People v. Gonzales

• Decision Date: 06 March 1969
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 10853
• Citation: 107 Ill.App.2d 44,245 N.E.2d 791
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eliseo GONZALES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 791

245 N.E.2d 791

107 Ill.App.2d 44

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eliseo GONZALES, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 10853.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

March 6, 1969.

Joseph W. Maddox and Richard J. Cadigan, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.

Raymond L. Terrell, Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee; Richard A. Hollis, Apringfield, of counsel.

SMITH, Justice.

A jury found the defendant guilty of murder and he was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than 40 nor more than 70 years. He prosecutes this appeal charging (1) that statements made to police officers were received into evidence without adequate proof that the defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights, (2) that a list of witnesses furnished the defendant five days prior to the trial precluded testimony of such witnesses at the trial, (3) that evidence showing that the defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor was erroneously admitted, (4) that certain items of evidence and exhibits were received into evidence without connecting them with either the crime of the defendant of the deceased, (5) the cross-examination was unduly restricted, and (6) that the court's instruction concerning the degree of proof required for circumstantial evidence was erroneous.

The death of Nellie Wells by means of multiple stab wounds took place in the late evening hours of October 18, 1965, or the early morning hours of the next day. On October 19, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant was issued. The interviews and the statements to which complaint is directed took place in April, 1966. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 84 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.E.2d 694, was decided June 13, 1966. The instant case went to trial on July 12, 1966. Thus, as announced in Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, the format as to in-custody interrogation applies. The trial court suppressed many of the statements which had been reduced to writing, but permitted police officers to testify as to the statements after refreshing their recollection from the reading of the same. The order suppressing the statements was based on the fact that the State had not complied with a previous order of the court to deliver them to the defendant and was not based on Miranda. The trial court specifically held that the defendant had waived his constitutional rights within the meaning of Miranda.

The evidence is clear that the defendant was released from Illinois State Farm at Vandalia, Illinois, on October 18, had a ticket to Chicago, got off in Springfield near noon, checked his duffle bag at the bus station, and spent the afternoon and evening drinking and carousing. He left Springfield that evening with a man whose name he did not know, first heading toward Chicago and ultimately turning around and passing through Springfield and on into Missouri. The driver of this car was headed for San Francisco. At a stop in Missouri, this gentleman drove off and left the defendant. He called the highway partol and they took him down to the bus station in Missouri where he slept on a bench all night and the following morning headed toward San Antonio, Texas. At Joplin, Missouri, he called his father and was in turn informed that he was wanted on a murder charge in Illinois. His father sent him $10.00. He then decided not to go back home and the record is silent from then on until we find him incarcerated in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. While in custody there, he told the sheriff that he 'was wanted for murder in Springfield'. 'They did not know 'til I told them.' As abstracted, the defendant stated, 'I talked to Captain LaBlanc in Baton Rouge freely and voluntarily about what I did in Springfield on October 18, 1965. I told him about meeting three women in Springfield. I did not know at that time I was wanted for murder, but I knew I was wanted for suspicion of murder. I knew this when I called my father while I was in Missouri. I didn't tell my father I was wanted, he already knew--he told me. He told me at this time that I was wanted for murder. I was told before by my mother. I called her'. Two police officers and an assistant State's Attorney went to Baton Rouge to return the prisoner. They first interviewed the prisoner on the evening of April 12. As abstracted, the assistant State's Attorney stated to the defendant, 'At that time, I advised him that he had a right to remain silent and that any statement that he might make could be used against him, and that he had the right to consult with an attorney. He stated that he would like to have an attorney at his trial in Springfield, Illinois. I told him he would have an attorney at his trial in Springfield, Illinois, but the question now was did he want to consult an attorney in Baton Rouge before he talked to us. He replied that he did not want an attorney in Baton Rouge, Louisiana'.

The following morning substantially the same warnings were given to him. The defendant was asked whether or not the conversations could be taped and he responded in substance that they could, but that he would not sign anything.

During the trip back to Illinois, there was a discussion of the penalties for murder. They were explained by Mr. Olshefsky, and by the assistant State's Attorney and the defendant was permitted to read the sections of the statute relating to them. His own testimony indicates that he made the inquiries without response to any interrogation. In fact, he testified on the trial that an inmate in Baton Rouge told him Illinois had abolished the death penalty. Both murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter were explained. He stated that he wanted to see the big boy in Springfield when he got there and that he might plead guilty to a manslaughter charge. Olshefsky told him that he once had a Mexican friend who was good with a knife and asked the defendant if he was good with a knife. Defendant testified, 'I told him I was good, but had never cut anybody before.' Upon reaching Springfield, the assistant State's Attorney was called and stated, 'You wanted to see me, you want to make a deal'. The defendant said, 'That's right, you're the man. I want to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter'. Prior to this conversation, the defendant was advised of his rights. He was advised that 'he had a right to remain silent, had a right to have counsel, that if he were indigent, he had a right to have counsel appointed, and that anything he said could be used against him in a court of record'. The defendant responded by saying that he had already been advised of his rights. The State's Attorney advised him that it would be impossible to reduce the charge unless he had committed a crime. Gonzales then stated that he would rather take a chance on manslaughter than gamble his life on murder. It should be further here observed that Gonzales insisted throughout that he had not cut anyone with a knife and that he did not kill Nellie Wells and did not hurt her in any way. Every police officer testifying testified to just that. The testimony throughout is remarkably free from contradictions, but the usual semantical variations charactersitic of human expression about a single event,. Gonzales testified that he had been mistreated in Baton Rouge, but repeatedly stated that he had had no mistreatment from the police officers in Springfield. He did state that he was afraid, afraid of his record and afraid of his life on a murder charge.

Enroute from Baton Rouge to Springfield, the party stopped at a restaurant for lunch in Memphis, Tennessee. At the back of the restaurant there was a Negro dressed in a white uniform standing near some garbage cans. He asked the defendant, 'What have they got you for?' The defendant replied, 'What do you get for killing a man?' The Negro replied, but his statement was not understood by the officer, and the defendant then replied, 'I didn't do it'. At the same time he said 'I didn't do it' his face broke into a grin and he winked at the Negro. The defendant himself testified to this conversation as follows: 'He asked me why they tagged me like that and I told him they picked me up for suspicion of murder. Mr. Blodgett (Assistant State's Attorney) smiled and I smiled back at him and winked. I winked at Mr. Blodgett. I never told anyone that I killed Nellie Wells or that i had hurt Nellie Wells'. On April 15, they were preparing a lineup. The defendant was shown some articles of clothing at the sheriff's office, the duffle bag and in particular a shoe with the name of Gonzales on it. He denied ever having seen the duffle bag or the shoe. As they were leaving and in response to no question, Gonzales turned to the officers and said, 'I will give you some food for thought. When I get mad I'm like two people. Somethimes I don't know what I'm doing. I may have done this thing and not known it'. The defendant did not recall these remarks.

Miranda does not judicially paralyze an accused's vocal chords nor bar volunteered incriminating statements. It does not still the voice of conscience in a sinful soul seeking expiation. It does not compel a police officer to close his ears to selfincrimination by an accused unless the vocalization is the product of in-custody interrogation absent the Miranda warning. Gonzales' own testimony that he freely and voluntarily told the Baton Rouge officers that he was wanted on 'suspicion' of murder in Springfield negatived any thought that the principles of Miranda were violated in Baton Rouge. He told the Springfield officers and assistant State's Attorney that he did not want a lawyer in Baton Rouge. In Springfield, he was given the Miranda warning before the assistant State's Attorney would talk with him. On the record in this case, the protective cloak of Miranda is unavailing. He waived it in Baton Rouge; he was given it in Springfield; he still talked and made statements...