People v. Grandahl

• Decision Date: 27 February 1969
• Docket Number: No. 1,Docket No. 2862,1
• Citation: 167 N.W.2d 802,16 Mich. App. 221
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry GRANDAHL, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 802

167 N.W.2d 802

16 Mich.App. 221

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Harry GRANDAHL, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 2862.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

Feb. 27, 1969.

Released for Publication May 29, 1969.

Kenneth A. Webb, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol.Gen., Lansing, William L. Cahalan, Pros.Atty., Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Arthur N. Bishop, Asst. Pros.Atty., Wayne County, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LEVIN, P.J., and HOLBROOK and ROOD, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals his conviction by a jury of the crime of buying, receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen property.M.C.L.A. § 750.535(Stat.Ann.1969 Cum.Supp. § 28.803).

There was testimony that the defendant was aware that property in his possession was stolen property.He points out, however that there was no direct evidence showing he was aware of the fact the property was stolen at the time it came into his possession and that an accused person may not be convicted of the charged offense unless it has been established that he knew the property was stolen property at the time it came into his possession.

It is, of course, true that a jury may not infer from the mere fact that the accused person is in possession of stolen property that he knew it was stolen at the time he came into possession of the property.Durant v. People(1865), 13 Mich. 351;People v. Smith(1926), 234 Mich. 503, 208 N.W. 674.However, here the people showed more than mere possession.There was testimony that at a time after the defendant came into possession of the stolen goods prior to his arrest he was aware of the fact that they were stolen.The jury could reasonably infer from the testimony that the defendant was aware of the fact he was in possession of stolen goods, that he was also aware of that fact at the time he came into their possession.

The jury brought in a verdict of 'guilty as charged' and after inquiry from the court clerk as to whether that meant guilty of receiving and concealing stolen property the foreman and the other members of the jury responded, 'Yes.'

The defendant asserts that he was charged with 3 separate offenses, I.e., (1) buying, (2) receiving, and (3) aiding in the concealment of stolen property, and invokes the principle stated in People v. Aiken(1887), 66 Mich. 460, 469, 33 N.W. 821, where the Michigan Supreme Court declared that a general verdict of guilty was defective where the information was duplicitous and the jury had not been instructed that they might acquit the defendant upon the 'second and third (counts) and find him guilty upon the fourth, or vice versa.'The Aiken Court reasoned, 'it may be possible that a portion of the jury based their verdict upon the second and third counts exclusively and another portion upon the fourth alone.There can be no safety in such a practice as this.'

In Aiken the several counts charged separate offenses under different statutory provisions.In the present casethe defendant was charged in a one- count information with violation of but one statutory provision, Viz.:

'(No) person * * * shall * * * buy, receive or aid in the concealment, of any stolen, embezzled or converted money, goods or property knowing the same to have been stolen, embezzled or converted.'M.C.L.A. § 750.535(Stat.Ann.1969 Cum.Supp. § 28.803).

The trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it might acquit the defendant of buying or receiving stolen property and yet convict him of aiding in the concealment of stolen property, or vice versa, and the receipt of the general verdict in the manner described was not error.

The defendant was sentenced to a term of not less than 3 1/2 and not more than 5 years.He claims he spent 2 1/2 months in the Wayne county jail awaiting trial and that the trial judge failed to give him credit against the sentence on that account as required by the following statutory provision:

'Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the...