People v. Graves

• Decision Date: 17 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-2617,83-2617
• Citation: 89 Ill.Dec. 399,134 Ill.App.3d 473,480 N.E.2d 1142
• Parties: , 89 Ill.Dec. 399 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James GRAVES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1142

480 N.E.2d 1142

134 Ill.App.3d 473, 89 Ill.Dec. 399

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James GRAVES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 83-2617.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, First Division.

Dec. 17, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 7, 1985.

Deputy State Appellate Defender, Alan Raphael, for defendant-appellant.

Theodore Gailman, Asst. State's Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

CAMPBELL, Justice:

Following a jury trial, defendant, James Graves, was found guilty and concurrently sentenced to twenty-two years imprisonment for armed robbery, twenty-two years for home invasion, ten years for residential burglary, four years for aggravated battery, and three years for unlawful restraint. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, pars. 18-2, 19-3, 12-11, 12-4, 10-3.)

The following issues are raised on appeal: (1) whether the court erred in allowing defendant to exercise his Constitutional right to pro se representation; (2) whether the court erred in allowing defendant to continue his pro se representation without court intervention (3) whether the prosecutor's statements during closing argument were proper.

The record discloses that on August 16, 1983, defendant, represented by an assistant public defender, appeared at a pretrial hearing for two separate indictments. At this hearing, defendant demanded trial on both pending indictments and announced his desire to proceed to trial without representation by counsel. The court declined to rule on either matter requested by defendant and transferred both cases to the second district to be heard on September 21, 1983. On that date, defendant was again represented by an assistant public defender. During this hearing, defendant repeated his demand for immediate trial and the right to conduct his own defense. The assistant public defender told the court that pretrial discovery was incomplete, that his office was not prepared to go to trial at that time, and that his office would prefer to withdraw as counsel in light of defendant's stated positions. The court then advised defendant of his right to counsel and informed him of the nature of the charges against him with the possible sentences. An inquiry into defendant's background by the court showed: that defendant was 33 years old, that defendant graduated from high school in Chicago, Illinois, that defendant had worked for some 20-30 companies as a truck driver for about ten years, that defendant had worked "off and on" for locals 63 and 136 as an ironworker since defendant was 18 years old, that defendant went to the New York School of Locksmith where he took a course in safe manipulation and penetration, and that defendant worked as a locksmith on a part-time basis. Defendant also stated to the court that he "defended himself in a previous misdemeanor case and won", that the pending charges against him were "frivolous", that he realized "the charges and consequences if found guilty", and that he wanted an immediate trial to prevent from being "in jail for who knows how long." After this inquiry, the court found a valid waiver of counsel and the public defender was allowed to withdraw. The State was instructed to provide defendant with photocopies of all relevant materials in their possession, and the court made a public defender available throughout the proceedings to assist defendant in presenting his case. The court gave defendant the option of having either the public defender sit in the courtroom or sit at the table with defendant. The court also explained the procedures for jury selection and a side bar conference to defendant.

The trial commenced on September 27, 1983, and defendant made his opening statement to the jury. In the course of the trial, defendant experienced some difficulty in the cross-examination of complainant and requested the court to allow the public defender to take over the representation of defendant. The court instructed the public defender to represent defendant. However, defendant indicated to the court that he wanted to resume his pro se representation before the public defender began to continue cross-examination of complainant.

On September 28, 1983, defendant asked the court that he be allowed the active participation of the public defender as co-counsel. This request was denied and defendant elected to proceed with representation by the public defender. The public defender conducted the cross-examination of the State's final witness, and the direct examination of the two witnesses presented by the defense.

During trial, defendant testified that he was present in complainant's apartment on the night of the incident, but that he had been attacked by complainant's homosexual friend named "John" and complainant. Defendant claimed complainant's injuries were caused by "John". Defendant further stated that complainant and "John" fought because complainant insisted "John" stop molesting defendant. Complainant testified that it was defendant who robbed and beat him. Complainant and the investigating officers testified that no third party nor anyone named "John" was present. Also, complainant claimed that he did not invite defendant into his apartment and that he had never seen defendant before defendant grabbed him from behind at the bottom of the stairs leading to complainant's apartment.

On September 28, 1983, closing arguments were made and the State moved to nolle pros the armed violence count. The jury acquitted defendant in the attempted murder count, but convicted him on the remaining counts. After defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, this appeal followed.

The first issue presented is whether the court erred in allowing defendant to conduct his own defense. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides for the right to pro se representation in criminal proceedings. (People v. Silagy (1984), 101 Ill.2d 147, 77 Ill.Dec. 792, 461 N.E.2d 415.) To exercise this right, a defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive the benefits of his right to representation by counsel. (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; People v. Kavinsky (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 784, 47 Ill.Dec. 90, 414 N.E.2d 1206.) Whether there has been a waiver of the right to counsel is a matter to be determined by the trial court, and that decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. (Glasser v. U.S. (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; People v. AMFT (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 619, 65 Ill.Dec. 69, 440 N.E.2d 924.) A careful inquiry must be made to determine defendant's ability to conduct his own defense, focusing on his age, level of education, mental capacity, and prior experience with legal proceedings. (People v. Kavinsky (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 784, 47 Ill.Dec. 90, 414 N.E.2d 1206.) Before one can understandably waive assistance of counsel, the trial court must give him admonitions specified by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a). (People v. O'Neal (1978), 62 Ill.App.3d 146, 19 Ill.Dec. 497, 379 N.E.2d 12.) The court may not permit waiver of counsel unless it is determined that defendant understands the nature of the charge(s), the maximum and minimum penalties prescribed by law, and the right to appointed counsel if indigent. Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110A, par 401(a); People v. Heidelberg (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 574, 338 N.E.2d 56.

Defendant contends that the court conducted only a limited inquiry into defendant's educational background and work experience, and that no inquiry was made regarding defendant's understanding of the admonitions against him as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a). Defendant further argues that his demand for immediate trial should have cast serious doubt upon his ability to prepare and conduct an effective defense. Defendant cites People v. Vanderwerff (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 44, 14 Ill.Dec. 735, 372 N.E.2d 1014, to support his contention. Although the defendant had received the Rule 401(a) admonitions in Vanderwerff, the appellate court reversed a battery conviction because of a failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry into defendant's understanding of the admonitions and competency to defend himself.

In the instant case, before allowing the pro se representation, the trial court considered defendant's age, level of education, mental capacity, employment record, and prior experience with legal proceedings in determining whether defendant was capable of conducting his own defense. The court also explained the advantages of being represented by counsel and the disadvantages of representing oneself. It appears from the record that the trial court sufficiently conducted an inquiry into defendant's ability to conduct his own defense and properly admonished defendant under the requirements of Rule 401(a). People v. O'Neal (1978), 62 Ill.App.3d 146, 19 Ill.Dec. 497, 379 N.E.2d 12.

Defendant next contends that the court erred in allowing defendant to continue his pro se defense without court intervention. Defendant argues that the court was required to terminate his pro se representation when it became apparent that defendant was unable to present an adequate defense. Defendant cites People v. Burson (1957), 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239, and People v. Allen (1967), 37 Ill.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1, to support this contention. In Burson, the issue was whether the court should have held a sanity hearing when defendant's courtroom outbursts and disruptive conduct hindered the rational disposition of his case. In Allen, the pro se defendant's rude, boisterous, and disrespectful behavior necessitated his removal from the courtroom. The Illinois Supreme court held that by such conduct, defendant waived any Constitutional rights to be present at trial, confront the witnesses against him, and conduct his own defense. Both Burson and Allen can be distinguished on the facts.

A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own...