People v. Goodwin
| Decision Date | 18 October 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. A049053,A049053 |
| Citation | 235 Cal.App.3d 342,286 Cal.Rptr. 564 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 235 Cal.App.3d 342 235 Cal.App.3d 342 PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald Wayne GOODWIN, Defendant and Appellant. |
Kyle Gee (under appointment of Court of Appeal, First District Appellate Project), Oakland, for defendant and appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald E. Niver, Supv. Deputy Atty. Gen., Bruce Ortega, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.
Ronald Wayne Goodwin was convicted of first degree murder (Pen.Code, § 187) and residential burglary (Pen.Code, § 459). The jury also found true the allegation that he personally used a firearm with respect to both crimes (Pen.Code, § 12022.5) and the special circumstance allegation that he committed the murder while engaged in the commission of, or in immediate flight after having committed, first degree burglary. (Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Appellant was sentenced to the upper term of six-years on the burglary conviction and a consecutive term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole on the murder conviction. The court added a consecutive two-year term for each personal use of a firearm enhancement, but stayed the enhancement on the murder conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a series of statements he made to the police.
On October 6, 1987, at approximately 4 a.m., Rita Morelli, the victim's wife, was in bed when she heard her husband, who was in the kitchen, say, "What do you want?" She then heard a shot and a thud. Her husband was killed by a single gunshot to the head, fired at short range. The police found a small flashlight, some coins, Mrs. Morelli's purse, and Mr. Morelli's pants in the garage. They also found, in the driveway and along the street, a garage door opener, some more coins, and some pantyhose. These items, along with two wristwatches, a set of cufflinks, and a large amount of money Mr. Morelli kept in his pants, had been taken from the Morellis' residence. The police also found a pair of footprints in the garage made by "Pro Wings"-style tennis shoes.
Appellant was arrested on another offense the morning of October 7, 1987. The arresting officer noticed that appellant was wearing Pro Wings tennis shoes and turned them over to the sergeant investigating the homicide. That sergeant then took appellant into an interrogation room and informed appellant that he was under arrest for robbery and auto theft. Appellant was fully advised of, and waived, his Miranda rights.
The interrogation initially focused on the robbery. After a break, the sergeant asked appellant about a gun that had been found in his car. Then, without disclosing where it had been found, the sergeant asked appellant about the small white flashlight that had been found at the Morelli residence. Appellant initially responded that he did not remember having a flashlight like that. He then said,
The sergeant then informed appellant that he was investigating a shooting and a burglary that had occurred the prior day and asked what appellant could tell him about it. Appellant said he knew nothing about it. The sergeant then told appellant that an expert had identified the footprints in the garage as matching appellant's shoes. Appellant said, "I don't see how they could be mine."
The sergeant then asked whether the gun that had been found in appellant's car was the gun that shot Mr. Morelli. First, appellant said "he didn't know what I was talking about." Then, he turned his head to the wall and said,
The sergeant told appellant that if he wanted an attorney that was Specifically, he told appellant,
After a three or four minute silence, the sergeant asked, "if the gun in the car was going to be the gun." With tears in his eyes, appellant nodded yes three times and then proceeded to make The sergeant asked if appellant would make a recorded statement to the district attorney and appellant agreed.
While waiting for the district attorney, appellant continued to provide details about the burglary and homicide. The sergeant asked appellant "what he meant when he said he wanted to talk to an attorney." He asked whether appellant "actually had wanted to consult with a lawyer or did he say that just because he knew he had done the shooting and wanted to go to jail and get away from talking about it." According to the sergeant, appellant replied that
When the district attorney arrived, appellant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights a second time. He then gave a detailed recorded statement in which he admitted the burglary and that he shot Mr. Morelli while trying to escape, but continued to describe the shooting as accidental. The next evening, while still in custody, appellant, after being re-Mirandized, gave another long statement along the same lines as the first recorded statement.
Although appellant did not testify at the trial of the felony-murder charge, all of his statements were admitted. In addition, the People presented expert testimony that the footprints in the garage matched appellant's. They also offered evidence that cufflinks belonging to Mr. Morelli were found in a hotel room near the Morelli residence registered under the name Ron Goodwin. The People further offered evidence that a gun was found in a search of a car that Goodwin admitted belonged to him. An expert testified that this gun was the murder weapon.
In the trial on the special circumstance allegation appellant testified, in accordance with his statements to the police, that the shooting was accidental. The People did not offer any new evidence and instead relied primarily on appellant's own description of the shooting to establish that the killing was intentional.
Appellant contends that his statements to the police should have been suppressed because: (1) his statement, "I don't want to talk anymore," was an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent which the police ignored (see Michigan v. Mosely (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313); (2) his statement, "I think I should call an attorney," was an unequivocal assertion of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel (see, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378; Minnick v. Mississippi (1990) 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489; McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158); and (3) his statements were involuntary because he had been "threatened" with the "gas-chamber" and impliedly promised leniency if he confessed to the shooting and described it as accidental (see, e.g., People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857).
The dispositive question in this case is whether appellant invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. If he did, none of his subsequent statements to the police should have been admitted. (See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, 101 S.Ct. at pp. 1884-1885; Minnick v. Mississippi, supra, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489; McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158.)
The United States Supreme Court recently explained the absolute bar on police-initiated interrogation absent the presence of counsel, once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is invoked, as follows: ...
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