People v. Grant

• Decision Date: 15 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. F011666,F011666
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Roland James GRANT, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 587

266 Cal.Rptr. 587

217 Cal.App.3d 1451

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Roland James GRANT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. F011666.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Feb. 15, 1990.

Review Denied May 23, 1990.

Jeanne Keevan-Lynch, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Jane N. Kirkland and Janine R. Busch, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

BEST, Acting Presiding Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to a plea bargain which included a 10-year lid on the trial court's sentencing power, defendant entered a nolo contendere plea to transportation of cocaine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352) and possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351) and admitted attendant enhancement allegations that the quantity of cocaine exceeded 10 pounds within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.4, subdivision (a)(2), and that the cocaine in defendant's possession exceeded 57 grams within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.073, subdivision (b)(1).

Defendant was sentenced to state prison for four years for transportation of cocaine plus five years, consecutive, for the special allegation for a total term of nine years. He was sentenced to state prison for three years on the possession charge plus five years for the special allegation, execution of sentence stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.

On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, contending the discovery of the cocaine resulted from an unlawful detention. We affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The operative facts, taken from the transcript of the de novo hearing on the motion to suppress, are generally without dispute. Defendant did not testify at the hearing.

On June 21, 1988, California Highway Patrol Officer Rubin Soliz was patrolling Interstate 5 in Kern County. At approximately 10 p.m., Officer Soliz observed a white Ford Taurus and a brown Ford pickup traveling in excess of the speed limit. Soliz advised the driver of the Taurus, through a loudspeaker, to pull in behind while he stopped the pickup. He then pulled behind the pickup and activated the red light. The pickup pulled over, but the Taurus drove past the officer. Soliz then advised the pickup to pull in behind, and activated his red light to stop the Taurus. He suspected the Taurus was trying to evade him, but succeeded in stopping the vehicle on the shoulder of the roadway.

Officer Soliz explained the reason for the stop to the driver of the Taurus, then requested his driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. The driver said that he had lost his license and had no other identification. The driver was asked to get out of the car so that he could identify himself outside the hearing range of defendant, who was a passenger in the vehicle. The driver said his name was Edward Shawn Henderson. Officer Soliz then asked defendant to identify the driver. He gave the name "Henderson."

Officer Soliz then left for the purpose of issuing a citation to the driver of the pickup. Defendant remained in the Taurus while the driver stood near the patrol car. Soliz did not tell defendant to wait while he wrote up the violation on the pickup.

After 10 to 15 minutes, Soliz returned to the Taurus. He asked defendant his name, and then asked if he had any identification. Defendant identified himself as Roland Green and said he did not have a driver's license. Defendant was not suspected of any criminal activity at that time. Officer Soliz testified that he questioned defendant to find out if he was licensed so the car could be released to him after the driver was cited. Consistent with California Highway Patrol policy, Soliz did not want to arrest the driver for operating the vehicle without a license. Soliz also needed to identify defendant as a possible witness in any court proceeding.

After defendant stated he had no identification, Officer Soliz asked him to get out of the car and join the driver near the patrol car. Officer Soliz testified that being alone, in a rural area, for personal safety he wanted to keep the driver and passenger together. As defendant got out of the vehicle, Soliz asked who owned the Taurus. He wondered whether the vehicle was stolen. Defendant told him it was owned by his aunt.

Officer Soliz returned to his patrol vehicle and ran the name and date of birth of the driver through communications. He was advised there was no driver's license issued under the name Edward Shawn Henderson. At this point, the officer began to suspect that the two had lied about the driver's identity.

In Officer Soliz's experience, many people hide their identification and give a false name when pulled over for a traffic violation. Soliz, still the only officer present, explained this to defendant, asking in a calm voice if he could search the automobile for some type of identification. Defendant said, "Yeah. Sure."

In searching the vehicle, Soliz found several pagers, a mobile telephone, and a rental agreement for the Taurus which was not in the name of Henderson or Green. Soliz believed these articles to be consistent with drug trafficking. He then asked if he could search the trunk to look for identification. Defendant said he did not have a key for the trunk. Soliz asked if it was all right to look in the trunk if he could find a way to get inside and defendant again said, "Yeah, sure." Around this time two other officers arrived. The back seat of the Taurus was removed to reveal five packages believed to contain drugs bundled for transportation. One of the packages was opened to reveal a white powder. The packages were seized and defendant and the driver were arrested.

DISCUSSION

WAS DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY DETAINED AT THE TIME HE CONSENTED TO A SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE?

Specifically not contesting the vehicle stop and, if the consent to search was valid, the subsequent search of the vehicle, defendant's sole contention on appeal is that consent to search the vehicle was the product of an unlawful seizure of his person. Because the searching officer had already acted illegally, he argues, the consent was invalid. Defendant draws a narrow bead on the issue: "The essential question is whether the consent to search that enabled the development of the probable cause was obtained during an illegal seizure of appellant's person.... Specifically, the seizure became unreasonable to appellant when Officer Soliz asked appellant to produce identification."

An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 is governed by well-settled principles.

"In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated....

The court's resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, viz., the reasonableness of the challenged police conduct, is also subject to independent review. [Citations.] The reason is plain: 'it is "the ultimate responsibility of the appellate court to measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness." ' (People v. Loewen, supra, [ (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117] at p. 123 [196 Cal.Rptr. 846, 672 P.2d 436].)" (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.)

Here, inasmuch as the evidence relating to the search and seizure is essentially undisputed, our task is limited to an independent review of the second and third steps.

Reviewing the court's denial of the motion to suppress under the foregoing principles, we find it was reasonable to request identification from a passenger in connection with a lawful traffic stop under the circumstances. Accordingly, the ruling must be upheld.

Defendant challenged the search of the car trunk on various grounds at the trial level. The court issued a written ruling which provides in part as follows:

"The motion to suppress is denied. Defendant concedes there was probable cause to stop the car and detain or even arrest the driver. It was not unreasonable for defendant to be asked for identification, and when no driver's licenses or vehicle registration was forthcoming from either occupant to request permission to search the vehicle for evidence of licensing or registration. The defendant had a simple remedy: he could have refused permission. Certainly there was no probable cause to search the car before the consent. The defendant was certainly detained in the sense that he was asked to exit the vehicle, but a brief removal of defendant for officer safety is not unconstitutional. Thereafter, he could leave, but would have been unable to leave with the auto, absent proof of licensing."

The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution forbid unreasonable searches and seizures. Stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of these amendments. (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660.) A passenger may challenge an unlawful stop because personal liberty and freedom of travel are intruded upon by such an act. (People v. Lionberger (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4-5, 230 Cal.Rptr. 358.)

If we understand defendant's position, he claims the request for identification was in excess of reasonable law...