People v. Gokcek, 1-05-AP-000244.
| Decision Date | 31 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-05-AP-000244.,1-05-AP-000244. |
| Citation | 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 405 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ihsan GOKCEK, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | California Superior Court |
George Kennedy, District Attorney, Cindy L. Cole, Deputy District Attorney, Denise J. Raabe, Deputy District Attorney, and Mary Shine, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Peter F. Goldscheider, Palo Alto, for Defendant and Respondent.
[11]
Since 1872, California law has allowed the civil compromise of certain misdemeanor offenses if a criminal defendant adequately compensates the person injured for all costs incurred. (Pen.Code, §§ 1377-1379.) Upon proof of compensation and satisfaction of the injured person, the court can dismiss the criminal charges against the defendant.
In the instant case, the criminal defendant sought dismissal of his misdemeanor charge of false imprisonment for an act which occurred on January 3, 2003, against a minor who was 14 years old at the time. The trial court found that a civil compromise was permissible and dismissed the criminal charge against defendant. The People now appeal this ruling and argue that a civil compromise was not available for defendant's offense because the victim was a child1.
[12]
Here, we will conclude that, though a civil compromise may be permissible where the crime was committed upon a "child", it is prohibited when the offense meets the description of any conduct listed in Penal Code sections 647.6 () and 11165.6 (child abuse or neglect). Further, we conclude that a civil compromise is prohibited for any conduct described by Penal Code section 11165.6, even in the absence of any caretaking, custodial, or familial relationship between the defendant and the child victim, except where expressly stated otherwise.
The issue of whether the charged crime falls within the conduct described by Penal Code sections 647.6 and 11165.6 is a factual one to be determined at a hearing in the trial court. That determination was not made here; therefore, we reverse and remand.
The following facts are based upon the police report contained in the record.
On January 3, 2003, the minor2 was selling newspaper subscriptions door-to-door. The minor knocked on the door of the apartment of Ihsan Gokcek (Respondent) and made contact with his wife, Ebru Gokcek. The minor was unable to communicate with Mrs. Gokcek, who could not speak English well. Mrs. Gokcek closed the door, and the minor remained a few minutes, believing that she had gone to get her checkbook. According to Mrs. Gokcek, she had tried to tell the minor that she was not interested and became concerned when the minor remained after she closed the door. She stated that she became afraid and decided to call her husband, who was on his way home.
As the minor left, he was confronted by Respondent, who appeared upset, accused him of scaring his wife, and asked what the minor was doing at the apartment complex. The minor became afraid and ran off. Respondent pursued him.
The minor ran into an Oil Changers auto shop, where he retreated into the shop's office. Respondent caught up with the minor and put him into a choke hold from behind. The minor screamed for help from the Oil Changers employees. According to the minor, Respondent held him tight enough for him to feel "some pain." The employees intervened and separated the parties.
[13]
As Respondent left, the minor and an employee claimed that Respondent stated, that, if the minor ever came back, Respondent would "kick [his] black ass."
To the police, Respondent denied stating any racial epithets, but acknowledged chasing the minor. He stated that he was upset because his wife was frightened. Respondent claimed that he chased the minor because he felt that his flight from the complex revealed consciousness of guilt of some crime or misrepresentation. Respondent admitted to grabbing the minor by the shoulders, but denied placing him in a choke hold.
The investigating officer examined the minor's neck and saw "no visible injuries" to his throat. The minor refused paramedics and said he was fine.
Pursuant to a June 23, 2004, order of the appellate division, the record was augmented with a declaration of the minor's father, John R. In this undated declaration, Mr. R. states that he was contacted by Respondent's trial attorney on behalf of Respondent to consider a civil compromise. Mr. R.'s declaration then states:
"I have agreed to a civil compromise in this matter if approved by the court so that Mr. Gokcek will pay our family the sum of $4,000, that sum to include any claims due for any civil action and damages to which we may be entitled."
Mr. R. states that he has accepted Respondent's apology and that "I am signing this declaration because Mr. Gokcek has no prior record and because I believe this resolution will benefit our family and society more than a continuation of the criminal proceedings."
Mr. R. further acknowledges that he has received $4,000 by check.
On December 13, 2003, the parties appeared before the trial judge to consider Respondent's motion for a civil compromise. The People opposed the motion. In the People's opposition papers, the sole objection raised to the compromise was that the compromise could not be applied to child victims. At the hearing, the People apparently attempted to argue that the compromise could not apply to child victims who suffered an injury other than an accidental injury.
The court rejected the People's arguments and found that the civil compromise statute was applicable because the charged crime of misdemeanor false
[14]
imprisonment "is not the type of charge that contemplates any kind of physical injury" and that violation of Penal Code sections 236 and 237 is not "something that is covered by these sections."
The court then ruled, "[s]o I am willing to approve the compromise, but I won't dismiss the charge until the defendant does 100 hours of community service and also does 20 hours of anger management counseling." In clarifying the need for Respondent's presence, the court further stated,
The deputy district attorney voiced no further objection to this ruling.
At the close of the proceedings, the court again clarified by stating, "[s]o although I approved the compromise, the charge will still be there, and if he doesn't satisfy me that he has completed it, then we'll press on with the prosecution."
The People appealed the trial court's December 13, 2003 ruling. However, this court rejected the People's appeal as untimely because Respondent had not yet been discharged from the case and the record contained no Penal Code section 1385 minute order dismissing the case and stating the reasons for the dismissal.
Following this court's order, the trial court held a hearing in which it formally dismissed the case and issued a minute order under Penal Code section 1385, stating that the dismissal was based upon the civil compromise.
At this hearing, the trial judge reiterated the reasons why he was accepting the civil compromise and dismissing the case. Specifically, the trial judge stated that he disagreed with the People's argument that the civil compromise could not be used in this case because the victim was a child. Instead, the trial judge concluded that the prohibition against the civil compromise only concerned situations involving crimes against family members:
"Looking at what I believe to be the legislative history that preceded the enactment of those sections, it seems to have been an attempt to cover family relationships to make sure that the people couldn't civilly compromise their way out of beating their own children or they would have undue influence over the victim."
[15]
The trial judge pointed out that Respondent had "absolutely no relationship to the victim" and had "no basis for undue influence over the victim." In addition, the trial judge indicated that he did not "regard this [the crime] as a particularly severe event." In approving the compromise, the trial judge concluded he did not believe the civil compromise statute was meant to be read that broadly and that it was intended "to be limited to situations where there was some sort of relationship between the victim and the defendant."
On appeal, the People repeat the claim originally raised below that the trial court abused its discretion because it was not permitted to allow a civil compromise where the conduct involved injury to a minor. They further argue, for the first time, that a civil compromise is prohibited where the minor suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering.
In addition, for the first time, the People raise a claim regarding the use of a hearsay declaration, instead of a personal appearance by the victim; and Respondent claims that the police report is not properly part of the record and should not be considered in this appeal.
When a crime is only a misdemeanor, and the person injured "has a remedy by a civil action", the offense may be compromised. (Pen.Code, § 1377; see People v. Tischman (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 174, 178 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 650].)
Penal Code sections 1377-1379 govern the rules and procedures for a civil compromise.
Under Penal Code section 1378, the procedure is described. The injured person "appears before the court in which the action is pending at any time before trial", and acknowledges that he or she has received satisfaction for the injury. (Ibid.) The court then "may, in its discretion, on payment of the costs incurred, order all proceedings to be stayed upon the prosecution, and...
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