People v. Gonzales
| Decision Date | 05 June 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 47,47 |
| Citation | 97 N.W.2d 16,356 Mich. 247 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Louis Stolz GONZALES, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Jerome F. O'Rourke, Pros. Atty., Edward P. Joseph, Asst. Pros. Atty., Flint, for appellant.
A. Matthew Buder, Flint, for respondent and appellee.
Paul L. Adams, Atty. Gen., Samuel J. Torina, Sol. Gen., Lansing, for the People.
Before the Entire Bench, except KAVANAGH, J.
This case poses 2 important questions. The first is: May police who stop and automobile on a Michigan highway to issue a traffic ticket also routinely search the automobile under Michigan law? We answer this question in the negative. The second is: Are certain amendments to the Michigan Constitution authorizing admission into evidence of concealed weapons, however seized outside the curtilage of a dwelling house, repugnant to the United States Constitution? Under controlling decisions of the United States supreme court, we answer this question in the negative also.
Defendant Louis Gonzales was a passenger in an automobile driven by one Jose Leal on October 18, 1955, at 4 o'clock in the morning, in the vicinity of Flint, Michigan. The automobile in which defendant was riding was stopped by 2 Michigan State police officers, 1 of whom subsequently testified that their attention had been called to the car by the fact that it had only 1 headlight burning. State Trooper Samonek advised Leal of the defective light and told him a summons would be issued for the violation. The trooper then took Leal back to the State police car and the summons was issued.
Subsequently Trooper Samonek went back to the car and asked the 2 occupants (1 of whom was defendant) to get out of the car so he 'could check it.' Under the circumstances outlined, the police, of course, had no search warrant. Trooper Samonek then saw the butt of a pistol sticking out of the front seat, and picked it up.
Upon being questioned, defendant admitted ownership of the gun and, on a search of defendant's person, the officers found a 38 caliber cartridge in defendant's pocket. Defendant had no permit to carry the weapon.
Trooper Samonek's testimony indicated that 'we always check cars quite thoroughly at that time,' apparently referring to the early hours of the morning. But he also testified pertaining to the issuance of the summons, 'at that moment, we didn't have any further suspicion.'
Defendant was arrested and charged with a felony, carrying a concealed weapon. C.L.1948 and C.L.S.1956, § 28.421 et seq., § 750.227 (). Prior to trial in Genesee county circuit court defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming that the search and seizure of the weapon were unreasonable under the 4th amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the 1936 and 1952 amendments to article 2, § 10, of the Michigan Constitution (1908), authorizing admission of evidence seized in an unconstitutional search, were repugnant to the 4th and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution.
The trial judge granted the motion and the people sought, and were granted, leave to appeal. On original consideration of this case, this Court remanded for furnishing a factual record pertaining to the search. People v. Gonzales, 349 Mich. 572, 84 N.W.2d 753.
This having been certified, leave to appeal was again granted. On resubmission of the case, in view of the serious nature of the questions involved, this Court requested briefs amici curice from the attorney general of the State of Michigan and from the State Bar of Michigan. The 2 questions posed were (1) whether or not the search ans seizure related were 'unreasonable' in a constitutional sense; and (2) if so, whether or not the 1936 and 1952 amendments to article 2, § 10, of the Mcihigan Constitution (1908) were repugnant to the 4th and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution. We acknowledge our debt for excellent briefs from the attorney general and from the civil liberties committee of the Michigan State Bar which have been of material assistance to the Court in resolving the problems concerned.
This case involved originally a misdemeanor for which 2 police officers stopped an automobile and issued the driver a traffic ticket. See C.L.S.1956, § 257.683 [Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. § 9.2383].
We are urged by the brief filed by the civil liberties committee of the Michigan State Bar to hold that the officer's actions in relation to Leal did not constitute an arrest. Failure on the part of the officers to use words of arrest is cited to justify this position.
The distinction, however, does not appear to us to be crucial since the officers saw the traffic violation and plainly had authority to arrest. C.L.S.1956, §§ 257.727, 257.728 (Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. and Stat.Ann.1955 Cum.Supp. §§ 9.2427, 9.2428).
American Jurisprudence defines 'arrest' in these terms:
We prefer to examine this search on the assumption that the officers had made a lawful, if brief, arrest by stopping Leal and holding him until the summons was issued.
This does not, however, answer all our problems. A lawful arrest is not a necessary condition precedent to a lawful search and seizure without warrant. Facts which indicate probable cause to believe a felony is being committed have many times been held to render 'reasonable' within constitutional terms a search and seizure without warrant. People v. Licavoli, 245 Mich. 202, 222 N.W. 102; People v. Miller, 245 Mich. 115, 222 N.W. 151; People v. Orlando, 305 Mich. 686, 9 N.W.2d 893; Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151; C.L.1948, § 764.15 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.874).
On the other hand, the fact of a lawful arrest does not, in our view, automatically render constitutional any contemporaneous search and seizure. The constitutional test is still whether or not under all the circumstances the search is 'unreasonable.'
'In general, the courts have recognized that officers who, as an incident to a lawful arrest, make a reasonable search of the premises of the person arrested for the means or instruments of the crime committed, may seize the instruments or means of committing another crime which that incidental search uncovers; at least that is true where the articles seized were of a contraband nature, the possession of which was illegal per se, or where another crime is discovered being committed in the presence of the officers.' 169 A.L.R. 1419, 1421.
The question of whether or not there was a preceding lawful arrest bears upon the purpose of the search and, of course, in many instances does serve to justify it. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399; People v. Cona, 180 Mich. 641, 147 N.W. 525; People v. Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N.W. 679.
The United States supreme court has stated the applicable principles thus:
'The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted.' Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 5, 70 L.Ed. 145, 148.
Thus, the search of the place where a lawful arrest is made of one committing a crime has been held constitutionally reasonable when the search was designed to reach (1) the fruits of the crime; or (2) the means by which it was committed; or (3) instruments calculated to effect escape from custody. No such purposes appear to have been present in our instant case.
We regard this record as demonstating conclusively that the officers had no reason to suspect any violation of the law other than the traffic offense for which the summons was issued to Leal. Further, we feel the record clearly shows that the officers had no intention of incarcerating Leal or detaining him further. There were no fruits of the traffic offense to search for, nor any need to search for the means by which it had been committed. And since no further detention was contemplated, there was no need to search for weapons or other means of possible escape from custody.
We cannot in the courts look back from that which an unlawful search actually uncovered to justify a constitutional violation. And we must always keep in mind that the constitutional rights of the innocent wither when those same rights are abused as to the guilty.
As of the time this search was commenced, we are unable to ascertain any justification therefor which would not freely allow any officer to search any automobile on Michigan highways in the early morning hours after the issuance of a ticket for any traffic offense.
The attorney general suggests to us that this is exactly what this Court's case law allows. We do not so read it.
He cites in support of his contention People v. Orlando, supra; People v. Miller, supra; People v. Lewis, 269 Mich. 382, 257 N.W. 843; and People v. Davis, 247 Mich. 536, 226 N.W. 337. In the Miller Case, the Court found no probable cause to believe a felony was being committed and held the search unconstitutional. In the Lewis and Orlando Cases, ample evidence of probable cause for the searching officers to believe that a felony was being committed was found. We find no conflict with these cases and our...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Smith
... ... Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, [420 MICH 22] 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). See also 78 A.L.R.2d 246, 250-251 ... The next significant and only other search and seizure standing case is People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 (1959). In Gonzales an automobile was stopped by two police officers after they observed that a headlamp was not burning. The driver was taken back to the scout car by one of the officers for purposes of issuing a citation. Meanwhile, the second officer ordered the ... ...
-
Scholle v. Hare
... ... urban areas in which the average population of the districts was 266,118 (according to the 1950 census figures) to represent 3,193,417 people. Twenty-two senators were elected from districts of average population of 144,470, or slightly more than half as large, to represent fewer people, a ... Local No. 415, 295 Mich. 580, 295 N.W. 320; Town & Country Motors, Inc., v. Local Union No. 328, 355 Mich. 26, 46, 94 N.W.2d 442; People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 ... It is clear to us that the question posed here has been repeatedly presented to the United States ... ...
-
Elkins v. United States
... ... power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches ... See People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16.) ... MINNESOTA ... Pre-Weeks: State v. Strait, 94 Minn. 384, 102 N.W. 913 ... ...
-
People v. Mason, Docket No. 6884
... ... Azukauckas (Supra, footnote 4), the defendant who was merely a guest for a few hours at the homeowner's Saturday evening party, sought to attack the legality of a search. The Court held that the guest lacked standing ... However, in People v. Gonzales (1959), 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16, where the defendant who sought to raise the constitutionality of a search of an automobile was only a passenger, with no apparent financial interest in the car, the Court held that defendant had standing to raise the issue. The Court stated 356 Mich. at 257, 97 ... ...
-
Countermajoritarian hero or zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's role in the criminal procedure revolution.
...to the exclusionary rule to include in the class of nonexcludable items evidence related to drug offenses. See People v. Gonzales, 97 N.W.2d 16, 23-24 (Mich. 1959) (recognizing the validity of a 1952 state constitutional amendment expanding the class of nonexcludable evidence). In 1957, Sou......