People v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 May 1966
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 721,721,3
• Citation: 3 Mich.App. 242,142 N.W.2d 54
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellant. Cal
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 54

142 N.W.2d 54

3 Mich.App. 242

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellant.

Cal. No. 721.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

May 11, 1966.

Rex P. O'Connor, Ionia, for appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Walter M. Marks, Pros. Atty., Ionia County, Ionia, for appellee.

Before WATTS, P.J., and FITZGERALD and HOLBROOK, JJ.

HOLBROOK, Judge.

On July 21, 1964, in the justice court for the city of Ionia, defendant railroad was charged with unlawfully erecting two 'right of way' signs on public highway property at the intersection of its main line track with Plain Street in the village of Muir, Ionia County, Michigan, and convicted on July 29, 1964, by said court without a jury; a jury trial having been waived. Defendant appealed to the circuit court and after trial de novo before the Honorable Leo B. Bebeau, circuit judge, a jury trial having been waived, by opinion dated September 17, 1964, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine and costs. From this sentence, defendant has appealed.

This appeal presents but one question for this Court to review, to-wit: Does Sec. 615 of P.A.1949, No. 300 as amended by P.A.1958, No. 98, prohibit a railroad from erecting traffic control 'yield right of way' signs on highway property approaching an intersection with its railroad tracks?

The parties have stipulated to an agreed statement of fact. The pertinent facts are as follows:

In July, 1964, defendant, through its track forces, erected two 'yield right of way' signs at the intersection of its main line track with the Plain Street crossing in the village of Muir in Ionia County. They were erected because railroad officials believed that the crossing's physical characteristics perhaps required some sign more forcefully remindful of the motorist's obligation to yield the right of way to an approaching train than the standard crossarms sign erected pursuant to CL 1948, § 469.5 (Stat Ann § 22.765). A sharp curve exists on Plain Street just south of the railroad crossing, and there is a moderate incline approaching the railroad tracks from that point. The Plain Street crossing has a low-volume of both rail and highway traffic. The signs erected were of a type used and approved by the state highway commissioner. The signs were erected by defendant without authorization by any public body or official.

The provision of the statute that defendant was convicted of violating is Sec. 615, P.A.1949, No. 300, as amended by P.A.1958, No. 98 (C.L.S.1961, § 257.615 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 9.2315)), and the pertinent part of said act with the additions placed therein by the legislature in 1958 printed in italics, is as follows:

'Sec. 615. (a). [ADDED: Except with authority of a statute or of a duly authorized public body or official,] no person shall place, maintain, or display along any highway [ADDED: or upon any structure in or over any highway ]any sign, signal, marking, device, blinking, oscillating or rotating light or lights, decoration or banner which [ADDED: is or] purports to be or is in imitation of or resembles or which can be mistaken [ADDED: for a] traffic control device or railroad sign or signal, or which attempts to direct the movement of traffic, or which hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any traffic control device or any railroad sign or signal, and no person shall place or maintain nor shall any public authority permit upon any highway any traffic sign or signal bearing thereon any commercial advertising.'

The facts disclose that defendant erected the signs in question without authorization by any public body or official. Unless a statute permits defendant railroad company to erect traffic control signs, it would appear that the acts of the defendant were contrary to such law. Defendant has not cited any such statute and we have been unable to find one.

It is a common principle of statutory interpretation that a statute and all its amendments are to be treated as one and every part given effect in determining legislative intent. Smith v. City Commissioner of Grand Rapids (1937), 281 Mich. 235, 274 N.W. 776; People v. Babcock (1955), 343 Mich. 671, 73 N.W.2d 521.

The intent of the legislature in amending Sec. 615 of the Michigan Vehicle Code as stated is clarified when we consider that the same amendatory act, P.A.1958, No. 98, also changed Sec. 47 of the Michigan Vehicle Code. Said Sec. 47 as it is now worded with the added portions in italics and the words deleted stricken through, is as follows:

"Railroad sign or signal' means any sign, signal, or device erected by authority of a [ADDED: statute or] public body or official [DELETED: or a railroad] and intended to give notice of the presence of railroad tracks [ADDED: or structures] or the approach of a railroad train.'

It is evident from the changes made by the 1958 amendment that the legislature meant to restrict official railroad signs or signals to such as are erected by authority of a statute, public body or official, and no longer permits the same to be authorized by a railroad.

Defendant denies it is a person under the terms of said act. Sec. 40 defines 'person' as follows:

"Person' means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation and their legal successors.'

The defendant is a corporation and is clearly within the definition of person as contained in said act.

The wisdom of the legislature in forbidding private individuals, including railroads, to determine the proper signs to be erected on the public highways of our State is well illustrated in the case and so...