as he was firing the gun. He claimed that he did not intend to kill her.

Marie Banks testified that she had seen defendant and Avie get into arguments before. Avie seemed angry when she came to defendant's grandmother's house on the day of the shooting, and she talked to defendant for about half an hour until defendant told everyone to leave. Avie and Banks left together, but as they were walking away they saw Munks. Avie said, "Fuck that bitch. I'm fixin' to go back." She walked back toward defendant's grandmother's house and Banks went home. Banks did not see the shooting.

B. The prior incident of domestic violence.

On September 5, 2002, a few weeks before the shooting, Officer Stephen Kotsinadelis and his partner investigated a report of domestic violence involving defendant and Avie. Defendant answered the door, apparently agitated, and allowed them to enter. Avie was sitting on the bed, crying. Officer Kotsinadelis interviewed Avie while his partner spoke to defendant in a different room. Avie said she had been talking to a female friend on the telephone when defendant became angry and accused her of having an affair with that friend. Avie ended the call and began to argue with defendant, who grabbed her by the shirt, lifted her off the floor, and began to choke her with his hand. She broke free and fell to the floor, but defendant climbed on top of her and punched her in the face and head. After Avie broke free again, defendant opened a folding knife, held it about three feet away from her, and said, "If I catch you fucking around I'll kill you." Officer Kotsinadelis saw no marks on Avie, but felt a bump on her head.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The trial court admitted Avie's hearsay statements to Officer Kotsinadelis over defense

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counsel's objection. The court ruled that the statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1370, which establishes a hearsay exception for out-of-court statements describing the infliction of physical injury on the declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the statements are trustworthy.

The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (Pen.Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and found that he had personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death.² (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)

The Court of Appeal upheld admission of Avie's statements to the police. Applying the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the Court of Appeal held that defendant "cannot be heard to complain that he was unable to cross-examine Avie about her prior, trustworthy statements to law enforcement when it was his own criminal violence that made her unavailable for cross-examination." It noted that, although the issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing was not litigated below, evidence of Avie's hearsay statements was admitted under a statutory hearsay exception that appeared to be valid at the time of defendant's pre-Crawford (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177) trial. Nevertheless, the court addressed the forfeiture issue because it was undisputed that Avie was unavailable to testify because of her death and that her death was the result of defendant's actions.

We granted defendant's petition for review to decide whether the Court of Appeal properly applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.

DISCUSSION

The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."

In Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (Crawford), the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause (as envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution) bars the admission of out-of-court "testimonial" statements except when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford overruled Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (Roberts ), which for 24 years provided the framework governing the admissibility of statements from witnesses who did not testify at trial. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 61-68, 124 S.Ct. 1354) Roberts had permitted the admission of hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses, without violating the confrontation clause, if those statements fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. (Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531.) Holding that hearsay rules and judicial...