People v. Gonzales

Decision Date27 June 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82SA18,82SA18
Citation666 P.2d 123
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leroy C. GONZALES, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Dennis E. Faulk, Dist. Atty., Canon City, Steven B. Rich, Deputy Dist. Atty., Fairplay, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. Gregory Walta, Colorado State Public Defender, Charles F. Kaiser, Deputy State Public Defender, Diana L. DeGette, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

NEIGHBORS, Justice.

The People appeal the district court's order granting judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. 1 We conclude that the ruling was erroneous and disapprove the judgment entered by the trial court. 2

I.

The defendant was charged in the Fremont County District Court with possession of contraband 3 (a homemade knife), and two counts of habitual criminality. 4 The substantive charge arose out of an altercation between the defendant and a fellow inmate which occurred in the Centennial Correctional Facility on May 21, 1981. The prosecution's theory was that the circumstantial evidence established that the defendant was armed with a knife during the incident.

The parties stipulated that the defendant was confined in a detention facility on May 21, 1981. The evidence presented to the jury established that the defendant and Ronald Montgomery, the fellow inmate, were first observed to be arguing by Corrections Officer Richard Yokom who was in the control center of Unit D. He saw the defendant and Montgomery engaged in a "low-key argument" on the upper tier of the pod, near the door to Montgomery's cell. Yokom testified that the discussion terminated and both men walked to the stairs leading to the lower tier of cells. They proceeded "part way down the stairs" when further words were exchanged. Montgomery immediately returned to his cell where he seized a mop handle which he shook at the defendant. The defendant went downstairs to the lower tier, towards cells 5 through 8, which were out of Yokom's sight. The defendant was housed in Cell No. 6. There is a dispute in the testimony as to whether the defendant's cell door might have been open. Corrections Technician Johnny Rodriguez testified to the policy in effect on May 21, 1981. He said that an inmate could request that his cell door be left open for certain periods of time. However, Yokom stated that the defendant's cell door was locked. In any event, the defendant returned to the upper tier where he and Montgomery had been arguing. The defendant and Montgomery then began fighting. Yokom sent Rodriguez to investigate. Rodriguez testified that he saw something "kind of shiny" in the defendant's right hand and that the object "appeared to be a knife." Rodriguez told the defendant and Montgomery to quit fighting but they ignored his order. Rodriguez observed the fight from a distance of ten to twelve feet for a period of possibly six to ten seconds. When the parties refused to stop fighting, Rodriguez yelled at Yokom to "send more help." Yokom heard a knife hit the floor. Yokom testified that the knife fell "two or three, four at the most," feet from the participants during the scuffle. The fight took place in front of cells 3 or 4 but the parties were closer to the railing than to the cells.

After asking Yokom to send reinforcements, Rodriguez went up the stairs to the second tier where he saw a knife on the floor. The knife was three or four feet away from where the participants were fighting. Rodriguez seized the knife and later placed it in the evidence locker. When other corrections officers, armed with guns, appeared on the scene, the defendant and Montgomery quit fighting and were returned to their respective cells.

Neither Rodriguez nor Yokom saw where the knife came from. Rodriguez identified the knife offered into evidence as the one he found, but stated that the object he saw in the defendant's hand "didn't look this big." He further testified that the front part of the knife was "shiny." On cross-examination, Rodriguez admitted making the following statement to the investigator for the attorneys who represented the defendant: "I have to say it was a knife now because that's what I picked up, but I couldn't tell at that time."

Rodriguez testified that the defendant's right hand was wrapped with an Ace bandage. He also stated that he watched the nurse examine the defendant's right hand after the fight and was "absolutely sure" there was no cast on the hand at that time.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the prosecution's evidence. The court found that a prima facie case had been established.

The defendant then called three witnesses to refute the prosecution's evidence. Montgomery, the co-participant in the altercation, testified that the defendant did not have a knife in his possession. Montgomery said the knife was thrown through the tray slot from a cell door in the upper tier, ten to fifteen feet from where he and the defendant were fighting. Montgomery stated that he heard the knife hit the tray slot as it was thrown through a cell door when the "goon squad" (the corrections officers requested by Rodriguez) appeared. When he saw the knife, Montgomery kicked it towards the stairs to prevent the defendant from using it. Montgomery also testified that the defendant had a cast on his right hand.

Robert Lee Romero, a prisoner at the facility, also testified as a defense witness. Romero was an eyewitness to the fight, which occurred in front of his cell. He stated he was three to four feet from the fight. He saw a bandage on the defendant's thumb. Romero said that the knife came from someplace to his left, slid across the floor, and ended up between the defendant and Montgomery. He stated he never saw the defendant in possession of a knife at any time. He testified that Montgomery picked up the knife "and threw it outside the door."

The defense then called Jackie Hendrickson, a nurse-practitioner at the Centennial Correctional Facility. She testified that a week earlier the defendant had suffered a chip fracture of the second joint of his thumb, that a physician's assistant had applied a plaster of paris cast to the defendant's right thumb, and that the cast had been wrapped in an Ace bandage. Ms. Hendrickson testified that the cast and Ace bandage were in place after the fight on May 21, 1981. She gave her opinion that it would be "very, very doubtful" the defendant could grip an object in his right hand. However, she admitted she had not seen the defendant attempt to hold anything with his right hand.

The trial judge entered a judgment of acquittal on his own motion after the defendant completed his evidence and the district attorney informed the court he had no rebuttal evidence. The trial judge made three significant findings of fact and conclusions of law. He found that the case against the defendant was based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. The judge further found that the testimony of Ms. Hendrickson "shows to the court that the defendant could not have grasped a knife with his right hand." He concluded that "there is no evidence in the record from which a jury can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstances are such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."

The People then filed this appeal.

II.

The threshold inquiry is whether this appeal by the district attorney, filed pursuant to section 16-12-102, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), involves issues appropriate for review by this court. The issue of sufficiency of the evidence involves a question of law, and, as such, the district attorney is granted the statutory authority to appeal. People v. Kirkland, 174 Colo. 362, 483 P.2d 1349 (1971). The purpose of appellate review in cases filed by the prosecutor involving sufficiency of the evidence is twofold: "(1) to settle the controversy, and (2) to provide explanation of and to give clarity to questions of law by means of published opinions." People v. Kirkland, 174 Colo. at 364, 483 P.2d 1349. Both prongs of the Kirkland test are met here. The trial court clearly applied an erroneous legal standard in granting the judgment of acquittal. In addition, there is a substantial question involving the sufficiency of the evidence created by the trial judge's ruling denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the prosecution's evidence and then granting judgment of acquittal on his own motion after the defendant presented his evidence. Accordingly, we elect to address the merits of this case.

III.

The trial court erroneously applied the test set forth in People v. Naranjo, 181 Colo. 273, 509 P.2d 1235 (1973), when it granted judgment of acquittal. In Naranjo, this court adhered to the test enunciated in Mathis v. People, 167 Colo. 504, 448 P.2d 633 (1968). We held in Mathis that where the guilt of the defendant is established by circumstantial evidence, the test to be used in considering motions for judgment of acquittal is whether there is evidence in the record from which a jury can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstances are such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

The "reasonable hypothesis of innocence" test was abandoned nearly ten years ago in favor of a more appropriate standard in People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973). In Bennett we held that in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court

"must determine whether the evidence before the jury is sufficient in both quantity and quality to submit the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence to the jury.

....

"The issue before the trial judge is whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that ...

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