People v. Gleisner

• Decision Date: 11 June 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 56506
• Citation: 115 Mich.App. 196,320 N.W.2d 340
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Penny Lynn GLEISNER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 340

320 N.W.2d 340

115 Mich.App. 196

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Penny Lynn GLEISNER, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 56506.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 10, 1982.

Decided April 8, 1982.

Released for Publication June 11, 1982.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Jeffrey R. Jurmu, Pros. Atty., and Leonard J. Malinowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

Chari Grove, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and CAVANAGH and WALSH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Four police officers arrived at a house occupied by the defendant to execute a search warrant. Defendant was sitting on the front porch of the house when the police officers appeared but she entered the house and slammed the door upon learning that the officers had a search warrant. All four officers testified that the defendant threatened to kill them if they entered the house. Finding the front door locked, the officers kicked it down, arrested the defendant, and executed their search warrant. Defendant was convicted of resisting and obstructing a police officer, M.C.L. Sec. 750.479; M.S.A. Sec. 28.747, and appeals as of right.

The principal question raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on specific intent. The court declined to do so on the ground that resisting and obstructing a police officer is not a specific intent crime.

The statute governing resisting and obstructing a police officer includes the following language:

"Any person who shall knowingly and willfully obstruct, resist or oppose any sheriff * * * or other officer or person * * * authorized by law to maintain and preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the peace, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." M.C.L. Sec. 750.479; M.S.A. Sec. 28.747.

Although the word "intent" appears nowhere in the statutory language, defendant focuses on the phrase "knowingly and willfully" as indicating that this is a specific intent offense. In People v. Tompkins, 121 Mich. 431, 432, 80 N.W. 126 (1899), the Supreme Court analyzed what these words meant:

"The law attempts to punish an assault upon an officer while in the discharge of his duty by a penalty more severe than that imposed for other assaults. It requires that the offense be committed knowingly and willfully. If an assault is willful, it is intentional; and, if intentional, it must be made knowingly. If, therefore, we are to apply these words as we are asked to do, the word 'knowingly' is superfluous. There is no doubt that a knowledge that the person assaulted is an officer in the discharge of his duty was made an element of the offense, and that the insertion of the word 'knowingly' in the statute had reference to this, and not to the assault, which could not be willful unless made intentionally, and therefore knowingly."

Thus the term "willfully" means that the defendant must have done the proscribed act, i.e., the resisting or obstructing, intending to do it. This is not a specific intent, but only an intent to do a certain physical act. "Knowingly" means that, in addition, the defendant must have done the act to an officer, knowing him to be an officer. See also People v. Royal, 62 Mich.App. 756, 233 N.W.2d 860 (1975).

Defendant next claims that resisting and obstructing an officer was held to be a specific intent crime in People v. Haley, 48 Mich. 495, 12 N.W. 671 (1882). In Haley, the Michigan Supreme Court made the following comment, concerning jury instructions given at trial:

"There was on the trial more or less evidence concerning defendant's condition from drink. The court charged in effect that if he was too drunk to be capable of forming the statutory intent he would be free from the statutory guilt, but not otherwise. We do not think any more could have been asked on this head." Id. 497, 12 N.W. 671.

This language is considered authority for the proposition that resisting and obstructing an officer is a specific intent crime, since, unlike specific intent, intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime and this seems to be the principal thrust of the distinction. The universally accepted rule in this country is that general intent cannot be negatived by evidence that the actor was intoxicated at the time the crime was committed. People v. Kelley, 21 Mich.App. 612, 618, 176 N.W.2d 435 (1970). The people correctly point out, however, that the case never explicitly characterized the offense of resisting and obstructing an officer as a specific intent offense. Additionally, the Michigan Supreme Court on at least one occasion has held intoxication to be a defense to a general intent crime. In People v. Peterson, 166 Mich. 10, 14, 131 N.W. 153 (1911), the Court ruled intoxication to be a defense to the charge of...