People v. Gipson
| Decision Date | 21 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 93422.,93422. |
| Citation | 272 Ill.Dec. 1,203 Ill.2d 298,786 N.E.2d 540 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Curtis GIPSON, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee G. Goldfarb, Theodore Fotios Burtzos and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Sarah Curry, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.
At issue are two questions concerning inventory searches: (1) whether a police officer's unrebutted testimony about police policy on inventory searches can be sufficient evidence of such a policy if the State does not introduce a written policy into evidence; and (2) whether a policy requiring the police to inventory items of value is sufficient to allow the opening of closed containers if the policy does not specifically mention closed containers.
The State charged defendant in the circuit court of Cook County with one count of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1996)). Defendant moved to quash his arrest and to suppress the evidence that was found during a search of his car.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant testified as follows. At 12:25 a.m. on January 8, 1998, defendant was driving home from work. When defendant reached the intersection of Jackson and Homan in Chicago, a police car began to follow him. The police car followed him for several minutes. The police car's lights went on when defendant crossed Kedzie, and defendant pulled over. The police officer approached defendant's car and told defendant that he was driving on a revoked license. Defendant gave the officer his identification and proof of insurance, following which the officer put defendant into the backseat of his squad car and locked it. The officer put some information into his computer and told defendant that if he did not have any outstanding warrants, he was free to go.
According to defendant, the officer never told him that he was under arrest. The officer then got out of the squad car and looked under the hood of defendant's car. He searched the passenger compartment of the car and then came back to the squad car. The officer started typing on his computer again and then went back to defendant's car, took the keys out of the ignition, and opened the trunk. Defendant testified that he had a yellow plastic Ameritech bag tied closed in the trunk. Inside of the Ameritech bag was a black plastic bag, containing rocks of cocaine, that was also tied closed. According to defendant, he never gave the officer permission to search his car, and the officer never told him that the car would be towed or that the officer was conducting an inventory search. The officer never told defendant he was under arrest before he searched the car.
The State presented the testimony of Sergeant David Byrd of the Illinois State Police. Byrd testified that he initially began following defendant's car because it had a cracked windshield. A "registration response" on defendant's license plate revealed that the owner's name was Curtis Gipson and that Gipson's driver's license had been revoked. Byrd pulled over defendant and informed him that the reason for the stop was that the car had a defective windshield and that the car's owner had a revoked license. When defendant confirmed that he was Curtis Gipson, Byrd placed defendant in the back of his squad car.
Once defendant was in the car, Byrd called a tow truck and conducted an inventory search of defendant's vehicle. Byrd explained that the State Police policy is to tow the vehicle when someone is arrested for driving on a revoked license. When a vehicle is towed following an arrest, the police policy is that a tow inventory search should be conducted. When asked to explain the police policy on tow inventory searches, Byrd responded:
"We are required to check the passenger compartment, and trunk area for any valuables, or just for our own—we don't want anything to leave us that might be of value without checking it first and putting it down on the tow sheet."
When Byrd opened the trunk, he found a yellow Ameritech bag. He opened the bag and noticed two smaller bags inside. He opened these and observed what appeared to be crack cocaine. Byrd testified that he never told defendant that he would be free to go at some point. Rather, defendant was arrested and taken into custody. Byrd gave defendant a ticket for having a cracked windshield and driving on a revoked license.
Following arguments by the attorneys, the trial judge recalled Sergeant Byrd to the stand. The following colloquy ensued:
Following further arguments from counsel, the trial court decided to reserve ruling on the motion until the parties submitted further case law. Two months later, the court granted defendant's motion to suppress. The trial judge stated that the police had no right to tow the car and that State Police policy could not supersede the law. The State filed a motion to reconsider in which it pointed out that the court had erroneously relied on cases that did not involve inventory searches. At the hearing on the motion, the State argued that a lawful inventory search pursuant to State Police policy had occurred. The trial judge responded that he was not sure what the State Police policy was because he had never seen it and the officer might have just given his own interpretation. The trial judge then stated that the police could not use a minor traffic ticket to create a basis for a search and that defendant had only been stopped for "a little, minor thing like a cracked windshield." The court questioned why the police had to tow the car. The State responded that defendant had been arrested for driving on a revoked license and that a proper tow inventory search had occurred. The court denied the motion to reconsider.
The State appealed, and the Appellate Court, First District, issued an unpublished order reversing the trial court. The appellate court held that the type of tow and impoundment carried out here were authorized by statute. The court then held that Officer Byrd's uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony provided sufficient evidence of the State Police policy on tow inventory searches and that the State was not required to admit the written policy into evidence. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing, which the court granted. The appellate court issued a second unpublished order, this time affirming the trial court. No. 1-99-1811 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court continued to hold that the tow and impoundment were lawful. This time, however, the court agreed with the trial court that Sergeant Byrd's testimony was insufficient and that the State should have introduced the actual written State Police policy. Further, the court noted that Byrd's testimony was also deficient in that he never stated that there was a specific police policy authorizing him to open closed containers during inventory searches. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.
On review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill.2d 425, 431, 256 Ill.Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001). However, we review de novo the ultimate legal question of whether suppression is warranted. Sorenson, 196 Ill.2d at 431, 256 Ill.Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078.
The State first argues that the appellate court erred in holding that Officer Byrd's testimony was insufficient to establish the State Police policy on inventory searches and that there is no constitutional requirement that the State produce the actual written policy. We agree with the State. An inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. People v. Hundley, 156 Ill.2d 135, 138, 189 Ill.Dec. 43, 619 N.E.2d 744 (1993). In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1005 (1976), the Supreme Court identified three objectives that are served by allowing inventory searches: (1) protection of the owner's property; (2) protection of the police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of the police from potential danger.
In conducting such a search, the police must be acting pursuant to standard police procedures. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372-74, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741-42, 93 L.Ed.2d 739, 746-47 (1987). "`"[A] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront."'" Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610-11, 77 L.Ed.2d 65, 72 (1983...
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...have been suppressed. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004); People v. Gipson, 203 Ill.2d 298, 303-04, 272 Ill.Dec. 1, 786 N.E.2d 540 (2003). As our supreme court has previously explained, "[o]n review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress,......
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